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The development and evolution of the eastern Bering Sea fishery for walleye 
pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) is retraced, its current economic and 
institutional structure is modeled, and the resiliency of that structure to 
substantive changes in pollock biomass and fuel costs is explored. Small 
variations in exvessel prices, total allowable catches, or allocation of catches 
between seasons and among industry sectors can lead to large changes to first 
wholesale revenues. Similarly, changes in fuel prices, changes in technology, 
changes in regulation, and changes in the spatial distribution of catches can lead 
to changes in harvesting or processing costs. Together, these changes affect the 
relative profitability of the inshore and offshore sectors, which can, in turn, affect 
the benefits that accrue to communities, the evolution of regulation, and create 
pressure to reallocate sector shares. The model indicates that first wholesale 
revenues are maximized when pollock harvests are maximized. However, legal 
barriers to the transfer of allocations between sectors can lead to under-harvests 
when product prices are low, fuel costs are high, or when the most productive 
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The Eastern Bering Sea (EBS) fishery for walleye pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) 
yields gross exvessel revenues of over $300 million and a first wholesale value of over 
$1.2 billion. The annual total allowable catch (TAC) has ranged from 813,000 mt to 
1,494,900 mt over the last 30 years, making it the largest fishery by volume in the United 
States. During the 1960s and 1970s, Alaska pollock was harvested by foreign fleets 
composed primarily of Japanese and Russian vessels, who then processed the groundfish 
into surimi, a fish-based protein paste. The passage of the Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act (FCMA) in 1976 pushed the “Americanization” of the fishery, 
progressively increasing the number of U.S. harvesters and processors through the 1980s 
and 1990s. While certain domestic processors invested in fillet technology, surimi 
production remained the primary flesh product primarily due to the race-for-fish that 
ensued from the rapid build-up in harvesting and processing capacity. Under the race-for- 
fish, it was not advantageous for processors to focus on the more time intensive fillet 
product; instead, the focus remained on the higher throughput surimi, causing processors 
to maximize their allocation of the harvests rather than maximizing the per-unit value of 
their catches. It wasn’t until the passage of the American Fisheries Act (AFA) in 1998 
that fishermen from various sectors of that the fishery were permitted to form harvesting 
cooperatives, in which privately negotiated contracts provided each vessel a guaranteed 
portion of the TAC. The catcher processor sector, consisting of factory trawlers which 
harvest and process fish at-sea and catcher vessels that delivered to them, formed 
cooperatives in 1999. In 2000, the shoreside sector, composed of harvesting only 
catcher/vessels that and the shoreside processors they delivered to, as well as the 
mothership sector, composed of harvesting only catcher/vessels that and the at-sea 
processors they delivered to also formed cooperatives. At the same time, the Western 
Alaska Community Development Quota (CDQ) program realized immense benefits from 
the AFA. The six CDQ entities represent 65 western Alaska communities and are tasked 
with providing opportunities for community residents to benefit from wealth associated
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with exploitation of marine resources available near their communities. Ten-percent of 
the pollock TAC is allocated to these groups, who then lease their quota to AFA-qualified 
fishing vessels operating in the at-sea and shoreside sectors.
Under the AFA, pollock harvesters and processors have enjoyed increased stability 
and revenues. Processors and catcher processors have been able to look beyond simply 
processing the largest amount of fish before the end of the fishing season and instead 
focus on maximizing revenues through increased capital expenditures into technology, 
expanded global markets, and optimized product mix. As a result, the fishery has 
experienced an unparalleled period of stability under which fishermen, processors, and 
CDQ groups have benefitted.
Recently, the pollock fishery has had to deal with stressors including regulations 
intended to reduce Pacific salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.) bycatch, regulations intended to 
prevent jeopardy to Steller sea lions (Eumetopiasjubatus) or adverse modification of 
their habitat, elevated fuel costs, and northwestward shifts in the center of abundance of 
pollock. These stressors affect the absolute and relative profitability of the inshore and at- 
sea sectors and the benefits that accrue to Western Alaskans through the CDQ 
allocations. Although the stressors have impacted all sectors, the inshore sector has been 
disproportionately impacted. During the 2007 B-season, a combination of low product 
prices and high fuel prices led the inshore sector to leave over 10% of its allocation 
unharvested. Under the AFA, this fish could not be transferred or leased outside the 
inshore sector, thereby depriving the inshore cooperative of potential lease revenues and 
depriving other sectors and CDQ groups of the opportunity to profit from harvesting the 
balance of the inshore allocation.
Chapter 1 details the development and history of the eastern Bering Sea pollock 
fishery. This young fishery has rapidly evolved since foreign fleets pioneered it in the 
1960s. Extension of U.S. jurisdiction under the Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act of 1976 provided opportunity and authority to “Americanize” the fishery. As the 
number of U.S.-flagged fishing vessels and catcher-processors increased in the late 1980s 
and 1990s, fishing capacity outstripped the total allowable catch. The resulting race-for-
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fish led to compressed seasons and to competition between the inshore and at-sea sectors. 
The competition played out in a race to maximize catch-per-day on the fishing grounds 
and to lobbying the North Pacific Fishery Management Council and Congress for 
favorable sector allocations and contesting unfavorable allocations in court.
Passage of the American Fisheries Act of 1998 (AFA) ended the between sector 
allocation battle and provided each sector with the authority to enter into voluntary 
agreements to share the sector allocation. These changes in the governance of the fishery 
allow the sectors to switch from maximizing catch rates to maximizing the per-unit net 
revenue of their catches. Chapter 1 examines the fishermen, processors, and issues that 
provided the impetus for the development, management, and evolution of the pollock 
fishery from past to present and its implications on the future of the fishery.
Chapter 2 documents the specification, estimation, validation, and implications of a 
simultaneous-equation equilibrium supply-demand model of international walleye 
pollock. The model is used to examine the effects of variability in landings and changes 
in pollock fillet, surimi, and roe production, on first wholesale prices and revenues to the 
inshore and at-sea sectors. The market for U.S. pollock products has evolved significantly 
since the early 1990s when processors focused on selling roe and surimi to Japan. The 
formation of harvesting cooperatives created the opportunity to expand the range of 
products and to enter new markets. Chapter 2 characterizes current market structure and 
explores the effect of variation in product prices and production costs on the mix of 
product forms and first wholesale revenues for the fishery as a whole and for each sector 
and for the CDQs.
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CHAPTER 1: An Historical Analysis of the Bering Sea Pollock Fishery1 
Introduction
Theragra chalcogramma, also known as Alaska or walleye pollock, is a species of 
fish found in the Pacific Ocean from the Sea of Okhotsk in Russia to the shores of 
Washington in the United States. Pollock is considered both a whitefish, based on the 
white-to-grayish color of its flesh, and a groundfish, due to its schooling behavior near 
the bottom, although schools of younger fish are often found off the bottom. They are a 
member of the family Gadide, making them closely related to cod (Gadus spp), whiting 
(Merlucciusproductus), and haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus). While pollock is 
rarely served as fish of the day at the local restaurant, it is the most plentiful whitefish in 
the world, providing the world’s highest-volume groundfish used for human consumption 
(Sj0holt 1998). The primary U.S. pollock harvests are taken in the eastern Bering Sea and 
the Aleutian Islands (BSAI)—although there is a smaller harvest in the Gulf of Alaska. 
The pollock fishery off the coast of Alaska is the largest U.S. fishery in terms of tonnage, 
with the BSAI yielding an annual average (1980-2009) harvest of over 1,200,000 metric 
tons (mt), or nearly 2.6 billion pounds (NMFS 2009c).
This enormous catch is processed into fillets, surimi, roe, and fishmeal and various 
other byproducts. The protein paste, surimi, created by a complex rinsing process of the 
meat, is used for a variety of final products and is a staple in the Japanese diet. Outside of 
Japan, the most familiar form of surimi is imitation crab, used in sushi such as the 
popular California rolls. Pollock fillets are a mainstay in fast food restaurants such as 
McDonalds and Wendy’s, where the fish is breaded and fried and used for sandwiches. 
Pollock fillets are a common base for frozen breaded fish sticks and are used in Europe, 
and increasingly in the U.S., as a base for fish and chips. The roe, or fish eggs, are a 
popular gift giving treat given at holidays in Japan, and are enjoyed salted and spiced.
1 Strong, J. and K. R. Criddle. 2011. Fishing for pollock in a sea of change. Submitted to University of 
Alaska Press.
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From these products, the pollock fishery represented an average annual first wholesale 
value of $1.1 billion between 1999 -  2008, making it, in 2008, the third most valuable 
fishery in the U.S. after Atlantic sea scallops (Placopecten magellanicus) and Gulf of 
Mexico shrimp (Farfantepenaeus aztecus, Farfantepenaeu duorarum, and Litopenaeus 
setiferus) (NMFS (2001b, 2005, 2009c, 2009d)).
In spite of its current value, the fishery for pollock off the U.S. coast is a recent 
development, having started in the early 1960s. Even into the 1980s, foreign fleets 
dominated the fishery, with Japan and Russia being the largest harvesters in waters 
offshore the U.S. It wasn’t until the extension of the U.S.’s marine boundaries and 
installation of a management structure through the passage of the Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act in 1976 that U.S. fishermen began harvesting of the resource, in 
what became known as Joint Venture operations. During this time period, fishery 
managers focused on the Americanization of the fishery and setting appropriate harvest 
levels. The push for the Americanization, as well as an increased awareness of the value 
of the pollock resource, led to the rapid development of U.S. harvesters and processors. 
With increased competition for pollock, a battle soon ensued between the entities 
processing at-sea (offshore) and those processing on shore or on vessels moored near 
shore (inshore). The battle over fish occurred in two arenas, with fishermen fighting at 
the regional fishery management council level and in the U.S. Congress and Senate. 
Congressional action led to the passage of the Anti-Reflagging Act, which unsuccessfully 
tried to limit foreign influence and investment in the pollock fishery. The fight moved on 
to the North Pacific Fishery Management Council, which passed regulations which 
created separate catch limits for the Inshore and Offshore sectors. The specific 
percentages of catch allocated to each sector further intensified the battle over 
resources—both at the Council and Senate level. With the rapid buildup of capacity and 
subsequent fight over fish came a period of instability in the pollock fishery—especially 
for the offshore processors—marked by bankruptcies and consolidation.
These battles over pollock allocations ended abruptly with the passage of the 
American Fisheries Act (AFA) in 1998, which circumvented the regional management
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council process with a congressionally designed three-sector allocation and laid the 
groundwork for the formation of cooperative harvest share agreements within each 
sector. The AFA effectively ended the race-for-fish, and created an unparalleled period of 
stability in the fishery. As an act of Congress, the regulations put forward under the AFA 
cannot be changed or altered without another act of Congress. Since the passage of the 
AFA, the pollock industry has been forced to deal with several stresses, including: 
closures of near shore fishing areas and seasonal apportionments intended to protect 
Steller sea lions (Eumetopias jubatus); regulatory actions to reduce Pacific salmon 
(Oncorhynchus spp)  bycatch; rising fuel costs; and environmentally induced shifts in the 
geographic distribution of pollock. Although fishery managers and fishermen have 
successfully dealt with these stressors, the AFA’s inflexibility precludes transfers 
between sectors even when such transfers could be mutually advantageous, such as when 
low product prices and high operating costs could lead some fishermen to forego 
harvesting a portion of their allocation.
Initial Development of the Eastern Bering Sea Pollock Fishery
Despite the high abundance of pollock found in the Bering Sea, the pollock fishery is 
relatively young in terms of the world’s major marine fisheries. For example, its cousin 
the Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) was harvested and traded internationally by the Vikings 
as far back as 800 AD. Similarly, although fishing off the coast of Alaska has taken place 
for centuries, Alaska Natives focused their fishing effort on salmon (Oncorhynchus sp.), 
herring (Clupeapallasi), halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepis), rockfish (Sebastes sp.), 
Pacific cod (Gadus macrocephalus), eulachon ( Thaleichthys pacificus), and 
miscellaneous other nearshore fish and shellfish species; it appears that pollock were only 
caught incidentally (NMFS 2002).
The first documented pollock fishing occurred off the coast of Asia in the late 18th 
century, but never developed into a large-scale fishery (Bailey et al. 1999). In 1929 and 
1931, Japan sent a fishing trawler into the Eastern Bering Sea to explore the resources
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available, including pollock and yellowfin sole (Pleuronectes asper). In 1933, the 
Japanese government followed up on its surveys by sponsoring a commercial venture to 
harvest Eastern Bering Sea pollock as a means to earn foreign currency. Fishing 
continued through 1937, with a Japanese fleet consisting of a mothership, three to five 
conventional catcher-trawlers, and as many as eight bull (paired) trawlers. The catcher 
vessels normally fished within five miles of the mothership. After they filled their nets, 
they delivered the full codends (the closed end of the trawl net) to the mothership. The 
mothership, a ship built for processing fish at sea, accepted the nets and processed the 
pollock into fishmeal and fish oil. Finished products were shipped back to port, where 
they were mostly sold to Europe (Alverson et al. 1964).
After a three-year hiatus that coincided with the commencement of major new 
military conquests in China, Japan resumed pollock fishing in the eastern Bering Sea in 
1940—but this time for a different purpose. Japanese military campaigns in China were 
straining food supplies, so instead of fishing for foreign currency, the Japanese pollock 
fishery began to fish to bolster domestic food supplies. As in 1933-1937, the Japanese 
sent one mothership and a fleet of nine to twelve catcher-vessels each year, but instead of 
processing pollock into fishmeal and fish oil, the mothership prepared the fish for human 
consumption, froze it, and shipped it back to Japan. Although the fishing was not 
profitable for the participating companies, it continued with government support through 
1941. Open warfare with the U.S. and Allied Forces from 7 December 1941 through 14 
August 1945 put a stop to Japanese fishing in the Eastern Bering Sea. While most of the 
Japanese catches from 1933-1937 and 1940-1941 were composed of Alaska pollock, 
yellowfin sole also constituted a large portion of the pre-WWII catches (Alverson et al. 
1964).
Post World War II Pollock Fishery
Although Japan had limited commercial success with its pre-WWII pollock 
operations, the landscape for distant-water marine fisheries such as pollock changed in
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the post-war era. The war led to a rapid buildup of military institutions and personnel 
along the West Coast; and with concurrent shortages in animal protein supplies, the 
demand for fish increased as devastated countries were forced to search for new food 
sources (Alverson et al. 1964). Countries, such as Japan, were looking to feed the 
starving masses after the devastation of the war. U.S. General MacArthur realized that 
Japan’s post-war food production system could not support her population of 80 million 
people. With the U.S. not utilizing Bering Sea or Gulf of Alaska pollock resources, 
MacArthur encouraged the Japanese to return to the Bering Sea to fish for pollock to feed 
their country. Nevertheless, it was 1954 before fishing resumed. Japan and other 
countries began globally expanding fishing operations to support their countries, with the 
eastern Bering Sea being a popular destination (Tillion 2003).
The end of World War II also led to a sharp downturn in industry that impacted many 
of the world’s largest nations, such as Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union. 
Development of distant-water fishing fleets provided a natural opportunity for increased 
jobs and industry—in addition to providing a new food source. The viability of these 
fleets was aided by technological advancements made during World War II. For example, 
wartime advancements in sonar aided in detecting fish schools. Wartime innovations in 
electronic navigation gave vessels better ability to navigate the high seas. Increased 
engine power allowed these vessels to travel more quickly and harvest more efficiently. 
New technologies also improved refrigeration on processing and barge vessels. The 
increased freezing capacity allowed vessels to fish longer, while increasing the quality 
and options for processed fish (Hornnes 2006).
These technological advancements led to the construction of the first modern vessel 
able to combine trawling and processing and stimulated a rapid expansion of distant- 
water fleets. The first factory trawler, the Fairtry, was launched in Scotland in 1954 by a 
Scottish whaling company, Christian Salvesen Ltd. The size of the vessel alone was 
impressive for its time. It was 280 feet long and had a gross tonnage of 2600 gross tons. 
More importantly, it included a stern ramp which allowed the Fairtry's crew to pull the 
trawl net onto the deck via a ramp on the vessel’s stern. Although this technique had been
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used in whaling, it had not previously been used in conjunction with trawling. Stern 
ramps proved to be much safer than traditional methods which brought fish aboard over 
the vessel’s side. In addition to improved harvesting capability, the factory trawler 
included fish processing facilities, a refrigerating system to freeze processed fish and to 
hold them in frozen storage, and the ability to process waste products into fishmeal. The 
Fairtry's factory contained an area under the trawl deck where fish were gutted and 
filleted using machinery manufactured in West Germany for land-based processing 
facilities, but never before used at-sea. The Fairtry's refrigeration system was the newest 
and lightest system produced by Clarence Birdseye in the United States (Hornnes 2006). 
This combination of harvesting and processing technologies made the Fairtry a success.
The Soviet Union, Japan, and other countries quickly recognized the factory trawlers’ 
potential as a means to make fishing for low-value species such as pollock profitable.
Less than a year after the Fairtry's introduction, the Soviets commissioned their first 
factory trawler, the Pushkin, from a West German shipyard; by 1956, they had ordered 23 
more factory trawlers (Hornnes 2006).
Even before commissioning these factory trawlers, the Soviets had launched into 
development of a sophisticated system of motherships and support vessels. Each distant- 
water fleet typically included a cluster of motherships each escorted by a pair of 120 to 
180 foot long trawlers. The trawlers delivered codends of fish to the mothership for 
processing, and were supported with additional refrigeration vessels between 240 and 400 
feet long. Fish processed by the motherships or aboard the factory trawlers was 
transferred to cargo and provisioning vessels. The Soviet government made a huge 
investment—over 10 billion rubles between 1956 and 1975—to build the largest distant- 
water fleet in the world. By 1975, the Soviets had nearly 5,400 distant-water vessels, 
accounting for nearly half of the world’s gross tonnage of such vessels. The Soviets 
dispatched this fleet across the world’s seas, including the eastern Bering Sea which they 
began to fish in the late 1950s (Alverson et al. 1964; NMFS 2002; Hornnes 2006).
Japan also sought to rebuild its fishing fleet after World War II. Although the 
Japanese continued to fish with motherships and trawlers, they launched their first factory
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trawler less than two years after the debut of the Fairtry, and a second two years later 
(Hornnes 2006). As their distant-water fleet was rebuilt, the Japanese recommenced 
fishing in the Eastern Bering Sea in 1954, targeting a wide array of fish and invertebrates, 
including yellowfin sole, Pacific ocean perch (Sebastes alutus), and king crab 
(Paralithodes sp.). Yellowfin sole was of particular interest as a target species because, in 
1960, Japanese scientists developed a technique to transform white-fleshed fish into 
surimi. Surimi, the generic name for the processed white protein paste, can be made from 
a variety of different types of fish. To produce surimi, fish are first filleted and then 
minced. Fat, blood, pigments and odorous substances are removed through repeated 
washing and dewatering. Fueled by this discovery, Japanese catches of the flatfish in the 
eastern Bering Sea reached a peak in 1962 when overfishing led to a decline of the stock. 
The reduction in catches of yellowfin sole from the Bering Sea coincided with a decline 
in the harvests of croaker(Atrobucca nibe, Argyrosomus argenteus, and Pseudoscianena 
polytis), another whitefish, off the coast of Japan, leaving the Japanese to look for a new 
fishmeal and surimi source (Natural Resources Consultants 1981; Park 2005; NMFS 
2009c).
The Japanese then choose to focus their attention on pollock, since it was an abundant 
species that provided a high-quality surimi. Pollock quickly became the preferred fish of 
the surimi industry in Japan. The demand for pollock surimi in Japan grew so fast, that by 
1979, there were 150 land-based surimi processing facilities, as well as over 3,000 
facilities which processed surimi into value-added products such as chikuwa and 
kamaboko (Natural Resources Consultants 1981). The economies of scale provided by 
the large factory trawlers allowed the Japanese to capitalize on pollock harvests and 
accelerated the development of the Japanese factory trawler fleet. The Japanese fleet 
quickly grew, from four factory trawlers in 1964 to 42 in 1972, making them pioneers in 
the pollock fishery (Park 2005).
11
Rising Pollock Catches
The demand for pollock surimi in Japan, as well as the expansion of distant-water 
fleets, fueled a rapid increase in pollock harvests from the eastern Bering Sea. Catches of 
pollock grew from 174,792 mt in 1964 to a peak of 1,874,534 mt in 1972 (Figure 1.1). 
During the same era, worldwide harvests of pollock peaked at nearly 3 million metric 
tons (mmt). Japan was the only pollock harvester in waters off Alaska until 1968, when 
South Korea began harvesting small amounts of pollock. Russian fishing vessels joined 
the eastern Bering Sea pollock fishery in 1969. Despite the increased competition, Japan 
dominated the fishery, taking over 88% of the catches between 1964 and 1979. Russia 
was the only other major harvester of pollock during this era with an annual average 10% 
catch share—their peak catch was 16% in 1975. South Korea harvests over this time 
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Figure 1.1. Foreign harvests of pollock in the Eastern Bering Sea (mt). 
Source: Natural Resources Consultants (1981).
The rapid increase in pollock catches—to a level that may have been unsustainable— 
was consistent with standard operating procedures for distant-water fleets. These new 
fleets, equipped with efficient factory trawlers and mothership groups, were allowing 
countries to access marine resources across the globe. Smaller, less efficient vessels were 
being replaced by the factory trawlers, leading to a growth in catches of many marine
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species, both in the Eastern Bering Sea and across the globe (Hornnes 2006). By 1970, 
the Soviets’ fleet alone contained more than 400 large, distant-water fishing and 
processing vessels. Distant-water fleets need large catches to sustain their operations, and 
typically focused their fishing on localized grounds until desired stocks were fished down 
to a level that was unprofitable. At that point, they continued the pattern of serial 
depletion on new grounds containing the next best species (Hornnes 2006). There are 
numerous examples of this across the globe, with two examples of this taking place in the 
early foreign fishing days off the coast of Alaska. The Japanese overfished yellowfin 
sole, before shifting their focus to pollock in 1962. The Soviets moved into the Gulf of 
Alaska in 1964 and pulse-fished Pacific Ocean perch, decimating local biomass until it 
was unprofitable and then moving on to waters off Oregon and Washington (NMFS 
2002).
Global Movement towards Increased Marine Rights
Serial exploitation of fisheries was both a cause of changes in international law and a 
product of those anticipated changes. A movement to extend rights over marine coastal 
waters stirred among countries after World War II. This was a challenge to the 
international convention of freedom of the high seas, which had been recognized since 
the late-eighteenth century. The conventional view of the high seas was predicated on 
three assumptions. First, it was argued that the high seas themselves were not amenable 
to physical occupation. Second, conventional wisdom argued that the resources of the 
seas were inexhaustible. Finally, it was supposed that the seas were so vast that no one 
use of the seas could impose external costs on other uses (NMFS 2002). Under these 
conventional views, countries could not exercise authority over waters more than three 
miles off their coasts (cannon range). The rise of distant-water fleets, along with an 
increased recognition that all natural resources are finite, led countries to a push for 
extended jurisdiction over coastal waters. Countries were watching catches of marine 
species decline worldwide. Moreover, distant-water fleets became capable of spending an
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entire season in an area, with freighters handling the delivery of supplies and the 
transport of fish.
The United States, in foreshadowing of changes to come, laid the groundwork for 
extended coastal rights, with President Harry Truman issuing two executive orders in 
1945. The first was the Truman Proclamation, which claimed rights to offshore minerals 
based on the concept of adjacency. The second, the U.S. Fisheries Proclamation of 28 
September 1945, gave the government power to establish conservation zones in the high 
seas off the United States coast (Hornnes 2006). The United States did not enforce the 
Proclamation, but the Proclamation was important in that it asserted the United States’ 
rights to offshore minerals. Other countries took even bolder steps. In 1946, Argentina 
and Panama asserted exclusive rights to fishery zones up to 200 nautical miles off their 
coastlines to lay claim to productive tuna (Thunnus spp) fisheries. Peru and Chile 
followed suit in 1947 to claim control of the anchovetta (Engraulis ringens) resource. 
Between 1958 and 1975, Iceland gradually expanded its maritime claims to 200 miles, 
progressively forcing British fishermen off cod grounds; a conflict that came to be known 
as the Cod Wars. Thus pressure from and competition with distant-water fleets spurred 
unilateral declarations of extended jurisdiction.
The trend towards increased claims to extended jurisdictions had enormous 
implications for the newly formed distant-water fleets. The shallow nutrient-rich 
continental shelves where most of the fleets operated compose only 9% of the world’s 
oceans, yet make up nearly 96% of the world’s fisheries. Access to most of these shelves 
would be eliminated with the extension of 200 mile zones. During the 1960s and 1970s, 
for instance, nearly half of Japan’s catches came from fisheries that would fall within 
other countries’ 200-mile zones, with 90% of that coming from the North Pacific 
(Hornnes 2006). Indeed, it was speculated that factory trawlers, not fish, were headed for 
extinction. The distant-water fleets would not be able to survive under the low quotas 
assigned to them by coastal countries under the new, extended boundaries (Warner 1983). 
Consequently, distant-water fleets recognized that it was only a matter of time before 
they would lose access to desired fishing grounds and thus they were left with little
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incentive to harvest at sustainable rates. Instead, the fleets would deplete a fishery until it 
ceased to be profitable (and in the process, drive the fish biomass to dangerously low 
levels) before moving on to the next species or area. With the rapidly rising catches seen 
in to the early 1970s, the pollock fishery appeared to be the next in line to be decimated 
by the distant-water fleet.
Fishery Management
The decline in various fish stocks off the United States’ coast was related to the lack 
of regulatory oversight limiting catches. During the 1960s, the United States had no 
unilateral fishery management authority over stocks more than 3 miles from the coast. 
With exception of international agreements over some species of groundfish in the 
Northwest Atlantic and for salmon in the North Pacific and Bering Sea, fish beyond the 
3-mile boundary were open to distant water fleets. Although fishermen and fishery 
scientists were increasingly concerned about the effects of unregulated fishing in waters 
beyond the 3-mile limit, the United States had not extended its boundaries, and therefore, 
lacked the legal authority to control the large distant-water fleets that fished the Bering 
Sea (Cushing 1988). Efforts by U.S. fishery scientists to gather harvest data for North 
Pacific fisheries went largely unrewarded. Japan offered limited catch data; the Soviet 
Union offered even less. In an attempt to increase oversight and management of near 
shore fisheries, the United States extended its exclusive fishery zone to 12 miles under 
P.L. 89-658 on October 4, 1966. Under this legislation, the United States used U.S.- 
foreign bilateral agreements; these were the first attempts at fishery management in the 
Eastern Bering Sea (NMFS 2002; NPFMC 2006).
The negotiations over bilateral agreements were initiated in 1967 with Japan and the 
USSR. The first agreement over the harvest of groundfish was with Soviet Union in 
1967, with further agreements negotiated in 1972-1973. The 1973-1974 bilateral 
agreements were probably the most important, because they imposed catch quotas on 
harvests of pollock and other species. The catch quotas limited the amount of fish each
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country was allowed to harvest based on the past three or four years’ average catch. At 
this point, fishery managers were simply attempting to cap harvests until the different fish 
stocks were evaluated to determine what the actual harvest should be. The final bilateral 
negotiations with Japan took place in 1974 and with the Soviet Union in 1975. Although 
setting catch quotas through bilateral agreements was a progressive move, it had little 
effect, as each country wanted to be in charge of monitoring its own catches, thus there 
was no accountability (NMFS 2002).
Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Magnuson Act
In the 1970s, pressure started to mount in the United States for extended boundaries. 
With little ability to control the foreign fleets, there was concern that the resources in the 
Pacific would be depleted. There was also worry from salmon processors in Alaska that 
the Japanese would come in and start competing for salmon. As a result, what would later 
become known as the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act, originally 
started as a salmon-packing act (A. Brindle, personal communication). Senator Ted 
Stevens of Alaska also saw the potential for his state in expanding the boundaries.
Stevens remarked:
In January of 1970, I went to Kodiak and asked the Navy to fly me to the 
Pribilofs. There was an amphibious plane there, an Albatross, and we flew 
from Kodiak to the Pribilofs at fairly low level. I counted more than 90 
foreign fishing vessels anchoraged (sic) there just off our state. And they 
had a bunch of little catcher boats going out from them. It really bothered 
me a great deal. (King 2009)
Stevens became the Congress’s primary proponent for legislation to extend America’s 
jurisdiction from 12 to 200 miles offshore; however, as a junior senator, his original bill 
went nowhere (King 2009).
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Stevens eventually obtained the support of a senior senator, Warren Magnuson of 
Washington. Fishermen—many from Seattle—pushed for the expansion to a 200-mile 
boundary. The number of boats in the Alaska crab fishery, a majority of which were 
based out of Washington, was growing quickly, and there was a growing realization 
within the industry that such growth could not be sustained. Fisherman such as John 
Sjong, future owner of the first domestic factory trawler in the Bering Sea, realized that 
they would soon need to look for other species to harvest:
There was a tremendous amount of boats joining the fishery. There was no 
way it could hold up. The writing was on the wall. We started to look 
elsewhere; what else could we fish? (Sjong 2003)
With the foreign fleets harvesting billions of pounds of fish yearly in the Eastern Bering 
Sea, it was natural for domestic fisherman to advocate for the expanded boundaries and 
the corresponding expansion in their fishing opportunities. “The groundfish resource was 
huge,” stated Wally Pereyra, a leader in the development of the domestic pollock fleet. 
With new opportunities in mind, Seattle fishermen appealed to Congress under the 
mantra of “Americanization” (King 2009; Pereyra 2003). Of Senator Magnuson’s push 
for a 200-mile exclusive zone, Clem Tillion remarks:
It wasn’t that Magnuson knew that much about fish, it’s just that his 
friends were in the business, and as such, he was going to defend them.
And he did a beautiful job. (Tillion 2003)
The extended boundaries not only had the fishermen’s support, but the oil industry’s as 
well. The oil and gas industry hoped to gain enormously from the protection of natural 
resources off the United States’ coast. The oil industry was happy to let the fishermen 
take the lead. The publicity of the day was weathered, wind-reddened fisherman on boats, 
with oil companies happily staying behind the scenes (Tillion 2003).
There was plenty of opposition to the extended boundaries. Some members of 
Congress were concerned about the implications of the move, thinking that extended 
boundaries would impede commerce and restrict national defense by limiting the Navy’s
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navigation through strategic coastal areas. Even the U.S. Air Force opposed the Act, 
worried that the 200-mile limit might be applied to airspace in the future. For some 
members of the State Department, fishing was thought of as a bargaining chip with other 
countries instead of as a U.S. asset. Another State Department concern was that the 
United States’ unilateral action would anger the Soviets and slow the already long- 
delayed international Law of the Sea negotiations, begun in 1958. Under the third round 
of the Law of the Sea negotiations, in 1973, there was substantial support for adopting 
200-mile limits through the international forums. There were even some in Alaska’s 
Congressional Delegation who opposed Congressional action outside the negotiations, 
making passage of Senator Magnuson and Stevens’ bill difficult (Hornnes 2006; King 
2009; Tillion 2003).
In the end, Magnuson and Stevens were able to persuade Congress to pass the 
legislation. The Fishery Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) passed on April 13, 
1976 with two primary functions. First, it created a new standard of conservation and 
management within the 200-mile fishery conservation zone (FCZ). Stevens said to the 
Senate:
The concept is ‘Shall the living resources of the sea have a chance to 
survive?’ The major fishery within our shores is, in fact, the Alaska 
pollock, where the [foreign fleets] have taken 2.3 billion pounds in one 
year. That pollock is the basic food chain for the Bering Sea and North 
Pacific and if this [over-fishing] continues even another [two or three 
years], it will go the way of the California herring. It will disappear from 
the ocean. (King 2009)
The FCMA established protection for marine fisheries and provided the framework to 
manage them (NMFS 2002; King 2009). The second goal was moving towards the 
“Americanization” of the marine fisheries. In a report to congress, Niblock (1977) states 
that “one of the purposes of the MFCMA of 1976 is to encourage the revitalization of the 
U.S. fishing industry.” The MFCMA formally recognized the importance and value of 
the resources off the U.S. coast, and established presence for domestic fishermen to
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utilize the supply. “Foreign fishing off our coasts cannot be allowed to continue,” 
President Gerald Ford said as he signed the bill (King 2009).
The 200-mile FCZ, later renamed the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) covers almost 
the entire productive area off the U.S continental shelf in the Eastern Bering Sea 
(Hornnes 2006; Wolff and Hauge 2008). The law gave the United States the right to 
regulate all natural resources, such as fishing, oil, and minerals, for a distance of 200 
miles off the coast. After the Act’s implementation on 1 March 1977, foreign fishing 
could only be conducted with an international treaty or a governing international fishery 
agreement (NMFS 2002).
Agreements were reached with Taiwan and the U.S.S.R. in 1976 and with Japan, 
Korea and Poland in 1977. While the agreements allowed these countries to continue 
fishing in U.S. waters, they were forced to conform to the Preliminary Fishery 
Management Plans (PMP) that were instituted as a result of the act, and only applied to 
the foreign fisheries. The PMP which affected the pollock fishery, Trawl Fisheries and 
Herring Gillnet Fishery of Eastern Bering Sea and Northeast Pacific, was posted in the 
Federal Register in February, 1977. The initial PMP set restrictions on pollock harvests to 
control the foreign fleet, but the principals applied were eventually carried over to the 
Fishery Management Plans (FMPs) that currently govern the pollock fishery and all its 
participants. The two primary objectives of the original PMPs and FMPs were to 
establish limits on various marine species harvests, and to limit bycatch of species of 
interest to the then extant domestic fisheries. For instance, there was concern that foreign 
fishing vessels, ostensibly fishing for pollock and other groundfish were in fact 
surreptitiously targeting higher-valued salmon and crab as bycatch, thereby affecting the 
amount available for domestic fishermen (NMFS 2002).
The PMPs and FMPs were established under the fishery management structure laid 
out by the FCMA. The Act set up eight regional fishery councils, which together with the 
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), manage the nation’s marine fisheries. The 
regional councils are responsible for making policy decisions related to fisheries located 
within their jurisdiction subject to a set of articulated national standards. The fishery
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councils and NMFS allow for decentralized decision-making and permit the public to 
have a say in these decisions. These organizations did not want to go back to the system 
used to govern Alaska fisheries before statehood, when officials in Washington, D.C. 
were making decisions thousands of miles away. The new system was designed to allow 
autonomy in each region; decisions were to be made by the fishery’s stakeholders. This 
system’s other unique feature is its transparency. The proceedings are public and allow 
open testimony in front of the Council and its supporting committees (NPFMC 2006). 
The Science and Statistical Committees (SSC) and the Advisory Panels (AP) support the 
Councils in decision-making. The AP is made up of fishermen and fishery stakeholders; 
it is designed to provide the Council with industry perspective. The SSC is a science 
panel that reviews the proposed policies and sets upper bounds on total allowable catch 
(TAC) for each managed species and species group. Both the AP and SSC provide 
feedback and opinions for the Council, who rely heavily on these two panels when 
making decisions. The Councils also rely on staff and NMFS to research and develop 
reports on the impacts of potential rule changes before making decisions.
The regional council governing Alaska’s fisheries—and thus the pollock fishery—is 
the North Pacific Fishery Management Council (NPFMC), which is composed of fifteen 
members: eleven voting and four non-voting. The four non-voting members represent the 
U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the Pacific States Marine Fisheries 
Commission, and the State Department. These non-voting members provide informal 
consultation on the implications of potential regulations from the perspective of their 
agencies. Seven of the 11 voting members are appointed by the Secretary of Commerce 
based on the recommendations of the governors of Alaska (5 ) and Washington (2). The 
governors typically nominate candidates who reflect diverse interests within the fishing 
industry in their states. Appointments are for a maximum of three consecutive three-year 
terms. The remaining voting members are the principal state officials with marine-fishery 
responsibility representing Alaska, Washington, and Oregon, as well as the NMFS 
Alaska regional director (NMFS 2002).
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Once the NPFMC passes a proposed regulation, it is forwarded to the NMFS Alaska 
Region Office. NMFS is responsible for reviewing proposed regulations for legality, 
consistency with national standards and compatibility with existing regulations and for 
developing an implementation plan. If NMFS determines that one or more parts of a 
regulation are either impossible to implement or would violate the standards set forth in 
the MSFCMA, the proposed regulation is remanded to the Council, which can make the 
appropriate changes. Otherwise, it is forwarded to the Secretary of Commerce for final 
approval before being published in the Federal Registry (NMFS 2002; Hornnes 2006).
Decisions made by the NPFMC and implemented by NMFS must comply with ten 
(originally seven) national standards set forth in the MSFCMA. These standards provide 
the groundwork for fishery management in marine waters. One of the most important 
standards, implicit in FCMA (1976) and subsequent reauthorizations and explicit in 
MSFCMA (2007), is the requirement that the total allowable catch (TAC), and optimum 
yield (OY) be set at or below the allowable biological catch (ABC) and overfishing limits 
(OFL) determined by the SSC. The concepts of ABC and OFL are explicitly incorporated 
into each FMP. The ABC is the maximum allowable catch for a species that is believed 
to be sustainable over time. The OFL is the level of catch that, if exceeded during any 
year, will result in a shutdown of directed fishing for the remainder of that year, while the 
OYis defined by the MSFCMA as
... the amount of fish which—(A) will provide the greatest overall benefit 
to the Nation, particularly with respect to food production and recreational 
opportunities, and taking into account the protection of marine 
ecosystems; (B) is prescribed as such on the basis of the maximum 
sustainable yield from the fishery, as reduced by any relevant economic, 
social, or ecological factor; and (C) in the case of an overfished fishery, 
provides for rebuilding to a level consistent with producing the maximum 
sustainable yield in such fishery. (MSFCMA 2007)
That is, OY is essentially the ABC adjusted downwards to account for stakeholder 
concerns. The OY involves a balancing of various objectives or criteria. For example,
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neither maximizing catch nor maximizing economic return would necessarily optimize 
the fishery. The OY should be the best balance of conservation, economic benefit, equity 
and flexibility (Niblock 1977). Under the mandate in the MFCMA for conservation, this 
would also imply that that the OY should never be set at a level above the ABC—since 
this would be unsustainable.
According to the FCMA, it is important to manage fisheries in a manner that 
produces “the greatest overall benefit to the Nation.” It expounds further in national 
standard 4:
Conservation and management measures shall not discriminate between residents 
of different States. If it becomes necessary to allocate or assign fishing privileges 
among various United States fishermen, such allocation shall be
(A) fair and equitable to all such fishermen;
(B) reasonably calculated to promote conservation; and
(C) carried out in such manner that no particular individual, corporation, or other 
entity acquires an excessive share of such privileges. (MSFCMA 2007)
Instead, fisheries in the EEZ are to be run in a way that considers the impacts to the 
nation. So when decisions are made for fisheries off Alaska’s coasts, fishermen, 
communities, and stakeholders based outside of Alaska are considered on par with those 
based inside Alaska. Once all of these factors have been considered, the TAC (now called 
the annual catch limit or ACL) is derived from the OY, and is simply the total amount of 
fish that is allowed to be harvested for a given time period.
In the case of pollock off Alaska, NMFS scientists use complex models and annual 
survey data to determine the pollock fishery’s biomass and to recommend an ABC and 
OFL for the coming year. The proposed ABC and OFL are reviewed by the Groundfish 
Plant Teams, NPFMC appointed committees, and then reviewed by the SSC, which 
serves as a peer-review panel and passes judgment on the methods used to determine 
stock status and then provides the Council with specific recommendations for ABC and
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OFL. After the ABC is approved by the SSC, it is passed for review by the AP and then 
to the Council. Based, in part, on input from the AP, the Council specifies the TAC. In 
addition to the general guidelines detailed in the MSFCMA, the Bering Sea and Aleutian 
Islands groundfish FMP (NPFMC 2009) has established an aggregate annual cap of two 
mmt of groundfish harvests in the BSAI. The council must factor this into their decision 
as they determine the TAC for each species covered under the FMP. In addition to setting 
the TAC, the Council establishes limits for target and incidental catches of each species.
With the fishery management structure in place, policies implementing the MFCMA 
(1976) goal of “Americanization” of U.S. EEZ fisheries began to be pursued. In 1976, at 
the time of passage of the FCMA, nearly 1.2 mmt of pollock were taken from the BSAI 
by foreign fleets, with 76% of that harvested by Japan, 15% by Russia, and the remaining 
7% by South Korea. Much of the fish not being harvested by Japan was sold to them, as 
demand for pollock surimi continued to rise in Japan. By giving domestic fishermen first 
priority for fish in the MFCMA, policy makers assumed there would be a quick 
movement towards the development of a domestic fleet to harvest species such as 
pollock. This was not the case. Indeed, by 1979—three years after the implementation of 
the act—only 1% of the total volume of BSAI groundfish was harvested by domestic 
fishermen and there were no significant domestic processing operations. Over the same 
time, the makeup of foreign harvests shifted somewhat, with the Japanese harvest share 
increasing to 82%, at the expense of Soviet harvests which decreased to 6%. The Soviets 
were eventually squeezed out of the U.S. EEZ pollock fishery as the allocation of foreign 
fishing permits was used to reward Japan and other U.S. allies (Natural Resources 
Consultants 1981).
Fish &  Chips Policy
The initial slow pace of Americanization of BSAI groundfish fisheries has been 
attributed to subsidies available to the foreign fleets and the lack of similar subsidies for 
domestic fishermen. While construction of factory trawlers and motherships such as those
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used by foreign fleets required substantial financial resources, similarly large investments 
were being made in the construction of vessels for use in the booming king crab fishery. 
Instead of switching to pollock and other low-value species with unfamiliar international 
markets, domestic fishermen focused their effort on crab and other high-value fisheries 
with well-established domestic markets. Trawling, the harvesting method used for 
pollock and most other groundfish species in the BSAI, was unfamiliar to most domestic 
fishermen; moreover, their vessels were not equipped to trawl and crab catches were 
reaching an all-time high (NMFS 2002; NPSC 1990).
To encourage expansion of domestic fisheries in the BSAI and elsewhere throughout 
the U.S. EEZ, Congress directed NMFS to introduce the “fish and chips” policy. The 
policy linked future access of foreign nations to U.S. EEZ fisheries to their efforts to 
assist in the development of the U.S. seafood industry through purchases of fish 
harvested by U.S.-flagged vessels and through investment in shore-based processing 
facilities. The Congress and NMFS instituted a variety of programs from the late 1970s 
through the 1980s to encourage Americanization of the pollock and other EEZ fisheries. 
One of the first such programs was approval of joint-venture operations: arrangements 
where U.S.-flagged catcher boats delivered their harvests to foreign processing vessels. In 
February 1978, NMFS announced a policy that it would only allow these joint ventures if 
domestic processors had neither the “capacity” nor the “intent” to buy the fish that were 
to be processed by the foreign processors. This ruling was overturned when NOAA 
general counsel determined that the Secretary of Commerce did not have authority, under 
the MFCMA, to deny foreign processors permits for buying U.S.-harvested fish— 
regardless of whether the United States also had the capacity and intent to utilize the 
resource (NOAA 1978).
In 1978, Congress overcame this ruling by passing the Processor Preference 
Amendment (U.S. Public Law 95-354), which prioritized access to EEZ fish resources in 
three tiers. Highest priority was given to domestic annual processing (DAP), which was 
reserved for U.S. flagged fishing vessels selling fish to domestic processors. Fishermen 
and processors who qualified under the DAP provisions could request the amount of fish
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they could process before the season began, and up to the entire amount of the TAC 
would be allocated to them. Any remaining amount between the TAC and the DAP 
would be offered to the next-level priority, Joint Venture Processing (JVP). This level 
was reserved for U.S. flagged catcher vessels that delivered their catches to foreign- 
flagged motherships and factory trawlers. Any portion of the TAC remaining after DAP 
and JVP demands were satisfied was to be made available to foreign catcher boats and 
catcher/processors as the Total Allowance Level of Foreign Fishing (TALFF).
Before passage of the Processor Preference Amendment the entire pollock TAC 
qualified as TALFF. In 1978, foreign fleets harvested all the pollock in the BSAI. Japan 
alone had six pollock motherships, along with 62 pair trawlers, 23 large trawlers and 103 
medium trawlers operating in the BSAI to catch 779,049 mt of pollock (NMFS 1983; 
NMFS 2002). It was Congress’s goal to have all fish allocated to the DAP sector. And 
with this amendment, it was hoped that there would be some domestic development.
The next major “fish and chips” regulation was the American Fisheries Promotion 
Act (U.S. Public Law 96-561), which Congress passed in 1980. The AFPA codified the 
“fish and chips” policy by putting into law four new criteria to apportion TALFF 
allocations. The first considered the degree to which the foreign nation imposed onerous 
trade barriers against U.S. fishery products; Japan was particularly reprobate in this 
regard and it was hoped that AFPA would help open Japan’s market to U.S. fishermen. 
The second criterion favorably recognized foreign purchases of fish products from U.S. 
vessels and processors, reinforcing a shift from TALFF to JVP. The third criterion 
penalized nations that re-exported processed catches from the U.S. EEZ back into the 
U.S. market. The fourth criterion favorably recognized foreign investment in the U.S. 
seafood industry. The AFPA also gave regional fishery management councils authority to 
phase out TALFF allocations. Although this rule was never used, it further enforced the 
idea that if foreign countries did not participate in the development of the U.S. fishing 
industry, their allocation of fish would be tenuous at best (NPSC 1990).
In addition, NMFS implemented a 100% observer coverage requirement for all 
foreign fishing vessels operating in the U.S. EEZ. Foreign vessels were required to have a
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NMFS-approved observer on board their vessels at all times, monitoring the catch and 
processing of fish. This ensured that foreign fleets were not overharvesting and 
misreporting catches, and allowed for better monitoring of bycatch. Costs of the observer 
program were recovered through increased permit fees to all foreign vessels (National 
Research Council 1999).
The early 1980s also witnessed the first significant dispute between the offshore 
(factory trawlers, motherships and aligned catcher boats) and the inshore (shore-based 
processors and aligned catcher boats) sectors. The dispute started in 1982 over whether to 
create a fishery development zone (FDZ) near Unalaska in which only domestic 
fishermen could operate (NPFMC 1982a). This was designed to address concerns that 
factory trawlers were preempting fish in nearshore fishing grounds, adversely affecting 
fishing vessels delivering to inshore processors. This would have also aided the catcher 
vessels delivering to Akutan and favored development of the inshore sector (NPSC 
1990).
The Regulatory Impact Review (RIR) accompanying the proposed amendment noted 
that there is
... ample, though conflicting, testimony about the existence of the gear 
conflict problem. American fishermen have maintained that there is a 
significant problem, while foreign fishery interests argue there is no 
problem. (NPFMC 1983 a)
After analyzing the number of foreign factory trawlers, the RIR determined that
... clearly, given the mobility of these trawlers and their efforts on 
localized concentrations of pollock (they have been likened to gigantic 
vacuum cleaners), these represent high densities of foreign trawlers which 
could effectively preclude domestic interest in utilizing the area. (NPFMC 
1983a)
In September 1982, the NPFMC passed the amendment, but it was subsequently 
overturned by NMFS due to procedural issues. Not wanting to create any problems which
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could affect their portion of TALFF, foreign fleets voluntarily refrained from trawling in 
the FDZ area. The FDZ, thereafter, became a de facto  domestic-fishing area in which 
foreign factory trawling was precluded (NPSC 1990).
Joint Venture Era
Since there was no domestic processing of pollock during the early “fish and chips” 
era, and joint ventures received priority over TALFF, their number grew quickly. 
Fishermen who participated in the JV fishery talk about how JVs were “suggested” by the 
government, and by “suggestion,” it meant that foreign nations would lose their TALFF 
if they failed to support development of the JV sector. Indeed, in 1980, U.S. officials 
withheld Japan’s share of TALFF until its fleet agreed to purchase more fish from U.S.- 
flagged catcher boats. To support fishermen and their foreign counterparts, the Alaska 
Pacific Seafood Industry Coalition (APSIC) was formed in 1983. Founded by a group of 
U.S. harvesters and processors operating in the North Pacific, it allowed “industry-to- 
industry” agreements with their Japanese counterparts. In trade for Japanese cooperation 
in buying U.S.-harvested fish, the (APSIC) delegation supported the full and timely 
release of allocations to Japan.
“Fish and chips” policies were not the only reason joint ventures flourished; 
additionally, the misfortunes of another prominent fishery contributed to the rise of the 
domestic pollock fleet. The Eastern Bering Sea king crab fishery was very lucrative 
throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, and consequently attracted ever increasing numbers 
of vessels. Much of this growth was attributable to Seattle-based first-generation 
Norwegian immigrants, who, by the late 1970s, owned about 50% of the crab fleet. This 
same group would subsequently play a key role in the Americanization of the at-sea 
sector in the pollock fishery. The 1980-1981 season marked the peak of the king-crab 
fishery, with crab fishermen enjoying their best season ever (Tillion 2003; Hornnes 2006; 
J. Gruver, personal communication).
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Crab fishermen returned the following year to greatly reduced catches: the king crab 
stock had collapsed. As out-of-work crab boats began to line the wharves of Seattle, 
fishermen began to look for new opportunities. House-forward crabbers had stern ramps 
and the ability to haul nets onto their decks. Using government-backed loans, these 
crabbers were able to upgrade their engine horsepower enough to allow their use as 
“catcher vessels” in the groundfish trawl fisheries where they delivered to inshore 
processors or participated in joint ventures with motherships and catcher/processors 
(Tillion 2003; J. Gruver, personal communication).
This period of rapid growth for joint ventures was exciting for those involved. Many 
of the ex-crabbers had no trawling experience and underwent a steep learning curve 
before becoming proficient. The first issue many vessels faced was the operation of the 
nets, as they learned to keep the mouth of the net open, at the proper depth, and learned 
where and how to avoid snags on the ocean floor. Once they had these techniques down, 
fishermen had to be able to find the fish, and then determine how many fish had entered 
the net; experience more than any other factor, taught fishermen how long to tow. During 
the learning process, fishermen traded the risk and expense of hauling in half-empty nets 
against the risk of overfilling their net and splitting the codend and spilling their catch as 
they tried to haul the fish onboard. Knowledge spread through the fleet as skilled crew 
members were hired away from the vessels where they had gained experience; fishing 
masters aboard foreign processing vessels also served as valuable sources of information 
for their new partners (J. Gruver, personal communication).
Over time, the catcher vessels were able to take advantage of new developments in 
technology. Part of the reason they were overfilling their net was they didn’t know what 
was in them, and in spite of the level of experience on the vessel blowing out nets was 
common. These vessels were greatly assisted by new improvements in nets. Perhaps the 
greatest improvement was using double twine for the nets. This reduced significantly the 
number of issues with net tears, allowing boats to take in more fish and worry less. 
Advancements in sonar proved invaluable as well. “One of the greatest advances was an 
improved sonar, produced by Simrad, which allowed fishermen to see up and down. This
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allowed us to see what was going into the nets,” said John Gruver, a long-time pollock 
fisherman. Catcher vessels could now determine the size of their catch, and stop fishing 
with the assurance that the net was not empty or overfull.
Catcher vessels in the mothership fleet operated no further than a one-hour run from 
their motherships, and delivered their codends on a regular cycle. With typical crews of 
four, and with fuel and supplies delivered at-sea, catcher vessels could focus on fishing 
for nine to eleven months a year and annual earnings were high. The fishery attracted 
newcomers from far away (NPSC 1990; J. Gruver, personal communication). “We would 
go out fishing, and we would see new tugboats from Mexico that had just started fishing 
with no prior experience,” said Gruver. The number of groundfish joint venture vessels 
grew from 7 in 1979 to the peak of 127 in 1987 (Figure 1.2). Harvests of pollock from JV 
operations jumped from over 58,000 mt to a peak of over 1 mmt in 1987 (Berger et al. 
1986; Figure 1.3).
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987
Figure 1.2. Pollock joint venture fishery vessels. 
Source: NMFS (2002); NPSC (1990).
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Figure 1.3. Pollock joint venture fishery pollock harvests (mt).
Source: NMFS (2002); NPSC (1990).
A Prototypical Joint Venture
One specific joint venture is described by Kenneth Hilderbrand, Jr., a fisheries 
observer aboard a foreign mothership that fished 50 to 100 miles offshore between 
Unalaska and Umiak Island from July 22 to August 19 in 1985. The mothership he 
worked on was a stern trawler that served as a surimi processor. At 308 feet, it was the 
smallest of the fleet and could accommodate 35 to 45 ton hauls of pollock and process a 
maximum of 13 tons per hour. “The ship’s crew of 64 was divided into 2 shifts, working 
6 hours on and 6 hours off. All crew worked in the factory, although 16 on each shift 
were identified as fishing crew.” Crew members were paid $400 and $500 a month and 
the captain’s wages reached around $3,000 a month (Hilderbrand 1986a).
The mothership was highly productive, since it and the vessels delivering to it didn’t 
travel outside the fishing grounds during the season. During the four-week period 
Hilderbrand was aboard, four or five transfers to cargo vessels were made of varying 
magnitude. Some transfers were simply to take on small quantities of supplies, such as 
food and fishing gear. Other transfers were extensive, involving offloading surimi, frozen 
fish, and fishmeal, in addition to taking on supplies. The highest production Hilderbrand 
observed was about 296 mt of pollock from 300 mt of landings, with the difference being
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the number of fish discarded. The daily average production for 28 fishing days was 200 
mt a day or 8.3 mt per hour. During the 29-day period, the vessel operated at slightly over 
61% of maximum production. This led to processing more than 5,600 mt of pollock into 
1,200 mt of surimi. In addition, 7.1% of the pollock went to fishmeal and 1.3% to fish oil. 
Cargo transfers, mechanical problems on catcher boats, lack of fish, and weather kept 
production below the theoretical maximum (Hilderbrand 1986a; Berger and Hare 1988).
The mothership that Hilderbrand was on was serviced by two catcher vessels; larger 
motherships in the fleet were supported by three catcher vessels. The two catcher vessels 
alternated deliveries and the normal schedule left them delivering three and a half hours 
apart. When it was time to transfer the full net of fish onboard the mothership, seven crew 
members would leave the factory to handle the cod-end exchange. With seven hours 
between catcher vessel deliveries, minus the hour for setting and retrieving nets, each 
boat could tow for as much as six hours. A typical tow length for a full codend of 45 mt 
was about two hours during good fishing, which meant that the landed fish age was 
normally four to six hours old. Some tows could be as short as 20 minutes, with only 30 -  
45 minutes for set and retrieval. Each catcher vessel had its own unique strategy, but 
most schools of pollock were found in 60 to 80 fathoms of water and 0 to 20 fathoms off 
the bottom (Hilderbrand 1986a).
Even with the large amount of fish the catcher vessels caught, the bycatch rate was 
fairly low, typically less than 0.5 mt per haul. Fishing hard on the bottom often increased 
bycatch of flatfish—occasionally forcing a move to higher grounds. Any bycatch over 
1% caused problems in the factory. The overall discarded rate for all the fish delivered to 
the mothership was about 0.7%. The low bycatch rate was also attributable to the time of 
year the vessels were fishing, as July and August are typically months with a low rate of 
bycatch (Hilderbrand 1986a).
Catcher vessels were fairly lucrative operations. The typical boat was 100 to 125 feet 
long and operated with a crew of 3 or 4 plus the skipper. With a price of $93/mt, the 
maximum daily gross earnings were about $14,500 from 155 mt landed. Landings, 
however, were always less than maximum as discards and small fish reduced the value of
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the catch. Even with the less than optimal catches, this translated into annual revenues of 
$1 to $3 million per catcher vessel (Hilderbrand 1986a).
The profit was not without risk: during the 1986 fishing season, the F/V Sea Dancer 
sank with the loss of one life. In addition, mechanical failures, although not common, did 
occur, with issues such as loss of steering, broken hydraulics on winches, and inoperable 
fish finders. For example, one boat had a malfunction of the net monitor used to indicate 
the quantity of fish in the net. Retrieving a net to examine the amount of catch in the net 
might take an hour away from fishing. But not knowing when the net was full meant the 
boat might tow far longer than necessary, resulting in wasted fuel and time (Hilderbrand 
1986a).
Initial Development in the Domestic Processing Sector of Groundfish
While “fish and chips” policies were successful in promoting joint ventures, there 
was little progress in the development of a domestic processing sector for pollock. 
Significant resources were invested into inshore processors in Western Alaska since the 
1880s for salmon; however, domestic firms had not made significant investments into 
either inshore or at-sea processing of pollock. There were several reasons for this. Unlike 
the joint ventures, where there was an excess supply of vessels from the collapsed crab 
fishery, there was no surplus stock of factory trawlers looking for new opportunities. 
Furthermore, investment in a factory trawler or shore-based plant was an order of 
magnitude more expensive than investing in the retrofit of a catcher boat. Moreover, 
domestic processors had little to no experience with processing pollock into surimi—the 
primary product of pollock. An attempt was made in the early 1970s, when Icicle 
Seafoods Corporation tried an experimental processing plant in Petersburg, Alaska. It 
was unsuccessful and closed (NPSC 1990).
In 1982, there was a rapid expansion of shore-based processing facilities, with the 
first focus on groundfish. Trident Seafoods Corporation, Universal Seafoods, Inc., 
Johansen Sea-Pro, and Jangaard Fisheries began processing groundfish, primarily Pacific
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cod, from shore-based processing facilities in Unalaska and Akutan. Trident alone 
processed 40 million pounds of groundfish in its first year, before the plant was destroyed 
by a fire in the spring of 1983 (NPSC 1990; Hilderbrand 1986a). Pollock was generally 
not processed at these shore-based facilities, since there was no domestic market for the 
fillets and domestic processors did not have the technology to produce surimi (Onstot 
2008; NPSC 1990). As a result, only 129 mt of pollock was allocated to shore-based 
processors in 1982 (NPSC 1990).
While domestic shore-based processors were making the first attempts at groundfish 
processing, there was also an initial effort to develop domestic at-sea processing. Sjong 
and Konrad Uri, Norwegian Americans who were participating in joint ventures, saw the 
Japanese and other foreign countries using factory trawlers to harvest fish in the North 
Pacific.
I knew that in Norway there were some factory trawlers, and they were the 
only part of the fishing industry over there that wasn’t subsidized by the 
government, and [I] knew they were making money. If they could do it, 
why couldn’t we? (Sjong 2003)
With financial backing from Erik Breivik, a successful Norwegian factory trawler owner, 
Sjong and Uri purchased the factory trawler Seafreeze Atlantic, for $6 million. The 
Seafreeze Atlantic had fished the Atlantic side of the United States, Greenland, and 
Norway for two years after its construction in 1968. It was not very successful, so in 
1971, it was laid up on the East Coast. It was, at the time, the largest U.S.-flagged fishing 
vessel. The renamed Arctic Trawler left Seattle on 14 May 1980 with Breivik acting as 
the “fishing skipper,” since American rules did not allow a non-U.S. citizen to formally 
captain a U.S. vessel. The trawl bosun was Kjell Rokke, who would later found American 
Seafoods. The Arctic Trawler had little initial success. “[We] didn’t catch anything for 
two months. It was sad and sadder. We were gone two months, and we found a 
tremendous amount of fish” (Uri 2003).They had stumbled on dense quantities of Pacific 
cod and brought home two million pounds of boneless, skinless fillets in little over a 
month.
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The Uri and Sjong sold the Arctic Trawler in 1987 due to two primary issues. The 
first problem was that they were targeting cod, but they were primarily catching pollock. 
The smaller pollock was difficult to process into fillets and even more challenging to sell 
(Hornnes 2006). The second problem was that there was a limited domestic market for 
U.S.-produced whitefish fillets: the Arctic Trawler was producing fillets from the cod, 
and there were few buyers. “The marketplace wasn’t there,” says Sjong. “People were not 
used to buying their fish this way. It wasn’t best to be number one” (Sjong 2003). In 
addition, the American consumer was skeptical because of the traditionally bad quality of 
U.S.-white-fish products. To top it off, the market was flooded with subsidized exports 
from Canada, leaving little room for new product (Hornnes 2006).
The difficulties facing at-sea processors were no different than those faced by shore- 
based processors. Although the shore-based processors plants had ventured into the 
production of groundfish fillets, they too had difficulty selling their product. Chuck 
Bundrant of Trident Seafoods had produced 40 million pounds of salted cod in from 1982 
to 1983, but had no one to sell it to. He tried exporting the product to European markets, 
but he couldn’t find any takers. According to corporate lore, Bundrant traveled around 
Europe and was turned down by buyer after buyer. He had reached the end of the road, 
and with one more stop on his trip, he made a deal with God that if he was able to sell the 
cod, he would repay him in the future. At the next stop, Bundrant was able to sell the 
entire load of cod and save the plant. As the story goes, he repaid God by building a large 
church in the town of Akutan, where the plant is located. Nevertheless, even after that 
sale, records indicate that Trident’s cod production was a money loser (Hilderbrand 
1986b).
Since domestic processors were having difficulty marketing cod fillets, it seemed 
even less likely that they would be successful with the smaller, more abundant pollock. 
Furthermore, while domestic processors knew how to fillet fish, they lacked familiarity 
with pollock surimi production. Without the technology to produce surimi, U.S. 
processors were unable to gain access to the growing Japanese surimi market. The 
Japanese, not wanting competition from U.S. at-sea or shore-based processors, remained
34
protective of the surimi production technology (Hornnes 2006). There were also 
questions as to whether or not pollock could be processed inshore and yield top-quality 
surimi. Fresh fish is essential to surimi production, and it was unclear whether surimi 
produced from fish held onboard for up to 48 hours could compete with surimi produced 
at-sea (NPSC 1990).
Domestic Inshore Pollock Production
Initial attempts at processing cod may not have proven very successful, but they were 
important because they set the stage for what was to come. Pollock, which was much 
more abundant than cod, seemed to hold the most potential for future production—if a 
market could be found for the fillets or if the secrets of surimi production could be 
discovered. And the tide began to change as the U.S. markets became more receptive to 
seafood, including whitefish, during the mid-1980s. From 1982 to 1987, the U.S. 
consumption of seafood increased by 22%, leading to an increased demand for whitefish 
products—particularly Atlantic cod fillets. Through 1984, the supply of Atlantic cod kept 
up with the strong demand through rising imports and increased domestic catch. But over 
time, imports declined and domestic production failed to keep up with the consumer 
demand. Buyers were forced to look for substitute whitefish products, and pollock began 
to gain acceptability (Hornnes 2006).
At same time, the demand for surimi was also strengthening (Hornnes 2006). In 1984, 
the Alaska Fisheries Development Foundation began to experiment with the production 
of surimi at the Alaska Pacific Seafoods plant on Kodiak Island. Nearly $4 million was 
spent on the “Alaska Pollock Surimi Industry Development Project” between 1982 and 
1987. The project focused on two goals. First, to develop the capability to produce surimi 
for domestic processors, and in particular, the inshore sector and second, to increase U.S. 
demand for the surimi products, giving the processors a market to sell to (Holmes 1987; 
NPSC 1990).
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In addition to marketing and research from the U.S. industry, U.S. processors were 
aided by further “fish and chips” policies. With domestic processing capacity of pollock 
nonexistent through the early 1980s, increased pressure was placed on Japan in the mid- 
1980s to invest in the U.S processing industry. The MFCMA was further modified 
through the 1984 amendments to emphasize to the Secretary of State that allocations of 
TALFF should be based on a nation’s purchase of fishery products. It further clarified 
that the United States did not have to allocate its surplus fishery resources to foreign 
nations. After the passage of the 1984 amendments, industry-to-industry negotiations led 
to the Japanese fishing industry agreeing with their APSIC counterparts in December 
1984 to purchase 35,000 mt of processed fish from U.S. processors. This turned out to be 
a problem for Japan. Because no U.S. operators produced surimi and because there was 
little demand for pollock fillets in the Japanese market, the Japanese failed to meet their 
purchase commitment. Intense criticism from the U.S. industry and pressure to hold-up 
Japan’s TALFF allocation led two Japanese companies to invest in inshore surimi 
processing. The first plant built was the UniSea processing plant in Unalaska, by parent 
company Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. The second plant was built as a partnership 
between Alec Brindle of Wards Cove Packing Company and Taiyo Fisheries and 
Marubeni, to form a joint venture to build a processor for crab. The result was the 
formation of Alyeska Seafoods Corporation, which built a plant in Unalaska to process 
seafood 270-300 days a year and began processing in 1984 (A. Brindle, personal 
communication). Under continued pressure from the United States the UniSea plant 
began producing surimi during 1985, and the Alyeska plant began producing surimi in 
1986. With this foreign investment into the U.S. seafood industry, the Japanese expected 
support for full and timely releases of Japanese allocations of TALFF (NPSC 1990).
At the same time, Trident Seafoods was beginning a plant expansion that would allow 
them to be the first truly domestic inshore operation willing to take a chance on pollock 
fillets. Bundrant, with the help of Kaare Ness, started Trident from the ground up. 
Bundrant got his start in 1961, taking a trip to Alaska for the summer to make some 
money to pay for college in Tennessee. He never returned. Alaska-fishing-industry lore
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has it that he spent that first summer sleeping under a boat on the docks in Bristol Bay, 
taking any work he could get on the boats and in seafood processing facilities. Bundrant 
did well for himself, and after a few years, found himself looking for new ways to make 
money in the waters of Alaska. He partnered with Ness and bought a crabbing vessel that 
they paid off after only three months of fishing (Onstot 2008).
Bundrant continued to look for the most profitable fishing methods. Most crab 
fishermen caught the crab then delivered their catch to processors who processed and 
sold the product. Bundrant wanted to eliminate the middleman by freezing the crab at-sea 
and selling the crab directly to the seafood wholesalers. He pooled his money with other 
fishermen—including Ness—to buy the Billikin, a 135-foot vessel. With the model of 
harvesting crab and processing at sea, the company Trident was formed. This model paid 
off handsomely two years later when crab vessels went on strike over the low exvessel 
prices offered by crab processors. Bundrant was able to catch and process his crab before 
selling it to the wholesalers, and with no one else harvesting, he made a fortune that 
allowed him to continue to expand his fleet (Onstot 2008).
Looking to take advantage of the vast groundfish resources, Bundrant wanted to build 
a processing plant for crab and cod that his fleet of vessels could deliver to. The Trident 
plant was built at Akutan, in between Unalaska and Unimak Pass, next to a village of 
only 60 people. It was an ideal location, next to a deep, sheltered harbor with no 
distractions for plant employees. More importantly, it was only a six hour boat ride from 
Unalaska and in close proximity to a very productive fishing ground, the Slime Banks. 
Cod production began in June of 1982 and continued until a fire burned the processor 
down in the June of 1983. The Akutan plant was rebuilt in 1984, but with the crash in the 
crab fishery, production continued with an emphasis on cod-fillet production 
(Hilderbrand 1986b).
Advances in filleting machines, as well as an abundance of pollock, allowed Trident 
to move towards production of pollock fillets. The Baader 182 filleting machine—new, 
less labor-intensive technology—deboned most of the smaller pollock without high-cost 
human labor. In addition, pollock was much more abundant in the Bering Sea than
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Pacific cod. With this in mind, studies indicated that switching to processing pollock 
instead of cod could be extremely profitable. Trident estimated a switch from focusing on 
production of cod to pollock would change a net loss into an estimated profit of nearly 
35% (Hilderbrand 1986b).
Bundrant still needed to find a market for the fillets. Although cod imports and 
production wasn’t keeping up with the increased U.S. seafood demand, pollock had still 
not gained widespread acceptance. But Bundrant was a gambler. He had taken a chance 
on cod and found buyers when it didn’t seem possible. Taking a chance on pollock 
seemed like the next step. Joe Plesha, who is currently legal counsel for Trident 
Seafoods, remembers a meeting he attended with Japanese fishing interests and Alaska 
senator Frank Murkowski in 1983. As a Murkowski staff member, Plesha was surprised 
to learn that Japan was pulling out 2 billion pounds of pollock off Alaska’s shores 
annually. He asked why Americans weren't interested. “It's a trash fish,” they responded. 
American boats didn’t have the ability to trawl for pollock. And even if they did, they 
lacked the capacity to produce blocks of minced fish or surimi. The only American trying 
to participate in the pollock industry, the Japanese told Plesha, was Bundrant, but he 
won't be successful. “That's the first thing I heard about Chuck,” says Plesha, “He'll never 
make it.”
Bundrant made the move for Trident to switch their equipment to process pollock, 
with necessary additions to the Akutan plant completed in the fall of 1985. Bundrant still 
had to find a market for the “trash fish.” A potentially huge profit was nothing if there 
was no one to buy the fillets. His major break came when he was able to talk Long John 
Silver’s executives into visiting the Akutan plant to try and get pollock fillets put on their 
menu. David Abbasian, the current Akutan plant manager, cooked up some frozen 
pollock for dinner. The executives, thinking the product was fresh, didn’t believe the 
product was frozen and asked to see it where it came from. With the executives 
impressed, Long John Silver signed a multimillion-dollar contract for Trident to provide 
breaded, frozen pollock fillets to the chain. “That was the first big, big major contract to 
introduce pollock to the U.S. market,” Abbasian says. Other fast-food chains, such as
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McDonalds and Burger King, soon switched from Atlantic cod to the cheaper, more 
abundant pollock. Trident was responsible for creating a market for the pollock fillet, 
creating new opportunities for domestic processing of pollock (Onstot 2008; D.
Abbasian, personal communication).
Domestic At-Sea Production
With Trident’s success in the U.S. fillet market and Japanese investment into Alyeska 
and UniSea for surimi production, the inshore sector was making large increases in 
capacity. At the same time, investment was beginning in the domestic at-sea sector. 
Although the Arctic Trawler’s venture into the Pacific cod fishery was not financially 
successful, investors saw the potential of factory trawlers in the pollock fishery. The 
Maritime Technical Consultants Corporation (MTC), which was behind the Arctic 
Trawler and several other vessels attempting to harvest cod, was also behind the first 
attempt to develop domestic factory trawlers for pollock. MTC originally intended to 
design vessels and have them financed and built them in the United States. They put 
together a group of investors, many of whom included persons involved in the Arctic 
Trawler. The group included Breivik, who had sold out of the Arctic Trawler two and a 
half years after he had become involved in its operation, as well as John Boggs and Rick 
Hastings, two other investors who had helped provide equity in the Arctic Trawler. Those 
five, along with other Norwegian and Norwegian-American crab fishermen, raised five 
million dollars in equity towards building a new vessel to fish for pollock (Hornnes 
2006).
Finding the remaining $7 million needed to build the factory trawler was difficult. 
U.S. banks had been burned by the crash of the crab fishery, and were reluctant to 
provide vessel construction loans. “I think I talked to all bank directors and vice 
presidents from California to Seattle”, Lars Aage Eldoy, a shipbuilder and one of the 
founders of MTC recalls. “They always needed more documentation about the fishery, 
prices, budget and so on.” The problem wasn’t solved until Eldoy, on vacation, met the
39
director of the local Sunnmorsbanken in Alesund, Norway; one meeting later Eldoy was 
informed that the $7 million loan had been granted (Hornnes 2006).
The factory trawler Northern Glacier was built from scratch at J.M. Martinac 
Shipyard in Washington in 1983. Although originally fitted to process cod, the sheer 
amount of pollock in the Bering Sea led Breivik to invest in a new Baader processor 
designed for filleting pollock. Unfortunately, the machine was designed for processing 
small pollock taken in the Russian fishery and had problems filleting the larger pollock 
caught off Alaska. Breivik recalls that he and a Baader technician decided to split the 
head-section of the processing machine in two. “He split the processor, and it was 
successful immediately. That triggered the run for pollock over here.” The Northern 
Glacier became the pioneer in the production of “frozen-at-sea pollock” fillets, and their 
success triggered significant investment into the domestic at-sea processing sector 
(Hornnes 2006).
The Northern Glacier was the first U.S. at-sea processor focused on pollock, but 
more quickly followed. The next to invest was Rokke, another participant in the Arctic 
Trawler. According to Sjong, Rokke had made a name for himself while working on the 
Arctic Trawler: Sjong recounted a time where the net split and Rokke ran onto the net, 
pulled out a needle, and saved the catch. “He was a 100 feet off the back of the boat, 
sitting on a bag of codfish, and he saved the load” (Sjong 2003). Coming over from 
Norway with nothing, Rokke saw potential in the enormous pollock resource. He 
managed to buy a small trawler and establish his own company in 1982 after spending 
2.5 years working on the Arctic Trawler. Rokke and Bob Breskovich, the owner of a 
shipyard, became partners and started investing in vessels together. With a few trawlers 
in operation, they decided to purchase a vessel from which they were able to process 
pollock. According to friends of Rokke, he had a way with bank officials (J. Jacobs, 
personal communication). After negotiations with a London-based bank, the partners 
bought a processing vessel for $3.5 million. The vessel was financed by British and 
Indian capital, and Breskovich and Rokke were able to acquire the vessel 99.9% on credit 
(Hornnes 2006). They renamed her Golden Alaska and used her as a mothership for the
40
other trawlers in the company, joining the fishery in 1985 (NMFS 2002). After only a 
year, the company started making money (Hornnes 2006).
The introduction of the Northern Glacier and Golden Alaska signaled future 
opportunities in the domestic at-sea processing sector. Most of the pollock was still 
processed through foreign joint ventures, and there was significant room in the pollock 
fishery for additional domestic processing vessels. Since U.S. banks were not willing to 
provide the significant amount of capital needed for the construction of factory trawlers, 
those looking to expand operations had to turn elsewhere for investment capital. The 
principal investors in the Northern Glacier and Golden Alaska were primarily Norwegian 
Americans, so it was natural for them to turn to Norway, where banks and financiers 
were familiar with the operations of factory trawlers. Furthermore, since additional 
investment capital was to come from Norway, the financiers preferred that the 
construction of these vessels take place in Norwegian shipyards, where they had 
significant experience converting vessels into factory trawlers (Hornnes 2006).
Before further vessels were introduced to the pollock fishery, there was some concern 
as to the legality of foreign investment and construction of U.S. fishing vessels. The 
United States requires that vessels pursuing commercial activities in U.S. waters have a 
U.S. certificate of documentation, which includes endorsements to pursue specific 
commercial activities. Four kinds of endorsements are available under U.S. maritime law, 
two of which were relevant to the Norwegians and the pollock fishery in Alaska. The first 
is a coastwise endorsement, which is required for vessels engaged in trade between U.S. 
ports. To obtain a coastwise endorsement, a vessel has to comply with strict construction, 
rebuilding and ownership standards defined in statutes in the Jones Act of 1920. The 
coastwise endorsement in the Jones Act also requires 75% U.S. ownership in the vessel.
If a coastwise vessel was substantially rebuilt abroad, it would lose its coastwise 
privileges. The second type of endorsement is the fishery endorsement, which is required 
for U.S. vessels fishing in all navigable waters of the U.S. and the EEZ. Compared to the 
coastwise endorsement, the fishery endorsement was subject to more lenient rebuilding 
and ownership standards. At the time, a fishing endorsement required that the vessel be
41
owned by a U.S. citizen or a U.S- registered company; however, it did not require U.S. 
ownership of the stock of the company. It also allowed a greater amount of rebuilding 
abroad (NMFS 2002; Hornnes 2006).
Until 1980, U.S. fishing vessels were required to have both coastwise and fishery 
endorsements. In 1980, it was determined that as long as a fishing vessel only operated in 
the EEZ, it did not need a coastwise endorsement. Since the fishery endorsement did not 
require that stock be owned by U.S. citizens, this allowed substantial investment from 
Norway. The only requirement was that officers and directors, as well as a majority of the 
board of directors be U.S. citizens. That is, all the stock could be owned by foreigners; 
the investors merely had to set up a “shell-corporation” in the United States. According to 
Eldoy of MTC, the woman they employed as director at their office also was head of the 
board of directors in one of the companies they had established to own the vessels; in 
addition, he had a cousin who held a similar position. Although much of the investment 
in the at-sea sector came from U.S. fishermen such as Uri, Sjong, Pereyra, and Ness, 
there was still substantial foreign investment into the factory trawlers that were being 
converted. This allowed foreign nationals like Rokke to participate in the 
“Americanization” of U.S. EEZ fisheries, including the BSAI pollock fishery (Hornnes 
2006; B. Myhre, personal communication).
In addition, not having to obtain a coastwise endorsement meant that fishing vessels 
could be rebuilt abroad, return to the U.S. and regain U.S. documentation with full U.S. 
fishing privileges. Norwegian investors had hired the Washington, D.C.-based attorney 
Bill Myhre to provide legal assistance to make sure that their vessels met the 1980 U.S. 
requirements. In 1986, Myhre was again hired to investigate whether it was possible for 
Norwegian investors to buy U.S. vessels, bring them to Norway for conversions into 
factory trawlers, and then send them back to the United States and fish in the U.S. EEZ. 
Through consultation with the USCG and authorities, the conversion of U.S. vessels in 
Norway to factory trawlers was deemed legal under then current law (Hornnes 2006; Bill 
Myhre, personal communication).
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This set off a flood of vessel conversions headed for the pollock fishery; twenty at-sea 
processing vessels were converted in Norway for the pollock fishery between 1986 and 
1990. The initial conversions were performed in close cooperation with U.S authorities. 
The first vessel brought over to Norway for conversion on 3 September 1985 was the 
Seafreeze Pacific, the Arctic Trawler’s sister ship. After the conversion, it was renamed 
the Royal Sea. Sjong and Uri, the original owners of the Arctic Trawler, were the primary 
investors. Four more vessels were quickly found for conversion, and included a former 
tuna vessel and three oil rig support vessels. The tuna vessel conversion was financed by 
Uri, Sjong, and Ness of Trident Seafoods; it was named the Snow King. The same three 
investors, aided by Pereyra’s Profish International, paid for the conversion of the three oil 
rig support vessels, which were renamed the Royal King, the Royal Prince and the Royal 
Princess. Each of these conversions cost $8 to $14.6 million (Hornnes 2006; B. Myhre, 
personal communication).
Eleven more vessels were converted with Norwegian equity between 1986 and 1990. 
Breivik, who had taken part in the investment of the Northern Glacier, converted a 
supply vessel into a combined surimi and fillet factory trawler called the Pacific Glacier 
for his company Glacier Fish. Emerald Seafoods, a company backed by Norwegian 
investment partnered with Korean financiers to refit three factory trawlers, the Claymore 
Sea, the Heather Sea, and the Saga Sea, looking to gain access to surimi products in two 
of the vessels. After selling his ownership in the mothership Golden Alaska, Rokke 
financed three factory trawlers between 1988 and 1990, the American Dynasty, the 
American Empress, and the American Triumph. Rokke took his conversions farther than 
most companies, stripping down most of the old vessel and completing nearly all the 
work in Norway (Hornnes 2006). A list of these vessels, their principal investors, and 
their place of conversion is included in Table 1.1.
43
Table 1.1. Vessels introduced into the pollock fishery (Hornnes 2006).
Main Investors Vessel Name Shipyard Delivery Date





31 -  May -  86
Snow King 14 -  Aug -  87
Royal Prince 19 -  Dec -  87
Royal King 28 -  Apr -  88
Royal Princess 28 -  Apr -  88
Breivik &  Co. Pacific Glacier Mjellem &  Karlsen 01 -  Jun -  88
Saekvik &  Co.
Crystal Viking
Ulstein
15 -  Jul -  88
Crystal Clipper 01 -  Nov -  88
Saetremyr &  Ervik
Claymore Sea Soviknes 01- Aug -  88
Heather Saga Kvaerner -  Kleven 01 -  Mar -  89
Saga Sea Soviknes 01 -  Jun -  90
R0kke, Mogster, & 
Togersen
American Empress Aukra 20 -  Dec -  88
American Dynasty Ulstein 01 -  Jul -  89
American Triumph Langsten 21 -  May -  90




01 -  Mar -  88
Northern Hawk 01 -  Jun -  88
Remoy Orion Myklebust 08 -  Nov -  88
Huse / Sporesem Ocean Rover Langsten 09 -  Dec -  89
Jeff Hendricks Alaska Ocean Ulstein 01 -  Jun -  88
North American 
Partnership
Ocean Phoenix Batbygg 01 -  Jan -  89
The flurry in building Norwegian converted vessels was not limited to foreign 
investors. A total of four vessels, three factory trawlers and a mothership, were contracted 
to be rebuilt in Norway by American interests. Pereyra, through Profish International, and 
a group of Norwegian Americans invested in the Ocean Phoenix—which became the
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largest fishing vessel in the United States. It was a mothership used for processing fish 
for the catcher vessels of its owners. In addition, Oceantrawl, Inc., which was headed by 
Bob Morgan, invested in three foreign converted factory trawlers, the Northern Eagle and 
Northern Hawk converted in Norway and the Northern Jaeger converted in Germany. 
Morgan, a former director of the Pacific Seafood Processors Association, a trade 
association protecting the interests of several shore-based processors in Alaska, was 
described as “the chief standard bearer for U.S. processors in the Americanization effort.” 
When confronted about his decision to involve a Norwegian shipyard and a Norwegian 
bank in converting factory trawlers, he responded:
Capital has no nationality. You have to differentiate between capital 
sources and control. If you’re an entrepreneur, you get capital where it’s 
available. (Hornnes 2006)
While a majority of factory trawler rebuilds took place in Norway, some rebuilds and 
conversions also took place in the United States. In 1987, Pereyra, through Profish 
International, financed construction of the Arctic Storm, the first vessel rebuilt in the 
United States—although according to some reports, some of the work was done in Korea 
(Hornnes 2006; NPSC 1990). In addition, Arctic Alaska Fisheries converted several 
vessels into factory trawlers in U.S. shipyards, including the Kodiak Enterprise, Island 
Enterprise, Seattle Enterprise, American Enterprise, and U.S. Enterprise.
Much of the investment in factory trawlers was fueled by rising domestic demand for 
pollock fillets. Bundrant had opened the U.S. market for pollock fillets, and during 1986 
and 1987, the prices for pollock fillets increased rapidly as demand grew. This attracted 
new participants and additional investment from current pollock fishermen, who were 
also aided by advances in technology. Improvements in fillet technology allowed for 
greater recovery and more automation, and at the same time, there was increased 
availability of surimi-processing capability. Surimi-processing technology, which had at 
one time been limited to foreign processors, was publically available. As a result, factory 
trawlers now had the option of focusing on fillets or surimi, or a combination of both, 
which allowed for a more profitable product blend. The combination of factors increased
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the profitability of the pollock fishermen, creating a rush of investment into the sector 
(Hornnes 2006).
There are several reasons why much of the investment in rebuilt factory trawler was 
completed in Norway and sponsored by Norwegian investors. The first is that the process 
for converting the vessels in Norway was easy for investors. To build the factory 
trawlers, the “ideal” vessel was first identified. The “ideal” was a U.S.-built vessel that 
had operated outside the U.S. for more than two years, allowing it to avoid duties on all 
the equipment placed on board. The MTC would then purchase the vessels and find 
suitable investors. Financing for loans generally came from Norwegian banks, and the 
vessels would be converted in Norwegian shipyards. It became a bundled process, where 
potential suitors would be approached, and once agreed on, most of the subsequent 
paperwork became a formality. Geir Ole Setremyr, co-owner of Emerald Seafoods, 
remarked that they were introduced to the package solution: “We were inquired about 
whether we were interested. The initiative came from Kare Eikrem [shipbroker at 
Alesund Shipping].” (Hornnes 2006)
Second, Norwegian shipyards were more experienced and more efficient at ship 
rebuilding than their U.S. counterparts. Furthermore, Norwegian investors knew the 
shipbuilders in Norway, and their experience with factory trawlers. Frode Igland, from 
the Den Norske Bank remarked,
I don’t think that Norwegian investors would have had their vessels 
converted in U.S. shipyards. They prefer the Norwegian design and 
equipment. The United States had no experience in building factory 
trawlers. (Hornnes 2006)
With the increased experience came greater efficiency and decreased costs. U.S.-built 
vessels and shipyards were more expensive, partly because they didn’t have to worry 
about competition from shipyards outside the country. The U.S. General Accounting 
Office pointed out in 1976 that U.S. fishing vessels cost up to 30% more than foreign- 
built vessels because U.S. fishermen did not have the option to purchase vessels from
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foreign shipyards (GAO 1976). With the increased experience, familiarity, and lower 
costs, Norwegian shipyards became the destination of choice for vessel conversions 
(Hornnes 2006).
Not only were Norwegian shipyards more efficient, but U.S. investors benefited from 
favorable currency exchange rates. The Norwegian krone (NOK) was at a low to the U.S. 
dollar in the mid-1980s, making it fairly cheap for U.S. investors to spend U.S dollars in 
the foreign shipyards. For instance, in March 1985, the dollar cost a record NOK 9.48. 
Sjong estimated that he was able to freeze the loan for the Royal Sea at close to that rate, 
which meant a cost of under $8 million. At that price, “It was a very cheap boat,” 
especially when it is compared to the over $30 million that R0kke would spend on some 
of his vessels only two years later. For the Norwegian investors, it was not a problem that 
the exchange rate was in their disfavor, since they were investing their currency in their 
shipyards. As the dollar dropped steadily in the later part of the 1980s, this advantage 
declined (Hornnes 2006).
Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, Norway provided for both the availability of 
capital and subsidization of financing through Norwegian banks and government. This 
was needed, as even with the high level of equity raised for some of the conversions, the 
U.S. banks were not willing to take a chance on the risky fishery sector. In Norway, 
however, it was a different story. Norwegian banks were familiar with the business of 
factory trawlers and were happy to offer the loans. The three largest business banks in 
Norway, Norske Creditbank, Christiania Bank og Kreditkasse, and Bergen Bank, 
increased their capital holdings by 150% between 1983 and 1987 by financing factory 
trawler conversions. Competition was so fierce that the banks even built branch offices in 
Seattle to compete for business from the primarily Seattle-based fishermen (Hornnes 
2006).
The Norwegian banks were also assisted in part by the subsidization of interest rates 
from the Norwegian government. Subsidization of shipbuilding projects dates back to 
Japan in 1947 and resulted in all major ship-building countries offering subsidies by the 
1960s in order to remain competitive. To understand how these interest subsidies work in
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the shipbuilding process, it is important to understand the two-step process by which 
vessel construction is financed. The first step involves the ship owner paying a share up 
front, perhaps 20% of the price. The shipyard then finances the remaining costs of 
construction by obtaining a construction credit from a bank. When the ship is completed, 
the ship owner is able to obtain long-term collateralized loans to pay off the shipyard’s 
construction credit and finance the vessel (Hornnes 2006).
In 1982, Norway introduced a new legislation in order to support its shipbuilding 
industry. The new arrangement involved interest rate subsidies for shipyards as well as 
long-term credits to vessel owners, which were available for both domestic and export 
contracts. The long-term credits and interest-rate subsidy were soon supplemented by a 
cash-payment arrangement, in which the Norwegian government supplied much of the 
equity in the transaction to rebuild the vessels. The interest rate subsidy, which was 
granted to shipyards, was then accepted by banks as equity. According to Pereyra, such 
subsidies financed 100% of the equity needed for the Royal King, Royal Prince and the 
Royal Princess, in which his company Profish International had a one-ninth interest 
(Hornnes 2006).
Anti-Reflagging Act
As the domestic at-sea sector was ramping up their construction of vessels through 
both domestic and foreign investment, certain U.S.-processing interests realized they 
were vulnerable to a different threat—the reflagging of ships by foreign countries. Under 
the Vessel Documentation Act of 1980, regulations allowed foreign-owned companies to 
reflag their foreign-built vessels as vessels of the United States and then transfer 
ownership to a U.S. shell corporation. In addition, American entities could purchase 
foreign flagged vessels and reflag them as U.S. ships. By reflagging their vessels, foreign 
companies could receive the same priority as U.S. companies for the DAP allocation, 
thereby circumventing the purpose behind Americanization. Initially, the primary
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concern was directed at the Japanese, who were involved in joint ventures and could 
reflag their motherships and provide competition with domestic processors.
The U.S. processing interests expressed their concerns in a letter to several senators 
and congressmen, including Senator Stevens of Alaska, on 24 September 1986:
The rapid increases in domestic harvests through joint venture fishing 
arrangements and domestic processing operations have drastically reduced 
foreign fishing (TALFF). Consequently, the large foreign fishing fleets 
which have been operating in the U.S. fishing zone are now faced with the 
prospect of reduced utilization of these foreign built vessels, many of 
which are fully amortized. ... To counter this growing Americanization 
threat certain foreign fishing companies are now aggressively pursuing 
plans to maintain their control and pre-eminence in the fisheries off 
Alaska by forming majority owned ‘U.S. citizen’ corporations for the 
purposes of acquiring U.S. flag harvesting vessels and/or reflagging their 
existing factory vessels as U.S. processing vessels. Several foreign fishing 
companies have taken such action. We expect others to follow suit in the 
near future. (Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 1986)
The letter calls for regulations “that a foreign built vessel cannot be documented as a 
‘vessel of the United States’ for purposes of processing U.S. harvested fish” in the EEZ 
as well as regulations that “require that any U.S. documented vessel engaged in 
harvesting or processing fish” in the EEZ “be majority-owned and controlled by U.S. 
citizens” (Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries 1986).
The letter was signed by several industry groups. Trident Seafoods, the only majority 
owned U.S. shore-based processor that had ventured into processing pollock, signed the 
letter, as the reflagging of foreign vessels could hurt their share of the allocation. In 
addition, other groups representing U.S. catcher vessels, longliners, and other fishermen 
signed the letter in opposition to the reflagging loophole. The letter was also signed by 
the Alaska Factory Trawler Association (AFTA), which represented domestic factory
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trawlers in Alaska. At the time of the letter, there was only one factory trawler that had 
entered the pollock fishery which had been converted in Norway, and it was owned by 
American citizens, Uri and Sjong. The last group to sign the letter was composed of 
representatives of the domestic shipbuilding industry. Their concern was that the 
reflagging loophole could reduce demand for U.S.-built vessels (Committee on Merchant 
Marine and Fisheries 1986; Hornnes 2006; NPSC 1990).
To address these concerns, H.R. 5658 and H.R. 5662 were introduced to the House of 
Representatives 7 October 1986. H.R. 5665 would have excluded foreign built vessels, 
while H.R. 5662 would have amended maritime laws to prohibit documentation of 
foreign built or foreign owned fish processing vessels. Additional bills were introduced 
over the next eight months, with most of the attention focused on the prevention of re­
flagging of vessels. Nevertheless, a majority of the testimony before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on 28 April 1987 opposed 
imposing any citizen ownership requirements on U.S. flag vessels, because many in the 
industry desired the access to foreign capital. Before the House Merchant Marine and 
Fisheries Committee the following day, Delmar Smith of the American Waterways 
Shipyard Conference submitted testimony as to 21 examples of U.S. fishermen and 
processors who were unable to obtain financing in the United States to construct or 
convert U.S. fishing industry vessels. The various bills were finally consolidated into one 
primary piece of legislation as on 4 June 1987: H.R. 2598- the “Anti-Reflagging Act.”
Although the letter and original drafts of the Anti-Reflagging Act focused on the 
reflagging of foreign motherships as U.S. vessels, the important issue of foreign rebuilt 
vessels emerged shortly thereafter. The initial investment sparked a flurry of concern 
from competitors that had failed to capitalize on the opportunity. Domestic catcher vessel 
owners, delivering primarily in joint ventures to foreign motherships, were worried that 
domestic investment in factory trawlers would eliminate the JVP allocation they relied 
on. Likewise, Trident and their fellow shore-based processors did not want the additional 
competition for the DAP allocation.
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The shipbuilding unions also become increasingly concerned. As discussed before, 
Norwegian investors and the shipbuilding industry were starting a flurry of projects in 
1986 and 1987 for at-sea processors in the U.S. EEZ, and that meant that U.S. 
shipbuilders were missing out on millions of dollars of work. Testimony before the 
American Waterways Shipyard Conference indicated that:
Within the past few months, several of these conversion jobs have been 
undertaken by Norwegian shipyards. When we first became aware of this, 
we were astounded that it could conceivably be cost effective to move 
these surplus supply vessels from the United States to Norway to do the 
conversion work. Based on our analysis and information, on an 
unsubsidized basis, the U.S. shipyards which have traditionally been 
involved in this work are very competitive with, if not cheaper than, yards 
who do the same work in Europe, particularly Scandinavia. This is 
especially true with the devaluation of the U.S. dollar and the 
strengthening of foreign currencies. In addition, the cost of conversion is 
increased by the cost of moving the vessels from the United States to 
shipyards in Europe and back, a cost which on a per vessel basis is 
estimated to be approximately $150,000.
When we became aware of the fact that we were losing this conversion 
work to foreign shipyards in Europe, we investigated to determine how it 
could possibly be. The information we developed indicates to us the 
shipyards doing this work in Norway are offering significant subsidies, 
both direct subsidies for reconstruction work and subsidized financing. In 
fact, we are aware of one circumstance where a vessel owner was 
approached by representatives of a Norwegian shipyard and offered a 
significant subsidy to do the work in their shipyard. (NPSC 1990)
Desiring to protect their jobs, shipbuilding unions pushed for additional regulations 
over and above those originally included in the letter. Shipbuilding interests documented 
36 fishing industry vessel projects that had involved substantial foreign shipyard work.
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They pressed Congress for additional regulations that would prohibit the rebuilding of 
any U.S. fishing vessel in foreign shipyards. There was also an additional push from a 
shipbuilding group that wanted to develop in the North Pacific (NPSC 1990; Myhre
1998). According to Rod Moore, a former member of Congressman Don Young’s staff, a 
group of U.S. investors, which included George Steinbrenner of the Yankees, had offered 
to create a system of barges and develop a “highway” in the North Pacific for the fishing 
industry—if favorable conditions were created.
Shipbuilding unions and shipyards became important drivers of new legislation, 
promoting their desired legislation as the next step of “Americanization” in U.S. 
fisheries. And as long as there was a “grandfather clause” allowing current projects 
eligibility to participate in EEZ fisheries, there was little opposition. This was an 
important provision, for at this point, at least 24 vessels had been granted rulings from the 
Coast Guard confirming that they would eligible for fisheries endorsements after their 
foreign rebuilding projects.
It was, in fact, the U.S. government who stood to lose the most from this piece of the 
legislation. The U.S. had implemented a loan guarantee program in the 1970s to promote 
the building of off-shore oil supply and delivery vessels. The program guaranteed 87.5% 
of loans, and with the crash in the price of crude in 1986, the government was left with a 
glut of vessels. The government found fishermen looking for potential vessels for 
conversion as the primary buyers of the docked vessels and provisions eliminating 
foreign rebuilds would reduce the demand for them (B. Myhre, personal communication). 
In spite of these concerns, the bill was amended on 28 July 1987 to: (1 ) to prohibit fishing 
industry vessels rebuilt abroad from fishing in U.S. waters; and (2 ) require that a 
controlling interest in corporations be held by U.S. citizens, but it explicitly exempted 
currently documented vessels.
It was not until 4 August 1987, at the bequest of fishing interests looking to stall the 
ban on the reflagging of foreign vessels, that Senator Frank Murkowski introduced an 
amendment to the bill that required U.S. controlling interests in fish processing vessels. It 
was a measure that benefitted few fishery participants. A majority of the domestic factory
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trawler fleet was built either through foreign direct investment or financing. Shipbuilders 
wanted the foreign capital flowing into new projects, as long as it went towards building 
or rebuilding vessels in the U.S. Catcher vessels delivering to foreign owned processors 
did not want to lose their foreign buyers. It was believed that by introducing the 
unfavorable regulation at the last minute, it would squash the bill. The original 
amendment was designed to run with the owner or corporation, not the vessel itself (B. 
Myhre, personal communication; Myhre 1998).
Senator Murkowski introduced the amendment to the Senate with the following 
statement:
This provision will not remove the privilege of fishing from any person or 
company that is presently operating or that can demonstrate that it already 
has undertaken to purchase a vessel for use in the fishery. It simply 
ensures that future entrants are controlled by the interests of the United 
States, rather than those of other nations. This amendment is a needed- in 
my opinion, a mandatory-step in the process of Americanizing our 
fisheries. Only a few years ago, Americanization seemed like a goal that 
would never be reached. Then, after our objectives were given form by the 
Magnuson Act, we began at last to make rapid progress. Our biggest lapse, 
however, has been to ignore the fact that much of our industry is 
financially subject to foreign interests. I will be the first to admit that 
foreign investment has brought some benefits. It has, for example, helped 
our fishermen learn new techniques, provided access to new markets for 
some processors who employ U.S. workers, and made it possible for both 
at-sea and onshore capacity to expand rapidly. But now is the time to say 
enough! (NPSC 1990)
The proposed ownership requirements encouraged considerable debate, with 
significant opposition to its inclusion. The Senate amended the bill on 17 December 
1987, and with it, the wording which explicitly terminated the grandfather clause if the 
vessel was sold to another owner. This amendment was combined with the House version
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of the bill and was passed 22 December 1987. It was almost vetoed by President Ronald 
Reagan, but was eventually signed as the Commercial Fishing Industry Vessel Anti­
Reflagging of 1987 on 11 January 1988 (Myhre 1998).
The final Anti-Reflagging Act contained several important elements. The first was an 
expanded definition of fishery to include fish processing, storing, and transporting. As a 
result, fish processors and tenders were required to obtain a fishery endorsement rather 
than a registry endorsement. Prior to the Act, foreign motherships could process fish with 
only with a registry endorsement, which allowed 100% foreign ownership (through a 
U.S. subsidiary corporation). The inception of this clause made it mandatory to obtain a 
fishery endorsement for all foreign vessels, which made foreign vessels participating in 
the fishery illegal. This eliminated the eligibility of reflagged vessels in U.S. fisheries 
(U.S. 101 Stat. 1778 1988; NPSC 1990; NMFS 2002).
To tighten up foreign ownership rules further, the Act also made the qualifications for 
receiving a fishery endorsement more restrictive. Before the Act, foreign ownership was 
legal through a U.S. shell corporation, but the new law mandated a U.S. controlling 
interest of at least 50% of the common stock. In addition, the Act required that all 
rebuilding, including the construction of major components, be done in U.S. shipyards, 
eliminating the future use of foreign shipyards. The Act also limited factory vessels from 
hiring entirely foreign crews. Instead, the Act mandated that 75% of the unlicensed crew 
on the vessels be U.S. citizens (U.S. 101 Stat. 1778 1988).
Since the Act was signed into law on January 11, 1988, but was enforced 
retroactively as of July 28, 1987, there was a grandfather clause in the Act to account for 
investments made by vessel owners under prior laws. If the Act had been enforced 
without the grandfather clause, the retroactive date would have eliminated numerous 
vessels in the pipeline or under construction in Norway and other foreign shipyards at the 
time. Under pressure from U.S. companies with vessels under construction in foreign 
shipyards, Congress inserted several grandfather clauses into the Anti-Reflagging Act, 
permitting vessel rebuilds that had embarked on foreign conversions based on the prior 
law. The first category of clauses eased the prohibition against foreign rebuilt vessels.
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Under this clause, a vessel converted outside the United States would still be eligible for 
fishery endorsement if one of four conditions existed:
1. If before July 28, 1987 the vessel was licensed under registry and operated 
as a fish processor or tender in the navigable waters of the United States or 
the Exclusive Economic Zone;
2. If before July 28, 1987 the vessel was purchased by a U.S. citizen or 
corporation for use as a processor or tender under contract entered into 
before July 28, 1987;
3. If before July 28, 1987, the vessel was documented as a U.S. flag vessel 
and was rebuilt in a foreign country before July 28, 1987; and
4. If a U.S. built vessel is subsequently rebuilt in a foreign shipyard 
providing rebuilding is done under contract entered into before January 
11, 1989, and the vessel is delivered before July 28, 1990.
(U.S. 101 Stat. 1778 1988)
These clauses were intended to account for foreign ownership and construction of 
vessels that began under prior law, as well as for vessels that were in the process or had 
been purchased for reconstruction in other countries, but were intended for the U.S. EEZ. 
There was an additional category of grandfather clauses that eased the impact of the 
citizen control requirements. The clause reads:
[The citizen control requirement] applies to vessels issued a fishery license 
after July 28, 1987. However, that [requirement] does not apply if before 
that date the v e s se l.
1. was documented under chapter 121 of title 46 and operating as a 
fishing, fish processing, or fish tender vessel in the navigable waters of 
the United States or the Exclusive Economic Zone, or
2. was contracted for purchase for use as a fishing, fish tender, or fish 
processing vessel in the navigable waters of the United States or the
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Exclusive Economic Zone, if the purchase is shown by the contract or 
similarly reliable evidence acceptable to the Secretary to have been 
made for the purposes of using the vessel in the fisheries.
(U.S. 101 Stat. 1778 1988)
The intent of these grandfather provisions was to accommodate those foreign-owned 
factory vessels which were already in the fisheries and instances where foreign-owned 
entities had already purchased factory vessels for the purpose of operating them in 
fisheries (NPSC 1990; NMFS 2002).
Effects of the Anti-Reflagging Act
Passage of the Anti-Reflagging Act limited the long-term foreign development of the 
pollock and other fisheries in the U.S. EEZ. The Act eliminated the rebuilding of factory- 
trawlers in foreign shipyards not specifically grandfathered, thereby insulating U.S. 
shipyards from competition. There was also an increase in the percentage of U.S. hires 
for jobs on processing vessels—although there are still some hires that come over on 
work visas. Most importantly, perhaps, the Act eliminated the ability of foreign vessels to 
reflag, which affected Japanese plans to reflag their fleet as U.S. vessels.
Much to the chagrin of advocates for limits on foreign investment, the Anti­
Reflagging Act did not stem the flurry of new vessels and foreign capital flowing into 
EEZ fisheries. Domestic catcher-vessel owners (who now backed the foreign ownership 
requirement with the elimination of foreign reflagging) and processors had hoped that the 
bill would eliminate the foreign investment into efficient factory-trawlers. This was not 
the case. The Act had a limited impact on the foreign control of vessels. First, the 
controlling ownership rule applied only to corporations, with the United States Coast 
Guard (USCG) applying the same standards that are applied under the Jones Act. For 
corporations, the USCG simply requested the nationalities (but not identities) of the CEO
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or chairman of the board, and a rough indication of the proportion of voting shares owned 
by U.S. citizens (under 50%, 51 to 74%, or 75% and above). In theory, a foreign 
individual or entity could own 100% of the non-voting stock and 49% of the voting stock, 
and still be eligible for a fishery endorsement. The foreign-control law could also be 
avoided through the use of loans. Many foreign investors acquired a majority interest in 
fishing vessels through loans secured by a preferred-ships mortgage in accordance with 
the Ships Mortgage Act. Since preferred-ships mortgages are secured by the vessels 
themselves, such loans gave foreign investors considerable influence and control over a 
highly mortgaged vessel. Shipyards and banks in Norway and Japan were reported to 
have invested hundreds of millions in factory trawler conversions through preferred-ships 
mortgages. Thus as the regulations were written, the Anti-Reflagging Act did little to 
restrict foreign control of fishery vessels (Gay 1992; NMFS 2002).
The Anti-Reflagging Act also allowed any vessel that qualified for a fishery 
endorsement to be bought by either a U.S. or foreign entity and be rebuilt in a foreign 
country—as long as the contract was entered into before 11 January 1989 and the vessel 
is delivered before 28 July 1990. Before the Anti-Reflagging Act was passed, Congress 
was informed that 24 vessels had received favorable rulings from the USCG to proceed 
with foreign rebuilding projects and documents were circulated to Senate staff indicating 
that up to 46 foreign rebuilding projects were likely eligible under the grandfather clause. 
With the impending regulations banning significant foreign rebuilding projects, the 
vessels that had received a ruling were bought by the highest bidder. And this meant 
converting the vessels into processing vessels. For example, Sunmar Alaska Inc. had 
plans to build shipping vessels to supply the American fishing fleets. The company 
wanted to rebuild three vessels into fishing tenders, and applied for a USCG ruling to 
proceed with rebuilding outside the U.S. With the passage of the Anti-Flagging Act, 
Sunmar switched their plans and decided to build processing vessels instead. They sold 
off the vessels, including the Alaska Ocean and Northern Hawk, before completion. The 
Anti-Reflagging Act played a role in the rapid buildup of foreign rebuilt at-sea harvesting 
capacity in the pollock fishery, with fishermen completing 17 of the 20 at-sea processing
57
vessels converted in Norway between 1988 and 1990, following the signing of the Act, 
and 23 out of the 24 vessels receiving rulings allowing conversion in foreign shipyards 
(B. Myhre, personal communication; Hornnes 2006).
Another issue with the Anti-Reflagging Act was the language addressing changes in 
ownership of the vessels. Under the verbiage in the Act, a vessel was grandfathered under 
the Act, and as a result, changes in the owners would not affect the status of vessel. An 
example would be a factory trawler which had been rebuilt in Norway and was 100% 
owned by Norwegians, but had received a fishery endorsement to fish in the United 
States under the grandfather clause in the Anti-Reflagging Act. As the Act was written, it 
could be argued that the grandfather exemption ran with this vessel, so if it was sold to a 
Japanese company twenty years later, it would still carry its fishery endorsement with it. 
This point became an area of contention, as there was testimony before Congress 
indicating that the grandfather clause was only intended to account for current owners 
who made investments under the prior law. Though this wording was removed in a 
subsequent amendment, there was a question as to whether the push to pass the bill 
quickly led to legislation that did not convey the true intent of Congress (NPSC 1990; 
NMFS 2002).
With the Act’s poor wording, the USCG was left to interpret the Act as it was written. 
The USCG formally adopted the regulations interpreting the ownership-savings clause on 
12 December 1990. The regulation stated that a corporation meeting the pre-existing 
requirements regarding the citizenship of its president but not satisfying the newly 
enacted 51%-citizen-control requirement may nevertheless be eligible for a fishery 
endorsement if, prior to 28 July 1987, the vessel came within subsection (1 ) or (2 ) of the 
savings clause. In other words, the savings exemptions was to “run with the vessel” rather 
than the owner, an interpretation that is consistent with maritime law (B. Myhre, personal 
communication). The implication of this ruling was great, because any international 
corporation could now avoid the citizen-control requirements altogether by simply 
purchasing vessels holding “grandfathered” fishery endorsements (NMFS 2002). A GAO
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study estimated that approximately 29,000 U.S. vessels were licensed for fishing, and 
thus grandfathered as of the savings clause cut-off date (GAO 1991).
This didn’t sit well with U.S. shipyards and certain fishing companies. U.S. shipyards 
expected to be protected by the act, because they could not compete with foreign 
shipyards. Catcher vessels were losing their JVP allocation; their foreign partners were 
unable to reflag and domestic factory trawlers were taking a larger share of the pollock 
TAC. Furthermore, Trident and other shore-based processors realized the increased 
competition from factory trawlers posed a threat to their allocation of fish. The 
elimination of these factory trawlers would substantially benefit the remaining 
participants of the pollock fishery as more participants battled over the pollock catch. On 
16 May 1990, before the USCG’s final ruling regarding grandfather clauses was 
published, the Southeast Shipyard Association and several U.S.-owned fishing companies 
challenged the granting of new fishery endorsements to two factory trawlers, the Resolute 
and the Northern Hero. Both of these vessels were owned by corporations controlled by 
U.S. citizens prior to 28 July 1987, and were subsequently sold to corporations in which 
foreign citizens held controlling interests. Not only were the vessels under foreign 
ownership, but the plans to build the vessels in Norway were switched, with rebuilding to 
now be done in Japan, with further modifications to the vessel’s design. A court decision 
was reached on 30 April 1991, when District Court Judge Penn overturned the USCG’s 
interpretation of the ownership savings clause, ruling:
... the savings clause did not attach to vessels and thus did not permit the 
transfer of ‘grandfathered’ vessels to noncitizen-controlled corporations.
The USCG’s interpretation, the court stated, would
... effectively obliterate the primary purposes of the Anti-Reflagging Act
which the court identified as promoting
... the continued orderly growth, development, and competitiveness of the 
U.S. fishing and fish processing industry...(NPSC 1990; NMFS 2002)
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The District Court’s decision caused immediate concern throughout the fishing 
industry. At least 60% of the North Pacific offshore fishing industry was owned by 
foreign-controlled corporations. The USCG decided not to appeal the District Court’s 
decision; instead it issued an advance notice of rulemaking to consider new 
interpretations of the savings-clause exemption. An estimated 28 factory trawlers and 1.1 
mmt of processing capacity risked losing their fishing endorsements. Affected companies 
immediately appealed the decision, and while the cases were in court, the USCG chose 
not to strip any vessels of their fishery endorsements (NPSC 1990; NMFS 2002).
On 24 November 1992, through the appeals process, Eleventh Circuit Court Judge 
Randolf reversed the District Court’s decision and upheld the USCG’s original 
interpretation of the savings clause running with the vessel. Randolf’s opinion was based 
on the fact that under maritime law, it is the vessel, and not the owner, that is eligible for 
documentation. Randolf noted that endorsements are issued to vessels rather than owners. 
Furthermore, Randolf reasoned that the language of the savings clause clearly frames 
exemptions in terms of the vessel. According to Randolf:
On its face, the clause makes nothing clear on who holds title to the vessel 
in the future. The criteria mentioned in the clause relate back, not forward. 
Whether a ship is grandfathered depends on what documentation had been 
issued to it before July 28, 1987 ... to give the savings clause the meaning 
the plaintiffs ascribe to it—that a grandfathered vessel will lose its 
exemptions if it is sold to another corporation after July 28, 1987 would 
require many additional words to be read into the statute. (979 F.2d 1541)
That is, Randolf overruled the District Court’s original ruling because it was not based on 
the original language of the Anti-flagging Act. The District Court’s ruling was made on 
the basis of a House report that described the legislative intent of the Act. However, the 
legislative intent could not be inferred since the Act came before the Senate without the 
House Report relied on by the District Court. The Senate had only the Act to consider in 
voting. Therefore, the House Report could not be used to imply the intent of the act. 
Randolf had further issues with what it meant for the change of ownership. For instance,
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if one share of stock was sold, did that constitute a change in ownership (NPFMC 2002; 
B. Myhre, personal communication)?
Both the District and the Circuit Court appeared frustrated by the Act’s inexact 
language and incomplete legislative history. Attorneys with the USCG’s Office of 
Documentation and Tonnage consider the Anti-Reflagging Act so poorly crafted that its 
intent is often incomprehensible—and consequently, nearly impossible to implement. 
Senator Stevens concluded,
When we marked up that bill, we just didn’t do a good job. We should 
have closed that door, and we should have been very plain about what a 
rebuild was. And when we said, ‘to the owner’, we should have said, ‘to 
the original owner’, to the owner who submitted the papers at the time that 
the exemption was sought; but we didn’t. (NPSC 1990; NMFS 2002)
With the Circuit Court’s decision in place, the Anti-reflagging Act did little to slow 
the short-term growth of new processing capacity in EEZ fisheries. Although only 22 of 
the potential 46 vessel that the writers of the Act knowingly allowed into the fishery were 
ever given a fishery endorsement, this proved to be more than the pollock fishery could 
sustain. Instead of slowing down the number of vessels being rebuilt for at-sea processing 
in the pollock fishery, the number grew exponentially to ensure access to the fishery. 
Although there was an attempt to lobby Congress to amend the Act, no changes were to 
be made until nearly eleven years after its passage.
Rise of the Inshore and Offshore Sectors
As the number of rebuilt factory trawlers grew between 1988 and 1990, it became 
increasingly clear to both shore-based and at-sea processors that the capacity for pollock 
processing was going to exceed the amount of fish available. TALFF and JV allocations 
were becoming ever smaller and with additional processing capacity in the pipeline, it 
evident that TALFF and JV allocations would be eliminated altogether and that soon
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domestic processors were going to be fighting over the pollock resource. By 1990, nearly 
50 factory trawlers were participating in the fishery, and it was not only the at-sea sector 
that was growing, the inshore sector was undergoing a similar flurry of capital stuffing in 
processing and harvesting capacity. Trident was expanding its primary focus from 
pollock fillets, and through a partnership in 1988 with Nissou, had begun construction on 
a surimi plant (Atkinson 1988). With the political pressure placed on Japanese 
companies, large investments had been made in the domestic inshore sector with the 
UniSea, Alyeska, and Peter Pan focusing effort on producing pollock surimi. In addition, 
Westward Seafoods, another Japanese owned company, was building a plant in Unalaska 
that would become operational in 1991 for the production of pollock surimi. Although 
foreign-owned, these processing facilities were on-shore and qualified for the DAP 
allocations.
With the exception of Trident and Wards Cove, the investment used to build and 
develop these shore-based processing facilities came from Japanese companies, which at 
the time included Nippon Suisan, Maruha, Taiyo, Marubeni, and Nichiro. These 
companies were beginning to feel the pressure from the factory trawlers that were now 
taking part in the pollock fisheries. Until this point, the Japanese had been the dominate 
players in the pollock fishery. They were pioneers in the harvest and processing of the 
pollock resource in the 1960s and 1970s, and maintained more than 80% of the TALFF 
during the early 1980s. They had responded to U.S. pressure during the 1980s by helping 
U.S crabbers transition into JV trawlers. These Japanese companies assumed they would 
be able to reflag their vessels in the late 1980s to qualify for the DAP allocations.
But the Anti-flagging Act had cut off the Japanese’s access to pollock:
The Japanese had never thought, when they had all the joint ventures 
going through, that they would lose control. They thought that they would 
use the joint ventures as an interim step, then they would re-flag those 
boats, and the industry would be theirs. But they got cut off at the path.
(Hornnes 2006)
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Instead, most of their processing ships, which had been working in joint ventures and had 
been receiving a portion of the JV processing allocation, were now losing their allocation 
to the now expanding domestic processing fleet. Joint venture harvests and processing 
peaked at 1,057,316 mt in 1987 and by 1989 JV harvesting had declined to 277,186 mt, 
with only 93,415 mt of that going to foreign JVs (NPSC 1990; Hornnes 2006).
It was apparent that within a year or two, the only parts of the Japanese fishing 
operations that would be eligible for the DAP allocations of pollock were their shore- 
based processors. But these investments were threatened as well. With the shore-based 
processors expanding capacity, their portion of the pollock catch had risen from 23,133 
mt in 1986 to 242,278 mt in 1989. On the other hand, catches by domestic factory 
trawlers were rising faster, with growth from 31,080 mt in 1986 to 846,278 mt in 1989. 
This set the stage for a battle between the primarily Japanese dominated inshore sector 
and the rapidly expanding Norwegian financed factory trawler fleet (NPSC 1990; 
Hornnes 2006).
Operation Differences between Sectors
While the at-sea and inshore sectors each have unique strengths, by the early 1990s, it 
was clear that the at-sea fleet had an operational advantage under the race-for-fish. The 
domestic at-sea processing sector was composed of two primary fleets: factory trawlers 
and motherships. Unlike inshore catcher boats, factory trawlers have the advantage of 
being able to stay on a school of pollock for as long as it is profitable; with more time 
spent fishing and less spent traveling to and from fishing grounds, the factory trawlers 
were more efficient at catching fish than the catcher vessels delivering to shore-based 
processors. Pollock processed at-sea was also viewed more favorably by Japanese 
consumers. Because factory trawlers and motherships have the ability to process the 
pollock within hours, these processors typically receive higher prices for their products, 
especially surimi and roe (Bledsoe et al. 2003). For example, similar grades of roe 
typically receive a 30% premium if produced at sea.
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The primary distinction between motherships and factory trawlers is that motherships 
depended on fleets of catcher vessels to harvest the fish. In 1990, there were three 
domestic motherships operating in the Bering Sea pollock fishery, ranging from 305 feet 
to 688 feet long. Each mothership owned or contracted with a fleet of catcher vessels.
The Golden Alaska entered the North Pacific fisheries in 1985, the Ocean Phoenix 
entered in 1989, and the Excellence entered in 1990. Although motherships had the 
ability to process large volumes of fish, the mothership sector did not expand as rapidly 
as the factory trawl sector (NMFS 2002).
The catcher vessels operating in the Bering Sea are relatively homogenous; most have 
participated in a variety of BSAI fisheries, including pollock, Pacific cod, and crab. 
Vessels in this sector range from 60 to 193 feet, with most pollock trawlers in the 70 to 
130 foot range, with an average horsepower of 1,500, an average gross tonnage of 225 
mt, and an average hold capacity of 8,300 cubic feet. The stereotypical catcher vessel is a 
crabber retrofitted in the early 1980s. Catcher vessels’ operating range was largely 
determined by their hold capacity. Those with little or no storage capacity generally 
participated in the mothership sector where they could trawl in close proximity to the 
mothership and transfer laden codends. Catcher vessels with hold capacity and 
refrigerated sea-water hold cooling systems had the option to deliver to the motherships 
or shore-based processors. If they chose to deliver to shore-based processors, they would 
travel anywhere from half a day to up to two days to reach the fish. From the time they 
make their first tow of fish, they have 24 to 48 hours to transport the fish back to shore, 
otherwise quality degrades and the fish are only suitable for low-value products such as 
fishmeal. Consequently, catcher vessels delivering to shore-based processors focus their 
efforts as close to the plant as possible, typically within a range of 150 miles (NPSC 
1990; NMFS 2002).
In 1986, most catcher vessels were involved in joint ventures with foreign 
motherships. Of the approximate 130 catcher vessels operating in the Bering Sea in 1986, 
only 10 delivered primarily to the shore-based processors. Although motherships offered
64
lower exvessel prices, operating costs were also lower because less fuel was used 
between deliveries and more time could be spent fishing (NPSC 1990; NMFS 2002).
The JVP allocations peaked in 1987, after which, by 1990, increases in domestic at- 
sea and shore-based processing capacity entirely displaced JVP allocations. In 1986, 
920,817 mt, or over 96% of the pollock TAC was harvested by catcher vessels delivering 
to at-sea and shore-based processors. Three years later, catcher vessels landed only 38% 
of the pollock TAC, even though nearly the same number of catcher vessels were active 
in the fishery. Catcher vessels, which had been profitable and successful during the joint 
venture era, were in trouble. With the phasing out of the Japanese motherships and rapid 
expansion of the domestic factory trawler fleet which did not require catcher vessels, the 
options for the catcher vessels were becoming more limited. They could deliver to one of 
the three domestic mothership operations or to the shore-based processors, but in either 
case, they were losing out to the factory trawlers, which were more proficient at 
harvesting pollock (NPSC 1990).
The catcher vessels were not the only companies losing catch share. The shore-based 
processors, who depended on the catcher vessels for fish, were also de facto losers; they 
were limited by the amount of pollock that the catcher vessels could provide. In 1989, the 
inshore sector was composed of three major processors: Alyeska and UniSea in Unalaska 
and the Trident in Akutan. These three facilities had a combined capacity for 470,000 mt 
of pollock. With Westward Fisheries Inc. scheduled to complete construction of a plant in 
Unalaska in 1990, inshore capacity was expected to increase to 650,000 mt. With 
harvests of only 242,278 mt in 1989, catcher vessels delivering inshore were unable to 
fully supply the existing processors, let alone the Westward plant (NPSC 1990).
Trident was the only inshore processor focused on fillet production, but Trident also 
produced surimi. Alyeska, UniSea, and Westward focused on surimi production, ensuring 
the supply of surimi to their Japanese parent companies. These processors also produced 
roe, fishmeal, and fish oil from pollock and processed a variety of other species including 
cod, halibut, and crab. Shore-based processors did not face the same space constraints 
that apply to vessels at sea and were thus in better position to manage inventories in cold
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storage and to process low-valued byproducts. This was especially true under conditions 
where vessels were locked into a race for shares of a limiting TAC. Under the race-for- 
fish, factory trawlers focused on high throughput of high-value products such as surimi 
and roe rather than maximizing utilization rates. While shore-based processors also had 
an incentive to maximize throughput, they could recover additional value from fishmeal 
and fish oil. Nevertheless, this was not enough of an advantage to offset the operational 
advantages of the at-sea processors (NPSC 1990).
Inshore/Offshore I
The inshore sector realized it was losing the race for pollock. Expansion of the 
factory trawler fleet was not slowing and the inshore sector was already operating pollock 
processing lines at well below design capacity. To counter this trend, the shore-based 
processors decided to lobby for an exclusive sector allocation which would guarantee 
them a portion of the TAC or an exclusive fishing zone for inshore sector catcher boats 
extending to a one hundred mile radius around their processors. Faced with losing a race 
for fish on the fishing grounds, the inshore sector set out to transform the battle into a 
political contest to be waged before the NPFMC and in Congress.
An early and unsuccessful effort to protect the inshore sector was initiated in 
December 1986 when the mayors of Akutan and Unalaska asked the NPFMC to create a 
100-mile radius fishing zone around Unalaska, wherein fish could be harvested only if 
they were to be delivered to domestic processors. Had the proposal passed, it would have 
pushed joint ventures out of productive near shore fishing areas. The request did not lead 
to Council action but it laid the groundwork for subsequent efforts by the inshore sector 
to protect their harvesting area (NPSC 1990).
In June 1987, the NPFMC began to look at roe stripping—removal of the valuable 
roe from female pollock and discard of the remainder of their carcasses as well as all the 
male carcasses. This practice made financial sense in a fishery geared to maximize 
throughput of high-valued product and minimize the opportunity cost of hold space, but
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was overwhelmingly viewed as shamefully wasteful. Roe stripping took place because 
certain factory trawlers and motherships found that it was profitable to strip roe during 
the pollock spawning season, which typically takes place between January and the 
beginning of April. By stripping roe, factory trawlers could minimize their labor costs 
and dedicate scarce hold space to the most profitable product—roe. A ban on the practice 
of roe stripping was passed through the Council process in 1990 for the 1991 pollock 
season as Amendment 14 to the BSAI. By pressing the issue in public, inshore sector 
sought to further stigmatize factory trawlers which already stood accused of “Hoovering” 
the sea to the demise of Atlantic cod and other important fishery resources worldwide 
FMP (Low et al. 1989; Fahys 1990; NPFMC 1990; NMFS 2004).
Near the end of 1988, joint venture harvesters realized that there would be a dramatic 
drop in the coming year for pollock allocated under JVP and that within a few more years 
all pollock would be allocated to DAP. Catcher vessels realized they would be losing 
their contracts to fish for the foreign motherships and they would have few options other 
than to deliver to shore-based processors. By January 1989, the American High Seas 
Fisheries Association, which represented the vast number of JV catcher vessels, began to 
express interest in allying with shore-based processors to advocate for an inshore fishing 
zone which could be used exclusively by vessels delivering to shore-based processors. 
Doug Gorden, the Executive Director of the American High Seas Fisheries Association, 
believed that the Council would adopt a limited-access quota system which did not 
include allocations of shares to processors, but within that quota system, fish harvested 
within a certain zone would have to be delivered onshore. This would have guaranteed 
catcher vessels a portion of the catch (NPSC 1990; J. Plesha, personal communication).
The inshore sector had the support of an important ally in the U.S. Congress; 
Bundrant of Trident Seafoods had developed a close relationship with Senator Stevens, 
who maintained strong support for the Americanization of U.S. EEZ fisheries off the 
coast of Alaska. Earl Comstock, Stevens’ staffer for fisheries issues, indicated to 
representatives of the inshore sector that Senator Stevens would support creation of an 
inshore fishery zone to protect them from competition with factory trawlers. Comstock
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felt that it should be handled as soon as possible, as it was a non-election year for 
Congress, and the Magnuson Act was up for reauthorization. By this time, Senator 
Stevens was no longer the junior Senator who needed help introducing the MFCMA; he 
had become a powerful member of the Senate, having already served for over 20 years. 
Senator Stevens supported the inshore sector because he believed that doing so would 
mean jobs for Alaska; his support would prove to be vital for this and subsequent issues 
in the pollock fishery (J. Plesha, personal communication).
At the January 1989 NPFMC meeting, the inshore sector began talking to members of 
the NPFMC with an aim to have council members ready to consider analyzing an 
amendment to the BSAI fishery management plan to create specific inshore and offshore 
allocations of the pollock TAC by the April meeting. The inshore sector realized the 
difficulty they faced: they would have to convince the NPFMC—which was dominated 
by Alaska representatives—that the NPFMC should guarantee a portion of the pollock 
resource to the inshore sector, which was largely foreign-owned and based out of Seattle. 
Alaskans had sought statehood in part so that fish traps controlled by outside interests 
could be outlawed and could be expected to oppose regulatory actions that would grant 
external parties preferential rights to resources offshore of Alaska. Council members 
from Washington and Oregon could not be counted on to support the inshore sector 
because the at-sea sector was also almost entirely based out of Seattle and provided an 
enormous number of jobs to the Pacific Northwest. Thus the inshore sector realized that 
they needed to win over NPFMC members from Alaska (J. Plesha, personal 
communication).
Concern about the rapid expansion of the factory trawler fleet was not just an inshore 
sector concern. At the same January 1989 NPFMC meeting, companies with existing 
factory trawler investments expressed concern about overcapitalization of the domestic 
at-sea processing fleet. Pereyra, a NPFMC member who had investments in the at-sea 
sector, proposed a motion that would
Establish an immediate cut-off date of January 16, 1989, after which,
vessels not in the pipeline ‘may or may not be’ be considered by the
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Council as eligible for participation in the fisheries under the Council’s 
jurisdiction. (NPSC 1991)
Pereyra explained to the Council that no matter what they did, overcapitalization of the 
groundfish industry was a reality. He estimated that in 1989, there would be 69 U.S. 
factory trawlers in the North Pacific and in the following year there would be 100. The 
letter was signed by four individuals in the at-sea sector but was opposed by Trident and 
other members of the inshore sector who objected to limited access regulations that 
neglected consideration of shore-based processors (NPSC 1991).
The at-sea fleet sector had no incentive to support inshore processor allocations; they 
were winning the race-for-fish. Moreover, as a sector, the at-sea processors had a higher 
rate of domestic investment than did the shore-based processors, which should have 
given them an advantage in the court of public opinion. Although there had been 
significant investment from Norwegian, Korean, and Japanese interests, U.S. investors 
such as Francis Miller of Arctic Alaska Fisheries, Pereyra of Arctic Storm and Profish 
International, Morgan of Oceantrawl, as well as numerous Norwegian-Americans like 
Sjong and Uri had invested significant resources into the at-sea fleets. They appeared to 
hold the advantage in fighting off and delaying any inshore allocation.
The tide unexpectedly turned against the at-sea processors. About a month after the 
January 1989 meeting, a few factory trawlers surged into the Gulf of Alaska pollock 
fishery and scooped up more than 37,000 mt of pollock in six weeks. The high level of 
pollock catch prompted the NMFS to close down the fishery in March, a drastic action in 
a fishery that normally ran through December and supported a fleet of small Kodiak- 
based catcher boats (NPSC 1991; NMFS 2002; Wolff and Hauge 2008). Although the 
factory trawlers had not done anything illegal, the backlash was immediate. The picture 
of the big, evil factory trawlers taking all the fish from the small, local fishermen was 
media fodder. The Anchorage Daily News featured a front page article titled “Fleet 
Dumps Thousands of Tons of Fish,” highlighting the practice of roe stripping and 
denouncing the effects of factory trawlers on local fishing (Bernton 1989). Dave Harville,
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a Kodiak fisherman with three boats that delivered pollock to local shore-based 
processors:
This is the Seattle-ization of our fisheries. They took our fish and shut 
down their competition. Now, they’re going to go on out to [the] Bering 
Sea and fish the rest of the year. But we can’t move the island. (Bernton 
1989)
At the April 1989 NPFMC meeting, fishermen and processors from Kodiak, Alaska, 
requested that the Council consider specific allocations of fish for processing by the 
inshore and offshore components of the fishery to prevent future preemption of resources 
by one component of the industry. In testimony at that meeting, Dave Harville described 
the view that became the mantra for the inshore sector:
As the at-sea processing segment of our industry has grown, coastal 
communities have been increasingly concerned that unregulated at-sea 
processing would result in the demise of coastal communities. What 
happened with pollock in Kodiak last month proved that coastal 
communities should be frightened. But unless we want to kiss our 
coastal communities good-bye this can’t be allowed to happen again.
Shore-based processors must be given preferential access to the fish within 
their area. Just because the at-sea fleet is overcapitalized, doesn’t mean 
they should be allowed to devastate coastal communities. (NPSC 1991)
The view, which was being vocalized in front of the Alaska majority council and 
throughout Alaskan media, caricatured a largely foreign, Seattle-based sector out to 
destroy the Alaskan coastal communities and their shore-based processors. With Alaskan 
fishermen from Kodiak coming out in favor of an inshore allocation, it was the perfect 
coup for the BSAI inshore sector, setting in motion, at the Council level, the idea of a 
specific inshore allocation. After fierce debate from both sides, the NPFMC voted to 
request proposals from industry to be submitted to the Council by 9 June 1989, for
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consideration during the NPFMC’s June meeting. After that meeting, the Council 
newsletter stated that the Council:
... will adopt formal alternatives at its September meeting, commence 
analysis in October, and consider taking action in April 1990 to send the 
resulting amendment package out for public review.
The Council formed a working group, the Fishery Planning Committee (FPC), to work 
with NPFMC staff and agency personnel to review the various alternatives for an 
allocation of fishery resources between at-sea and inshore sectors. NOAA General 
Counsel was asked to advise on the legal viability of the various alternatives. With one 
ill-considered decision to fish in the GOA pollock fishery, a few factory trawlers opened 
the door for the introduction of separate inshore and offshore allocations, ushering in an 
era of turmoil in the fishery that industry participants describe as the “pollock wars” 
(Plesha, personal communication).
The FPC met on 6 September 1989 and identified several general alternatives, 
including status quo, super-exclusive registration areas, priority access for inshore 
deliveries, inshore-offshore allocations with or without special operational areas, a 
prohibition on factory trawlers in the Gulf of Alaska combined with special areas in the 
Bering Sea and Aleutians reserved for harvesters delivering to shore-based processing 
facilities, and traditional tools to extend the seasons and preserve product flow to all 
sectors of the industry. The Committee recommended that proposals dealing with limited 
entry and a prohibition on roe-stripping be considered outside of the inshore/offshore 
issue, as it was outside the scope of the issue and would slow down the inshore/offshore 
process (NPFMC 1992).
Arguments Against the Inshore/Offshore Allocation
Both sides presented strong arguments for and against the inshore/offshore allocation. 
Testimony from Pereyra outlines some of the strongest arguments advanced by the at-sea
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sector. He describes his involvement and investment in the mothership Ocean Phoenix, 
the largest vessel in the U.S. at-sea fleet:
The reason for getting into this project [the investment of the Ocean 
Phoenix] goes back a number of years when we first became involved in 
the joint ventures. At that time, we were advised by Congress, including 
such nobles as Senator Magnuson, Senator Stevens, Congressman Young, 
and others that the joint ventures weren’t going to last forever and while 
special provision was being given for joint ventures to be prosecuted, we 
had to look to the DAP sector for a long term operation. With this in mind, 
a couple years ago as the joint ventures started to peak, we joined together 
to look at options we might have for getting into DAP fisheries. (NPSC
1991)
The first argument is that development of the domestic at-sea sector was encouraged 
by the selfsame political leaders who encouraged development of the inshore sector. The 
owners of the Ocean Phoenix had spent in excess of $50 million. Why was it fair to treat 
the at-sea sector as “second class citizens?” In reference to the proposed preferential 
allocation to the inshore sector, Pereyra commented:
We feel [this] is a form of taking, and as such, would require that we be 
compensated for our losses.
This investment in the at-sea sector was made with the expectation of the status quo; that 
is, that the current rule structure would not change to favor one sector. It was unfair from 
the perspective of the at-sea sector for the Council to make fundamental changes that 
would expropriate the value of capital invested in the at-sea fleet (NPSC 1991).
Ron Pauly, vice president of Oceantrawl Inc., which owned three surimi factory 
trawlers, further argued that setting inshore/offshore allocations
... seem[s] in direct conflict with the encouragement that was given to this 
industry within the last two or three years to Americanize, of which the 
factory trawler group, as a group, are substantially responsible [for],. .It
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seems grossly unfair to be encouraged one year to invest and the following 
year face the possibility of losing potential livelihood. (NPSC 1991)
Not only did the at-sea sector argue that action alternatives proposed under amendment 
18/23 were unfair, but that such an allocation would reduce net benefits to the nation. 
Pauly argued:
We are efficient at catching fish. We’re efficient at processing fish. And 
we’re extremely efficient at maximizing the market value of that fish.
(NPSC 1991)
In the same vein, Pereyra argued that the at-sea sector possessed some additional 
advantages over the inshore sector:
The alternatives we had were building a processing plant and putting that 
processing plant on shore or in a floater near shore and modifying our 
catcher boats by lengthening them and installing RSW capability so that 
they could haul fish from the fishing grounds to the plant or floater. Or 
secondarily, building a processing plant and putting it into a floater and 
taking the floater to the fishing grounds. After considerable analysis and 
discussion, we chose the latter. The reason being is that we determined on 
a business decision basis that this was the most efficient way to operate. It 
was the most cost effective and it would make us competitive in the 
international market place, as we could produce the highest quality 
products at the most competitive prices. (NPSC 1991)
For those involved in the at-sea sector, a conscious decision had been made. It was more 
efficient and cost effective to operate at-sea. From a business standpoint, at-sea 
production was more cost efficient than inshore production (NPSC 1991).
Not only were at-sea processing vessels more cost-effective, but the products 
produced at-sea were of a higher quality, which meant that they were able to obtain 
higher prices in the market place. Trawlers delivering to shore delivered fish that had
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often sat in refrigerated tanks for 24-48 hours before processing. At-sea processors were 
able to get the most value from the pollock. In that regard, Pereyra argued that:
In actuality, the discrimination against off-shore processors would reduce 
the overall efficiency and competiveness of [the] domestic industry in the 
marketplace. In this regard, it’s a clear violation of national standard five 
[in the MFCMA]. (NPSC 1991)
National standard five states that:
Conservation and management measures shall, where practicable, consider 
efficiency in the utilization of fishery resources; except that no such 
measure shall have economic allocation as its sole purpose. (MSFCMA 
2007)
Processing at-sea was more profitable, and to take fish away from the at-sea sector and 
give it to the inshore sector was not efficient or competitive but instead served a sole 
purpose of economic allocation (NPSC 1991).
The at-sea processors also felt that giving the inshore sector an allocation would 
adversely impact employment:
The Ocean Phoenix project got started by finding a large vessel in which 
to build and install a processing plant. It required a used container ship 
680 feet long. [We] built a large processing plant and have installed that 
plant in the container ship. The vessel is now in Portland, Oregon being 
finished and hopefully will be in the Bering Sea in December receiving 
fish from seven JV catcher boats, or ex-JV catcher boats I should say, 
producing surimi, fillets, roe, and meal from pollock. Together, we will be 
employing throughout the year in excess of 400 people. And the total cost 
of this endeavor is in excess of $50,000,000.
Why are we concerned? We are greatly concerned because the majority of 
the proposals that you have before you, or the options you have before
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you, to give priority to fish delivered to shoreplants would put limits on 
our mobility which we feel is very important to our success and would 
also limit the availability of fishing grounds to us. Such measures would 
severely damage and probably bankrupt our operation. Hundreds of people 
would lose their jobs. (NPSC 1991)
One of the most important issues raised by the at-sea sector was the fact that the 
MFCMA mandates that the EEZ fisheries should be managed in a manner that is most 
beneficial to the country as a whole. Bert Larkins, AFTA’s executive director at the time, 
pointed out an important topic that was little discussed:
One, we’ve heard about how the Magnuson Act requires that some 
concern be expressed about the coastal communities involved. I agree ... I 
think that this Council’s area of jurisdiction [over] coastal communities 
that would apply here include Newport, Oregon. The[y]include Westport.
They include Seattle as much as they do Kodiak and Dutch Harbor.
(NPSC 1991)
That is, the impact of any changes needed to be looked at through the eyes of all affected 
states, not just the State of Alaska. Although the Council was dominated by Alaska 
representatives, the Council needed to examine what was most beneficial to the country 
as a whole, as required by the MFCMA (NPSC 1991).
Arguments for the Inshore/Offshore Allocation
The inshore sector countered with several arguments, advocating strongly for an 
inshore allocation. Their wisest move was, however, to continue to leave the focus on 
Kodiak fishermen and processors. The inshore sector emphasized Alaska and what would 
happen to Alaska’s rural economies if the at-sea sector were allowed to continue to 
expand. They argued that the demise of shore-based processors would irreparably harm 
Alaska’s coastal communities through the loss of jobs, income, and tax revenues. Not
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only would an inshore allocation protect current Alaska jobs, it would increase economic 
benefits and jobs available to Alaskans. According to testimony of Brindle, of Wards 
Cove Packing Company, and a 50% partner in Alyeska Seafoods:
Our company has two plants located on Kodiak Island.. .I have sitting in 
my desk drawer, a couple of Corp. of Army Engineer permits for 
expansion, [but] after the experience of last spring [shut down of the Gulf 
of Alaska Fishery] . we were shut down. What we do . depends on the 
action of this Council. We think the future of shoreside communities in 
Alaska is basically at stake. (NPSC 1991)
Most of the testimony from the inshore sector focused on Alaska, and how the loss of 
shore-based processors would affect the communities they were located in (NPSC 1991).
It was anticipated that gains from the inshore allocation would most likely accrue to 
the economies of western Alaska and Pacific Northwest, with Unalaska being the largest 
winner. With three major pollock processors located in Unalaska, it was expected that the 
local economy would benefit from stable employment and indirect spending. According 
to the cost/benefit analysis conducted for the proposed sector allocations, Unalaska stood 
to gain 388 full-time equivalent jobs. The Washington economy was also expected to 
benefit, since most shore-based processors were based out of Seattle, and companies 
tended to recruit a majority of their employees from the region (Iani 1992; NPFMC
1992).
The inshore sector also pointed to some important operational advantages of the 
factory trawlers, such as their ability to avoid local and state taxes in Alaska; shore-based 
processors in Unalaska paid a 3% sales tax as well as a 3% state fish tax, 50% of which 
went back into the local economy. They argued that an increase in shore-based 
production would benefit the local communities by contributing much needed funding for 
infrastructure. The tax revenue was an important source of income for communities that 
had very few other sources of income (NPSC 1990; NPFMC 1992).
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The at-sea sector was also able to avoid numerous regulations, such as the State of 
Alaska water-quality standards and many workplace laws, which only apply to 
companies on-shore. The NPSC (1990) also points to the high level of foreign investment 
in the at-sea sector—although it reluctantly recognizes the high level of foreign 
investment in shore-based processors such as UniSea, Westward, Peter Pan Seafoods, and 
Alyeska Seafoods, among others. NPSC (1990) outlined three proposals for providing 
increased protection for the inshore sector. The first was to start the fishing season after 
April 1, effectively eliminating the race for the valuable roe product, even though it 
acknowledged that the NPFMC’s SSC found no evidence of adverse biological impacts 
from harvesting spawning pollock. The second proposal was for increased protection for 
the area around Unalaska, similar to the 100-mile zones first proposed in 1986. The last 
was a proposal for a 50/50 split of the pollock TAC between the inshore and offshore 
sectors.
Both the inshore and offshore sectors raised valid arguments. Each sector had grown 
since the mid-1980s, while investing a significant amount of capital, all with the support 
of Congress. With the exception of Trident, growth of the inshore industry was a result of 
U.S. pressure on Japan to encourage plant construction. The Japanese had little choice 
about making their initial investment, as the United States threatened to withhold their 
TALFF and JV allocations and would have excluded them from the pollock fishery. The 
at-sea sector had also invested with the encouragement of Congress. Congress knew that 
foreign investment supported many of the vessels; nonetheless, it was viewed as a 
desirable counterweight to Japanese influence in the inshore sector and was in 
conjunction with U.S. fishermen (Hornnes 2006). Furthermore, domestic investors had a 
choice whether to invest the inshore or at-sea sectors, and with the exception of Trident 
and Wards Cove, most choose to invest in the at-sea sector, because it was more efficient 
and profitable. Perhaps the strongest argument the Japanese inshore sector could muster 
in support of the inshore/offshore allocation, was that their investment had been coerced 
and therefore merited a portion of the allocation (NPSC 1990).
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Alaska’s coastal communities would also be affected if inshore sector were to be 
wiped out by continued growth of the at-sea sector, although the magnitude of the impact 
was less certain. Both the inshore and offshore sectors required support services in 
Unalaska. Hotels, airplane, and grocery services were used by fishing and processing 
crew. There was also the occasional need for repair and supply services. For the most 
part, however, both sectors purchased their supplies from Seattle, hired nonresident and 
foreign crew and laborers, and had headquarters in Seattle or elsewhere outside Alaska.
In addition, the fishing and processing crew often worked twelve to sixteen hours a day, 
so the amount of money they spent in Unalaska or Akutan was minimal. Companies such 
as Trident, have company stores set up for most necessities and barge up their own fuel.
A majority of the catcher boats that participated in the mothership and inshore sectors 
were based out of Seattle and elsewhere outside of Alaska. If shore-based pollock 
processors were to have closed, there would have been adverse impacts in Unalaska and 
Akutan, but some of the adverse impacts would have been offset by increased demand for 
support services related to the at-sea sector. The bigger loss to the communities would 
have been the loss of tax revenue. Akutan’s budget is almost entirely supported by local 
taxes paid by Trident. While Unalaska has a somewhat more diverse tax base, the taxes 
paid by the shore-based processors are a substantial component of city finances (NPSC 
1990; NPFMC 1992).
In reality, in the 1990’s, the EEZ fisheries off Alaska were to a large degree “Seattle’s 
fisheries.” Everyone involved in the fishery knew this, and the goal of inshore sector was 
to position themselves as “more” Alaskan in an effort to encourage Alaskan members of 
the NPFMC to favor a sector allocation favorable to the inshore sector. They knew, 
however, the precariousness of their position. At the time of the September 1989 NPFMC 
meeting, Plesha felt it was more difficult to argue for a quota than just for the “protection 
from the factory trawlers ability to pulse-fish,” which would have simply meant 
protection from factory trawlers in a zone around Unalaska. The inshore sector had to 
“continue to make Alaska aware how important this issue is to the State” (J. Plesha, 
personal communication). It was, however, going to be difficult to do, as a cost/benefit
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analysis conducted for the NPFMC suggested that implementation of the proposed sector 
allocations would likely reduce net national benefits by $153 million (Miller et al. 1992).
Reaching out to Congress
The at-sea sector seemed to realize it was fighting a losing battle at the NPFMC level. 
While it continued to defend and represent itself before the Council, the at-sea sector 
began to focus effort at a congressional level. The at-sea sector lobbied in favor of 
changes to the MFCMA, which was up for renewal in 1990, with an aim to increase the 
number of Washington and Oregon representatives on the Council. Pushing for the seats 
was a risky maneuver with a potentially big payoff. With additional seats, the at-sea 
sector hoped to be able to block the creation of an inshore zone or an inshore sector 
allocation, but a failed effort to amend the MSFCMA risked stiffening support for the 
inshore sector among Alaskan appointees to the NPFMC. The at-sea sector enlisted the 
help of Washington State’s Democratic congressional delegation, although it was unable 
to gain the support of Washington senator Slade Gorton. He maintained careful neutrality 
as he had constituents on each side of the dispute. As a countermeasure, the at-sea sector 
secured the services of Jim Gilmore, an influential D.C. lobbyist (Brown 1992a; J.
Plesha, personal communication).
The inshore sector seemed to have the support of Senators Stevens and Murkowski of 
Alaska, as well as Alaska congressmen Don Young. However, Young, who had pledged 
his support to the inshore sector, suggested that a compromise might be in order, offering 
one additional seat for Washington and Oregon—as long as Alaska received one in 
return. The inshore sector expressed its strong opposition to Young’s suggestion, telling 
Young that if he even talked compromise, many Alaskans would be furious. In addition 
to directly courting Congress, the inshore sector hired Charles Black of the high-powered 
public-affairs firm Black, Manafort, Stone, &  Kelly. Black was highly influential in 
political circles, and was later appointed co-chair on President Bush's re-election 
campaign in 1992 (Brown 1992a; J. Plesha, personal communication).
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Both parties to the inshore/offshore contest also tried to argue their points through the 
media, with the at-sea sector focusing their efforts on the Washington state area and the 
inshore sector focusing on Alaska. The Seattle Times published various articles, many of 
them supporting the factory trawlers and complaining of NPFMC bias against the at-sea 
sector (Brown 1992b; Schaefer 1992a; Schaefer 1992b; Schaefer and Wilson 1992). The 
Seattle Times posted stories of local Seattle fishermen who fished catcher vessels in the 
at-sea sector who opposed an inshore allocation (Anderson 1991a; Anderson 1991b; 
Brown 1992a). The inshore sector countered, with John Iani of the Pacific Seafood 
Processors Association repeatedly writing letters to the editor, contending that the Seattle 
Times articles omitted relevant facts favorable to the inshore sector (see, e.g., Iani 1991 
and Iani 1992). Articles favoring the inshore sector appeared in Alaska, with articles in 
the Anchorage Daily News covering topics such as the factory trawler’s exemption from 
the Fair Labor Standards Act’s minimum wage and overtime requirements (e.g., ADN 
1990 and Bernton 1990 ).
The at-sea sector also focused their efforts elsewhere. Emerald Seafoods, a factory 
trawler company, sold a substantial share of itself to Chugach, an Alaska Native 
corporation. Senator Stevens had historically used his Congressional pull to benefit 
Native Alaskans, and this seemed to be a ploy to influence the Senator. Indeed, Eric 
Silberstein, CEO of Emerald Seafoods, told participants at the December 1989 NPFMC 
meeting that now that Chugach owned part of Emerald Seafoods, Senator Stevens would 
back off the inshore/offshore issue. Not only that, he also asserted that Emerald Seafoods 
would be operating in the Gulf of Alaska in the spring of 1990. “Why not,” Silberstein 
said at the meeting. “It’s legal and we have an Alaska Native corporation as part owners. 
We have just as much right to operate there as anyone” (J. Plesha, personal 
communication).
If the at-sea sector had come out right after the 1989 Gulf of Alaska pollock closure 
and volunteered to refrain from fishing there in future years—much like the foreign fleets 
did in the early 1980s in the 100-mile radius around Unalaska, the inshore/offshore
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amendments may have been stopped. But with the race-for-fish and the instability within 
the fishery, factory trawlers were unable to organize a unified response.
And while Silberstein was correct that Emerald Seafoods and other factory trawlers 
could fish the Gulf of Alaska, it was not a wise idea to broadcast this information.
Instead, it probably just reinforced the tarnished image of the factory-trawler industry. 
Perhaps not coincidentally, NOAA shut down the Gulf of Alaska pollock fishery entirely 
in 1990, citing conservation concerns about the pollock biomass. Indignant, Emerald 
Seafoods sued NOAA, claiming the shutdown
... is really a political move against factory trawlers. To label it a 
conservation measure aimed at preventing overfishing is a complete 
misrepresentation. Its purpose is quite clear—to keep trawlers out of the 
Gulf. (Associated Press 1990)
By 1990, it was apparent to the at-sea sector that a plan amendment protecting the 
inshore sector was going to be passed by the NPFMC. Factory trawlers decided to hire 
Bill Timmons to lobby the White House. Timmons was a former Deputy Assistant to 
President Nixon, a former Assistant to President Ford, and National Director for 
President Reagan in 1980 and 1984. His connections in Washington, D.C. were 
considered second to none. Trident, who was involved in a 50-50 venture with ConAgra, 
a diversified food company, used Paul Karody, ConAgra’s lobbyist, and Senator Stevens 
to counteract Timmons’ influence. With strong lobbying on both sides, AFTA was unable 
to sway Congress to amend the MSFCMA to add more seats for Oregon and Washington 
to the NPFMC, and without that change, it was unlikely that the at-sea sector would be 
able to change the preferred alternative or final decision through the Council process (J. 
Plesha, personal communication).
Meanwhile, the inshore/offshore debate continued in NPFMC meetings. At the April 
1990 meeting, staff members for the Council indicated that the analysis for the 
inshore/offshore issue was going to have to be moved back, due to the complexity of the 
issue. With that change, the time for a final decision was to be moved to June of 1991. To
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reinforce the negative aspects of factory trawlers at the June 1990 NPFMC meeting, the 
inshore sector brought three fishermen up to testify, with the intention of establishing a 
record of grounds preemption, grounds souring (from discarded carcasses from roe- 
stripping), gear conflicts, and localized depletion caused by factory trawlers (J. Plesha, 
personal communication).
At the September 1990 NPFMC meeting, the issue of roe stripping was brought up 
for a vote. Although being considered separate from the inshore/offshore legislation, it 
was associated with the at-sea sector and portrayed them in a negative light. All at-sea 
processors came out in favor of a ban on roe-stripping, although a proposal to stop all 
fishing during the spawning season was rejected. Instead, the Council decided to look at 
allocating a portion of the pollock TAC to the spawning season, but decided to delay the 
vote until December in order to check with the NOAA legal counsel. The final decision 
by the NPFMC allocated the pollock TAC to “A” and “B” seasons, with up to 40% of the 
TAC allocated to the A or roe season (January-March) and the remainder to the B season 
(June-October). This was done with the intent of protecting the pollock during the 
spawning season, which some thought was important to the sustainability of the stock. 
Although there is no clear evidence that fishing at approved levels has a negative impact 
on the reproductive capacity even if the fishing were focused on spawning aggregations 
(NPFMC 1992, NMFS 2004).
After much debate between the Council and the FPC, the final draft of the 
Inshore/Offshore Draft Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement was completed 
for the April 1991 meeting and sent out for public review. In June 1991, after public 
review, the Council voted by a 7-4 margin to pass Amendment 18/23. The preferred 
alternative consisted of five major components:
1. For the Gulf of Alaska, 100% of pollock and 90% of Pacific cod would be 
reserved for vessels delivering to shore-based processors.
2. For the Bering Sea, the pollock TAC was to be allocated between the inshore 
and offshore sectors to be phased in over three years with the percentage
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reserved for the inshore sector starting at 35%, then rising to 40% in the 
second year, and 45% in the third year.
3. A catcher vessel operational area reserved for a specified time for inshore 
harvesters.
4. A sunset date of 31 December 1995 with reversion back to the status quo ante 
unless the Council adopted a comprehensive rationalization management 
strategy. Strategies to be considered included limited entry, individual fishing 
quotas (IFQ), and a continuation of the inshore-offshore allocation. And,
5. A 7.5% allocation of the Bering Sea pollock ABC for a Western Alaska 
Community Development Quota (CDQ) program.
The preferred alternative contained the important elements that the inshore sector desired: 
a guaranteed allocation of the pollock TAC, which was to be ratcheted up over time and a 
zone around the inshore processors which gave the inshore catcher vessels priority to the 
resource.
The preferred alternative also included a new and innovative component, the CDQ 
Program which set aside 7.5% of the pollock TAC to foster community development 
projects in Western Alaska. Eligibility and criteria for qualification in the program was to 
be established by Alaska’s Governor in consultation with the NPFMC, although the 
actual allocations would be released by the NMFS Alaska Region Office on behalf of the 
Secretary of Commerce (NPFMC 1992).
The initial rationale for the CDQ dates back to the Council’s Comprehensive Fishery 
Management Goals, which were adopted in 1984. The third goal called for the promotion 
of economic stability, growth, and self-sufficiency in maritime communities, with an 
expectation that improving the opportunities for maritime communities to enhance their 
self-sufficiency would benefit the region and the nation (NPFMC 1992). Henry Mitchell, 
an NPFMC member who represented western Alaskan interests, together with Harold 
Sparck, a rural-fisheries activist, devised the concept of the CDQ program and a strategy 
to use the inshore/offshore issue as a vehicle to create it. Mitchell was a lobbyist for
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Southeast Alaska charter fishermen, but had roots in western Alaska. Sparck was a 
resident of Bethel, Alaska, and headed an advocacy group, Nunam Kitlutsisti— Yup'ik 
for “protectors of the land”. Mitchell and Sparck wanted to create jobs to combat Western 
Alaska's seemingly hopeless poverty. They believed that Alaska's coastal villages 
deserved a cut of the hundreds of millions of dollars of fish being caught off their shores 
and came up with an idea to make it happen (DeMarban 2008).
The idea had additional supporters. In 1988, Paul Fuhs, mayor of the city of Unalaska 
circulated a six-page proposal to fishing industry members, proposing the idea of CDQs:
The clearest way to ensure that local communities will benefit from the 
bottom fishery is to allocate a Community Development Quota (CDQ) 
directly to Alaskan communities. This quota would be a powerful tool for 
providing jobs and financing for boats and harbor developments leading to 
stable rural economies.
At the April 1989 NPFMC council meeting, Fuhs testified in favor of some type of quota 
system,
which sets aside a community development quota for communities who 
have not yet had a chance to participate and can use this quota to leverage 
financing for the appropriate size vessels that it would take to process or to 
get the processing equipment.
He suggested “45% to fishermen, 45%  to the processors, [and] 10% to as a community 
development quota” (NPSC 1991).
At the June 1990 meeting, Mitchell, who was serving on the NPFMC at the time, 
proposed that CDQs be given to disadvantaged communities based upon 
recommendations of the Governor of Alaska to the Secretary of Commerce. To be 
eligible, a community must be located accessible to fishing grounds, have little economic 
viability outside of commercial fishing, have cultural dependence upon fishing, and not 
have previously substantially developed harvesting and processing capacity. He was 
supported by Council member Larry Cotter, who was a strong ally of the inshore sector.
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As the council debated the inshore/offshore issue, Mitchell added the CDQ amendment to 
the preferred alternative. Mitchell believed those Council members who opposed the 
inshore allocation voted to add the CDQ amendment even though they opposed it, 
thinking that the Secretary of Commerce Barbara Franklin would reject the entire 
measure because of the CDQ amendment. According to Mitchell, Franklin did not reject 
the package, because Senator Stevens carried through on his commitment to secure her 
approval (DeMarban 2008).
NMFS began its required review of Amendment 18/23 on 1 December 1991. On 4 
March 1992, NMFS approved Amendment 23 to the GOA FMP and approved 
Amendment 18 to the BSAI FMP with two exceptions. First, implementation of the 
sector split would have to be delayed until the 1992 pollock B season, to allow time for 
Secretarial review and required public notice and public comment period. Second, NMFS 
deemed that while a 35%/65% split would satisfy MSFCMA National Standards, 
proposed increases for the second and third years were not consistent with the National 
Standards. The NOAA Administrator stated that NOAA was not opposed to the concept 
of an allocation between onshore and offshore interests as an interim measure pending 
development of a solution to overcapitalization—ideally, a market-based solution. 
NMFS's disapproval of the BSAI pollock allocations for 1993 through 1995 was also 
based, in part, on a cost/benefit analysis prepared by NMFS that indicated a net economic 
loss to the Nation of $153 million under the proposed allocations for years 1993 through 
1995 (Miller et al. 1992). This was found to be a direct violation of national standard 7 
and Executive Order 12291, which directs the fishery councils to consider the economic 
implications of their actions. This marked the first time since the passage of the MFCMA 
that a cost/benefit analysis was cited as evidence for a significant U.S. fisheries decision 
(Herrick et al. 1994). The NOAA Administrator urged the Council to work as 
expeditiously as possible toward some method of allocating fish other than a free-for-all 
open access fishery or direct government intervention. It was also noted that preventing 
preemption by one fleet by another, safeguarding capital investments, protecting coastal 
communities that are dependent on a local fleet, and encouraging fuller utilization of
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harvested fish were desirable objectives consistent with the Magnuson-Stevens Act 
(NMFS 2002).
At its April 1992 meeting, the Council considered NMFS's objections and decided to 
revise Amendment 18. The Council supplemented its previous analysis of allocation 
alternatives. At a special meeting to consider this issue in August 1992, the Council again 
considered the comments of its advisory bodies and the public, adopted a preferred 
alternative, and submitted it to NMFS as revised Amendment 18. As adopted by the 
Council, revised Amendment 18 would have established a 35/65 inshore/offshore 
allocation for 1993, the first year of the revised amendment. The inshore allocation would 
then have increased to 37.5% for 1994 and 1995. In addition, revised Amendment 18 
proposed two changes to the CVOA. Under revised Amendment 18, the CVOA would 
only be in effect during the pollock B Season (1 September to 1 November), and 
motherships (and factory trawlers operating as motherships) would be allowed to receive 
deliveries and process pollock inside the CVOA as long as they did not engage in 
directed fishing for pollock themselves. In September 1992, the Council submitted 
revised Amendment 18 to NMFS for review and approval (NMFS 2002).
On 23 November 1992, after consideration of the revised amendment, public 
comments, the record developed by the Council, and the analysis of the potential effects 
of the proposed amendment, NMFS again partially disapproved revised Amendment 18. 
NMFS approved pollock allocations of 35% and 65% for vessels catching pollock for 
processing by the inshore and offshore components, respectively, for the years 1993 
through 1995, and the establishment of the CVOA. However, NMFS disapproved the 
2.5% increase for 1994 and 1995, finding that the sole purpose of the increased allocation 
to the inshore component during those years was economic, and therefore, in violation of 
national standards 4, 5, and 7 of the MSFCMA, as well as Executive Order 12291. The 
final rule implementing these decisions was published on 24 December 1992 (Miller et al 
1992; Herrick et al 1994; NMFS 2002).
AFTA fought the sector allocations and the CDQ in court, hoping to overturn the 
regulations as a violation of the MSFCMA. They sought an injunction against the new
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harvest regulations, but the new allocations were upheld by United States District Court 
Judge Barbara Rothstein on 24 July 1992. The at-sea fleet was left with no choice but to 
comply with the regulations.
With the inshore/offshore allocations in place, the offshore sector was headed for a 
tumultuous time. The inshore sector had won the political battle, guaranteeing itself a 
larger share of the pollock TAC and a measure of stability. The offshore fleet, on the 
other hand, had just gone through a period of rapid expansion in the number of active 
vessels and in the capacity of those vessels. The number of factory trawlers harvesting 
pollock had grown from a single vessel in 1985 to 54 in 1991. The capacity now far 
exceeded the quantity of pollock available to the at-sea sector.
The market was able to support the new vessels in 1991 and 1992 for a few reasons. 
The Japanese had controlled imports of seafood until the late 1980s through the use of 
import companies, limiting the introduction of U.S.-produced seafood products, and 
colluding on prices offered for U.S. seafoods. As a result, many domestic processors of 
pollock, such as Trident, initially focused their efforts on finding buyers in the U.S. 
market. With the Japanese losing most of their pollock allocation to the new domestic at- 
sea fleet, Japanese companies had no choice but to turn to U.S. processors for surimi and 
other products. But, they continued to exert monopsonistic control over import prices by 
funneling purchases through import/export companies that had the authority to collude to 
minimize prices paid to U.S. exporters.
The unequal balance of market power changed in 1990 when Rokke spearheaded 
formation of the United States Surimi Commission (USSC) under the authority of the 
Exports Trading Company Act of 1982. The Act was passed by Congress to stimulate 
U.S. exports of products and services. It allowed the U.S. Department of Commerce to 
issue a certificate which entitled a holder to a limited exemption under federal and state 
antitrust laws. The certificate
... has enabled our members to deal with a myriad of import quotas and 
other trade barriers that previously thwarted U.S.-owned fishing
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companies from successfully competing in various foreign markets— 
particularly Japan, the largest surimi market in the world. (D. Christensen, 
personal communication)
The USSC allowed the domestic at-sea fleet to establish a common negotiating position 
to offset the strong negotiating position of the Japanese import/export companies.
These are efforts that would be dauntingly difficult for relatively small 
independent companies to accomplish on their own behalf. (D.
Christensen, personal communication)
With control of a relatively large portion of the pollock surimi supply, the USSC was able 
to negotiate higher export prices.
With diminishing control over surimi sources and prices, as well as decreases in the 
amount of surimi held in Japanese cold-storage facilities, a perceived shortage of surimi 
occurred in Japan. Prices for surimi tripled over 1991 and 1992, as Japanese firms built 
up their inventories (D. Christensen, personal communication). The elevated surimi price 
partially offset the reductions in catch-per-boat caused by expansion of the at-sea sector 
and allowed the large number of factory trawlers to earn enough to continue fishing. 
However, with reduced catch shares entailed by the inshore/offshore allocation in the 
latter half of 1992 and unsustainable surimi prices, the pollock fishery was set up for a 
tumultuous period (Sproul and Queirolo 1994).
Implications of Inshore/Offshore I
The passage of Amendment 18/23 gave inshore processors protection from the 
factory trawler fleet and nearly doubled the amount of fish delivered during the previous 
year. This in turn allowed catcher vessels, which had been displaced by the transition 
from foreign JV operations, an opportunity to harvest fish. The sector allocations did not, 
however, address the more import issues facing the pollock fishery: overcapitalization 
and the associated race for fish. With estimated combined processing capacity of the
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inshore and offshore sectors reaching 3.2 mmt in 1990, and only 1.385 mmt allocated for 
catch, there was far more capacity than was needed to harvest and process the pollock in 
the Bering Sea (NPSC 1990).
If a fishery provides profitable opportunities and entrance to the fishery or investment 
in fishing vessels and vessel upgrades are unconstrained, more and more harvesting and 
processing capacity will enter the fishery. Without a TAC, unconstrained capacity growth 
decimates fish stocks. Imposition of a TAC can prevent overfishing and stock collapse, 
but in the absence of efficacious capacity constraint fisheries generally devolve into 
economically perverse derbies wherein vessels race to catch as much fish as they can 
before the TAC is met and the fishery closed. Under such circumstances, fishing 
companies tailor their operations to maximize catch-per-day by overspending on 
additional horsepower to get to the fish quicker, by building larger holds on the boats to 
be able to fish longer, and by spending more money on spare parts and supplies to ensure 
that their vessels can stay out longer. Vessels under a race-for-fish will fish under unsafe 
conditions, in order to ensure that they are able to catch as large of a share of the fish (and 
therefore revenues) as possible—as one trip can mean the difference between profitability 
and loss. Background documents written for the FCMA in 1976 recognize this.
Often too many fishermen, vessels, and gear concentrate in “harvesting” a 
particular species which may result in overfishing. When this happens, 
harvesting costs of fishermen increase and their efficiency decreases.
More fishermen often means less catch for each. To conserve fish 
resources, States have enacted regulations which generally give little 
consideration to fishermen’s economic efficiency. As the economic 
viability of fishermen becomes impaired, obtaining financing at 
reasonable rates of interest and with reasonable loan payback periods 
becomes more difficult for them. (GAO 1976)
Fishing under these conditions leads to the shortening of seasons. A classic case of 
this was the Pacific halibut fishery which had collapsed from a year-round fishery to a 
two-day season in the mid-1990s. Vessels in the halibut fishery would catch as many fish
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as possible on those two days and the catch would be thrown into freezers for processing 
at a future date, meaning lower prices were being paid for the product. The pollock 
fishery was headed in the same direction. Factory trawlers had been engineered to operate 
for 10 or 11 months a year. But as harvesting and processing capacity flooded into the 
fishery between 1988 and 1991 and catches were secured under a race for fish, NMFS 
responded with offsetting reductions in season length. By 1991, the pollock A season had 
been reduced to 53 days and the B season had been reduced to 95 days; five months of 
fishing time for vessels designed, financed, and built under expectations of longer 
seasons and correspondingly larger catches.
Compressed seasons due to the increased numbers of factory trawlers also meant 
lower-quality products, lower product recovery rates, and lower valued product forms: 
vessels were operated to produce products that were the fastest to produce. During this 
time, most at-sea vessels focused on surimi production, which is quicker and less labor 
intensive than fillet production. The race-for-fish was also behind the incentive to roe- 
strip before doing so was banned; it was more profitable to catch as many fish as 
possible, keep the high-valued roe and discard everything else. After the ban on roe- 
stripping was in place, it was still advantageous to strip the roe and create low-quality 
surimi and fishmeal products from the carcasses, rather than produce labor-intensive 
fillets. In the absence of rights to predetermined shares of the TAC, the individually 
sensible but collectively irrational decision was to maximize catch and throughput rather 
than maximize quality or product recovery rates.
Inshore/Offshore I did nothing to address the root issue of overcapitalization. In fact, 
for the at-sea sector, it intensified an already heated race for fish: instead of having access 
to nearly 80% of the TAC, the at-sea sector was limited to a maximum of 65% of the 
TAC. For the inshore sector, although they were now guaranteed 35% of the TAC, 
catcher vessels had taken over a million mt of pollock in JV partnerships in 1987, so 
Inshore/Offshore I simply guaranteed them a share of the TAC that was much smaller 
than they had taken before the rapid expansion of the domestic at-sea sector. The three
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motherships in the at-sea sector had, for the most part, their own fleet, so most of the 
former JV fleet was locked into deliveries to the inshore sector (NPSC 1990).
Because Inshore/Offshore I failed to address overcapitalization, the race-for-fish 
quickly intensified within each sector. From 1993, the first full year of sector allocations, 
through 1997, annual season length shrank by 33% in both the inshore and offshore 
sectors (Figure 1.4; Figure 1.5). The factory trawler fleet was arguably hurt the most; as it 
saw its already short seasons shrink more: the valuable A season, where the profitable roe 









Figure 1.5. Offshore season length. 
Source: NPFMC (1998).
High surimi prices in 1991 and 1992 helped the factory trawlers weather the 
shortened seasons and ensuing reduction in average catch-per-vessel, with many 
companies making just enough to get by. In 1993, however, they were hit with a perfect 
financial storm. First, the factory trawlers faced their first full season under 
Inshore/Offshore I, meaning their catch share was to be reduced by 12.6%. Second, the 
factory trawlers faced a changed surimi market. At-sea vessels had turned their focus to 
producing more surimi. Russia, seeing the increased demand and prices for surimi, also 
stepped up production. In 1993, with Japanese inventories full and the additional product 
in the marketplace, surimi prices plunged. Factory trawlers were hit hard, and it had an 
immediate effect on the industry (NPFMC 1995a; Hornnes 2006).
With limited ability to move the factory trawlers outside the U.S. EEZ, the banks that 
made the loans to build and convert vessels were in immediate danger. Norway’s 
Christiania Bank, which had substantial loans tied up in the factory trawlers, initially 
chose a bridge-building strategy with the expectation that individual transferable quotas 
(ITQ) would be passed. Catch-share systems involve entitling beneficiaries exclusive 
rights to harvest a certain percentage of TAC. Depending on the type of catch share 
system, the entitlement can be held by individuals or corporations; it can be bought, sold
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or leased to others; and in many cases, even used as collateral for loans. Norwegian banks 
and investors hoped and expected that an ITQ system would be implemented before 
Inshore/Offshore I expired (Hornnes 2006).
Even with the support of some banks, 1992 through 1998 were characterized by 
numerous bankruptcies and substantial consolidation in the at-sea sector. Although there 
were 54 factory trawlers fishing in 1991, records indicate that only 25 vessels fished in all 
six years from 1991 through 1996. Major turnovers occurred with an annual average exit 
rate of 25% over that time period. When companies failed to meet obligations, banks 
were left holding vessels that had few alternative uses. With too many vessels already 
fishing in the Bering Sea and few other fisheries large enough to support large vessels, 
banks chose to cut their losses and sell the vessels at whatever price they could get even 
if the sales price was insufficient to cover the bank’s equity. This allowed repossessed 
vessels to enter the fishery at a lower capital investment, and therefore, the ability to turn 
a profit with a smaller amount of fish than had been needed to support the same vessel at 
an earlier date (NPFMC 1998; Hornnes 2006; Pollock Conservation Cooperative 2008).
Where other investors were scrambling to liquidate their assets, Rokke, through 
American Seafoods, saw these tumultuous times as an opportunity to purchase factory 
trawlers at fire sale prices. Because the initial allocation under a ITQ system is usually 
based on the catch history of the vessel, Rokke set out to acquire as many vessels and as 
much catch history as he could, even if it meant being saddled with unprofitable vessels 
until an ITQ was implemented. In short order, Rokke became the primary player in the 
factory-trawler fleet (Hornnes 2006).
American Seafood’s first purchases were two factory trawlers, the Pacific Scout and 
Pacific Explorer, formerly the Crystal Scout and Crystal Viking, which had been 
converted in Norway in 1988. Rokke added to his fleet with purchase of the Royal 
Prince, which had been converted in Norway in 1987 for nearly $11 million financed 
with 100% of equity. In the same year, 1994, Rokke’s partners sold out leaving him with 
a 90% ownership stake in American Seafoods which then controlled six factory trawlers. 
Another major player, Tyson Foods Inc., entered the pollock-factory-trawler fleet in 1992
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when it purchased Arctic Alaska Fisheries for an estimated $212 million. Tyson, a leader 
in the poultry industry, was looking to expand their offerings to seafood products. Arctic 
Alaska’s fleet of 31 vessels included five at-sea processing vessels involved in the 
pollock fishery. Tyson bought Arctic Alaska Fisheries at its peak, taking on substantial 
debt, but the purchase made Tyson an instant player in the pollock fishery. The last 
significant purchase made under Inshore/Offshore I was by Pereyra and his company, 
Arctic Storm Fisheries. In 1994, Arctic Storm Fisheries purchased the Michelle Irene and 
renamed it the Arctic Fjord, bringing the number of factory trawlers his company owned 
to two. While the purchases made by Tyson, American Seafoods, and Arctic Storm were 
significant, they merely foreshadowed even greater turmoil to come (Hornnes 2006).
Inshore/Offshore II
With the turmoil in the factory trawler fleet, the NPFMC process was followed with 
great anticipation. Inshore/Offshore I was intended to be a short-lived bridge to a 
comprehensive rationalization program that would end the race-for-fish and allow an 
orderly partial decapitalization of the fishery. The at-sea sector favored some type of ITQ 
or license-limitation program. In addition, it was felt that some type of buyback program 
would be needed to remove excess capacity from the fishery. Shore-based processors 
remained opposed to rationalization of the fishery unless the program included some type 
of processor share. Moreover, Trident and other inshore companies realized they would 
not receive large amounts of quota if shares were granted based on past catch history. It 
was in the best interest if the inshore sector to stall rationalization as long as possible 
while pressing for interim measures that would allow them to increase their catch history.
While vessels continued to race each other for fish in the Bering Sea, their owners 
jockeyed for advantage in the Council arena and corridors of Congress. Factory trawlers, 
desperate to stem capacity growth, pressed for a moratorium on new vessels. The Council 
began to look at a Comprehensive Rationalization Plan (CRP) in November 1992, shortly 
after they had finished with Inshore/Offshore I, and established the Comprehensive
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Planning Committee (CPC) to suggest an appropriate course of action. In January 1993, 
the CPC determined that some type of limited-license program or IFQ system would best 
address the current issues facing the fisheries in the Bering Sea. The CPC determined that 
a limited-license system could deal with five of the fourteen issues that needed to be 
addressed in rationalization of the pollock fishery and that an IFQ system could deal with 
thirteen of the fourteen issues (NPFMC 1995a).
The CPC, meeting June 1993, looked into limited license programs and individual 
fishing quotas, as well as into allocations to processors or a possible two-pie scheme with 
allocations to harvesters and processors, for all groundfish and crab fisheries in the 
Bering Sea. Planning for the CRP at the September 1993 meeting laid out a number of 
alternatives. The first alternative was the overall groundfish/crab IFQ alternative, which 
was to be identified as the preferred plan. The second alternative was a two-pie IFQ 
alternative, which would create Individual Processor Quotas (IPQs) to mirror the IFQs 
for the harvesting sector. Although prejudged as illegal by NOAA general counsel, the 
Council wanted to move forward with the idea for analytic purposes. The third alternative 
was a limited-license program (LLP) (J. Plesha, personal communication; NPFMC 
1995a).
The focus remained on IFQs for all groundfish and crab fisheries, but the scope of the 
plan appeared to cover such a large number of interests that it further slowed down the 
process. The CPC was disbanded when the Council acknowledged that the contentious 
issue would require the entire Council’s full attention. At the January 1994 meeting, CRP 
dominated the discussion. It was determined by the Advisory Panel that a license- 
limitation program would allow for the quickest implementation. However, the Council 
concluded that a license-limitation program would not address the issue of the 
inshore/offshore allocations, and asked staff to begin evaluation of continuing the 
inshore/offshore allocations program beyond the 1995 sunset date. The Council 
specifically instructed staff to look at extending the provisions of the Inshore/Offshore I 
for an additional three years to allow for a continued development of the CRP (NPFMC 
1995a).
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The at-sea sector, fearing additional reductions to their share of the pollock TAC, 
came out in support of Inshore/Offshore II. It had watched the Council try to steadily 
raise the inshore sector allocation in Inshore/Offshore I, and with no way to stop the 
adoption of the three-year extension through 1998, decided it was better to support a no 
change extension of Inshore/Offshore I while the Council took up design of a pollock 
IFQ program. Consequently, the at-sea sector testified in favor of the plan, and continued 
to push for the adoption of the CRP in the pollock fishery.
The inshore sector also backed a three-year extension of Inshore/Offshore I, but 
pushed for an increased inshore allocation. The inshore sector had growing excess 
capacity and desired a higher proportion of the TAC, whether it came through an IFQ 
program or through an increased sector allocation. As a vertically integrated company, 
Trident openly opposed any IFQ program that neglected to include protections for 
processors. In general, it appeared that opposition to an IFQ system was to be maintained 
until either processor quotas were included or a plan that provided increased benefits to 
the inshore sector was implemented. Politically, this gave Trident the power to hold off 
support for any ITQ proposal until they were offered something in return for their 
support. With the rate of bankruptcy in the at-sea sector, it appeared that at some point 
the offshore fleet would have to give up some of the TAC in order to get its support, or 
face continued financial instability.
By 1995, the NPFMC had made some progress on a long-term plan. In June 1995, it 
adopted a license-limitation program for the groundfish and crab fisheries, although a 
final rule was not submitted to NMFS until June 1997. The Council also passed 
Amendment 38/40, later be known as Inshore/Offshore II. Inshore/Offshore II was nearly 
identical to Inshore/Offshore I. It continued the 65%/35% sector allocations because the 
Council anticipated that changing the allocation would require rigorous cost-benefit 
analysis that was unlikely to support an increased inshore allocation. Inshore/Offshore II 
also carried on the pollock CDQ program and CVOA with two exceptions. It reduced the 
dimensions of the CVOA and allowed the at-sea sector to fish in the CVOA once the 
inshore quota was filled (NPFMC 1995a).
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Reauthorization of the Magnuson Stevens Act
Although Inshore/Offshore II was little more than a three-year extension of 
Inshore/Offshore I, it had a significant impact on the factory-trawler fleet. Banks had 
provided bridge financing, hoping that an IFQ system would be implemented by 1995; 
they realized that it would be three or more years before a CRP plan could be 
implemented. In addition, although a LLP had been approved by the Council (NPFMC 
1994), NMFS had not yet completed draft rules to implement the LLP, let alone 
submitted the draft rule for Secretarial review. The uncertain regulatory process and 
uncertainty about the ultimate outcome led banks to lose confidence in the ability of 
fishing companies to make good on their vessel-backed loans. Owners of factory trawlers 
that had endured losses in anticipation of receiving windfall capital gains under an initial 
allocation of IFQ also came to realize that there would be no near term solution to the 
overcapitalization and race-for-fish problems and thus the unenviable prospect of at least 
several years of continued operating losses.
Another bill, which was developed and passed outside the Council process, further 
impacted the possible introduction of IFQs. An amendment to the MFCMA was passed in 
1996 and put into law in 1997. The legislation, which renamed the MFCMA the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA), focused on 
overfished fisheries, protecting essential fish habitat, and reducing bycatch. The bill also 
established a moratorium on new IFQ management regimes until after completion of a 
National Research Council study of the effects of IFQs (National Research Council
1999).
The MSFCMA effectively eliminated IFQs as an option for rationalizing the pollock 
fishery. Not only were the shore-based processors relieved of the threat of adoption of a 
fisher-only IFQ program that would work to their disadvantage, but the MSFCMA also 
stipulated that “the term ‘individual fishing quota’ does not include a sector allocation,”
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thereby providing assurance that the legitimacy of the inshore/offshore allocation scheme 
could not be challenged.
While a specific rule on a LLP was still being debated, it was clear that no matter 
what that rule entailed, it would do little to change the battle between the inshore and 
offshore sectors. At most, the LLP would stop the addition of new vessels to the fishery; 
it would do nothing to reduce existing superfluous harvesting or processing capital. In 
addition, the at-sea sector had to look forward to an ongoing and likely inefficacious 
political battle against increases in the inshore allocation (NPFMC 1994). The 
combination of Inshore/Offshore II and the moratorium on IFQs triggered a wave of 
bankruptcies in the at-sea sector; with no end to the race-for-fish in sight, bankruptcy and 
consolidation became the norm. American Seafoods, which owned six factory trawlers in 
1996, seized the opportunity to buy up every bankrupt factory trawler it could find. The 
company first bought the Ocean Rover, a vessel which had been converted in Norway. It 
then signed an agreement with Oceantrawl Inc., the U.S./Japanese-owned company 
represented by Bob Morgan, to manage its factory trawlers, the Northern Eagle, Northern 
Hawk, and Northern Jaeger, a fleet it later purchased. American Seafoods’ next major 
purchase included five vessels from International Marine Management, Inc., which had 
been owned by investors including Uri, Sjong, and Ness. This fleet included four vessels 
converted in Norway, the Royal Sea, Snow King, Royal King, and Royal Princess, as well 
as the Aleutian Speedwell, which had been converted in the United States. Their names 
were changed to the Katie Ann, Elizabeth Ann, Rebecca Ann, Victoria Ann, and Christina 
Ann. In 1997, American Seafoods also purchased three of the Emerald Seafoods vessels, 
the Claymore Sea, Heather Sea, and Saga Sea. With these purchases, American Seafoods 
controlled a fleet of nineteen factory trawlers, sixteen of which were then operating in the 
U.S. E.E.Z. and represented over half of the factory-trawler capacity in the pollock 
fishery.
Along with the consolidation in the U.S. fishery, several vessels were sold to 
companies operating outside the Alaska fisheries. Some of these vessels were sold to 
Russian companies. One was the Arctic Trawler, the first U.S.-owned factory trawler
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used in the Bering Sea for groundfish. Tyson also sold a factory trawler to Russia. In 
addition, Emerald Seafoods sold three vessels to a Russian enterprise that was unable to 
meet its payment obligations; the vessels were later bought out of bankruptcy by 
American Seafoods (Plesha 1997).
According to Rokke, these investments were part of calculated strategy which he felt 
would give him an edge. First, Rokke continued to hope for the eventual implementation 
of an ITQ-management system. He felt that controlling a large fleet of factory trawlers 
would give him a strong position to persuade policy makers to allow implementation of 
an ITQ program. Second, a large fleet would give him control over a large portion of the 
quota. That would guarantee that he would be richly rewarded in quota share. Lastly, he 
felt it would enable American Seafoods to surrender vessels in give-and-take negotiations 
on an ITQ system. He was guessing that if legislation was passed, there would be some 
type of buyback provision to reduce excess capacity, and he would be able to sell the 
least-efficient vessels in his fleet while retaining their catch history for use by his most 
efficient vessels (Hornnes 2006).
Introduction of Inshore/Offshore III
With the continued bankruptcies within the factory trawler fleet, and the continued 
rise of American Seafoods, talk at the Council level focused on reduction of fleet 
capacity and rationalization plans. Paul MacGregor, an attorney representing the factory 
trawlers testified at a 1997 meeting:
.. .boats don’t go away. People buy’em and the people that buy them are 
the ones.. .that are the more successful companies. As companies have 
gone bankrupt in the offshore fleet, a number of companies have picked 
them up. So you have today a fleet that’s pretty much the same size as it 
was back in 1990, there have been a few vessels sold to Russia, but absent 
those your fleet is more or less the same size. (Plesha 1997)
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Testimony for the at-sea sector continued to focus on some type of fleet reduction plan or 
rationalization plan, since sector allocations had only hurt and decreased the stability of 
the at-sea sector (Plesha 1997).
Still, attempts at rationalization stalled, and the Council prepared to revisit the 
inshore/offshore sector allocations for the third time. At their April 1997 meeting, the 
Council acknowledged that a comprehensive rationalization plan to address 
overcapitalization and preemption issues could not be adopted and implemented prior to 
the expiration of Inshore/Offshore II. The Council began development of a third set of 
inshore/offshore FMP amendments. In June 1997, the Council requested information in 
the form of pollock-industry profiles that enabled it to examine the evolution and current 
status of the BSAI pollock fisheries from 1991 through 1996, and at its September 1997 
meeting, after examination of the industry profiles, consideration of public comment, and 
Council discussion, the Council adopted a complex set of inshore/offshore alternatives 
for analysis (NPFMC 1998).
Over the course of the next several Council meetings, these inshore/offshore 
alternatives evolved into five basic alternatives and included various sub-options within 
each alternative. At the June 1998 meeting, the preferred alternative was similar to the 
Inshore/Offshore II with a couple of modifications: (1 ) 4% of the BSAI pollock TAC, 
after subtraction of reserves, would be shifted to the inshore sector resulting in a 39/61 
inshore/offshore allocation split; (2 ) a portion of the inshore Bering Sea B-season 
allocation, equal to 2.5% of the BSAI pollock TAC after subtraction of reserves, would 
be set aside for small catcher vessels, and would become available on or about August 25 
of each year to other vessels; and (3 ) catcher vessels delivering to the offshore sector 
would be prohibited from fishing inside the CVOA during the B season from September 
1 until the inshore sector B-season allocation was closed to directed fishing. Amendment 
51 would remain in effect for the years 1999 through 2001 (NPFMC 1998).
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Cooperatives
During 1998, while the Council was discussing Inshore/Offshore III, factory trawler 
companies began building support for an alternative approach to rationalize the pollock 
fishery: harvesting cooperatives, similar to that created in the Pacific whiting (Merluccius 
productus) fishery off the coast of Washington in 1997. The whiting cooperative 
provided fishermen with an opportunity to enjoy the benefits of individual catch shares 
while legally circumventing the moratorium on new IFQ programs (PFMC 1993; Sylvia 
and Larkin 1995; Freese et al. 1995; Larkin 1998; Townsend 2005).
The Pacific whiting fishery and the pollock fishery shared key similarities. They had 
a similar industrial organization with inshore and offshore sectors consisting of factory 
trawlers, motherships, shore-based processors, and catcher boats, with nearly all of the 
catch being processed into surimi (Hastie et al. 1991; Radtke 1991; Dorn et al. 1993; 
Larkin and Sylvia 2000). Like the pollock fishery, the Pacific whiting fishery had been 
managed with sector allocations, with a preference given to the inshore sector. Within 
each sector, vessels raced for fish, leading to compressed seasons, reduced product 
quality and reduced product recovery (PFMC 1993; PFMC 1995; PFMC 1997). 
Similarities between the pollock and Pacific whiting fisheries also extended into capital 
ownership. For example, the ten factory trawlers involved in the Pacific whiting fishery 
were owned by four companies that also participated in the pollock fishery: American 
Seafoods, Tyson, Glacier Seafoods, and Alaska Ocean.
With the intent of ending the race-for-fish and securing their portion of the whiting 
TAC, the four companies lobbied for authority to form a harvesting cooperative. The idea 
was to combine features of the enterprise allocation system utilized in the Atlantic cod 
fishery of the east coast of Canada with provisions of the Fisherman’s Cooperative 
Marketing Act of 1934 which provides limited antitrust exemptions for the fishing 
industry. In 1982 to respond to gear conflicts and battles between inshore and offshore 
sectors, Canada designed and implemented a management structure that allocated a 
percentage of the TAC to each sector, and within the offshore sector, the TAC was 
further subdivided into three portions. This guaranteed, though only on a year-to-year
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basis, individual portions of the offshore TAC to the two largest companies that typically 
accounted for over 80% of the offshore allocation. The remaining quota was granted to a 
group of independent fishermen, who fished in a typical race-for-fish. Although the 
inshore fishermen, who weren’t granted any individual rights to the TAC, and the 
independent offshore fishermen, who continued to increase vessel size and capacity, 
failed to realize gains, the two large offshore companies were able to reduce their fleet 
size and increase their efficiency (Gardner 1988; Binkley 1989; PFMC 1993).
The Fisherman’s Cooperative Marketing Act of 1934 was intended to allow groups of 
“small” producers to form cooperatives to jointly market their products. Because the 
offshore whiting companies interested in forming a cooperative were large integrated 
companies, there was concern that the proposed cooperative would be found to violate 
U.S. antitrust law. Much of this concern came from Tyson’s prior experience with 
antitrust issues in the poultry industry. Therefore the whiting industry spent considerable 
time consulting with the Anti-Trust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, in order 
to obtain a ruling on the legality of the organizations (PFMC 1993; J. Plesha, Personal 
communication; Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative 2010).
On 27 May 1997, the Department of Justice accepted the argument that a harvesting 
cooperative would be pro-competitive, and permitted the formation of the cooperatives 
(Klein 1997). After receiving the favorable ruling through a Business Review Letter by 
the Department of Justice, the four companies took a single afternoon to split the sector 
allocation into individual company allocations. The whiting cooperative fulfilled three 
primary functions for the companies: it allocated quota shares of whiting and subdivided 
sideboard constraints; it facilitated bycatch avoidance; and it provided for monitoring of 
compliance and enforcement of the contractually allocated shares of the sector allocation. 
Of these, the foremost advantage was the authority to contractually sub-allocate quota 
within each sector and within each cooperative (multiple cooperatives could be formed 
within a sector). The contractual sub-allocations are based on membership agreements 
negotiated among the cooperative members. Participation was voluntary and governed by 
civil contract. In practice, the cooperative system is similar to an ITQ system. However,
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beyond deciding on the allocation of harvesting privileges, cooperative members also 
decide on rules for trading or selling their allocations as well as penalties for violating 
contractual agreements (Sylvia and Larkin 1995; Criddle and Macinko 2000; Sullivan 
2000; Anderson 2002; Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative 2010).
The four offshore whiting companies saw immediate results. With suspension of the 
race-for-fish, they immediately reduced the number of vessels in the fishery. Product 
recovery rates increased from 17.2% to 20.6%; a 20% increase in product with no 
increase in catch. Bycatch rates also declined as vessel operators had more flexibility to 
shift to fishing grounds with lower bycatch rates. In addition, the cooperative members 
agreed to maintain full-time observer coverage, report their catches to a third party 
service, and to pay penalties to each other if they exceeded their shares. The cooperative 
was self-regulating, and enjoyed increased profits from eliminating the race-for-fish 
(Sylvia and Enriquez 1994; Sylvia et al. 2008; Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative 
2010).
Success of the Pacific whiting cooperative led the companies to anticipate similar 
benefits in the pollock fishery. Moreover, many of the same companies had already 
experienced similar benefits from the CDQ shares they had leased. The 7.5% pollock 
allocation given to the CDQ program under Inshore/Offshore I and continued under 
Inshore/Offshore II had been sub-allocated to six CDQ entities, which represented more 
than 50 western Alaska communities. Because the CDQ entities did not have the vessel 
capacity or port infrastructure to harvest pollock, they leased their sub-allocations based 
on bids that included royalty payments, offers of employment for community members, 
and investment opportunities. While the Inshore/Offshore I regulatory impact review 
anticipated that the CDQ share would “accrue to the inshore sector,” the opposite 
occurred (NPFMC 1992; NPFMC 1995a). Shore-based processors including Westward 
and Trident tried to compete for the CDQ share, but they were unwilling to pay as much 
as the factory trawlers were willing to pay. For instance, while Trident was able to lease 
quota from the Aleutian Pribilof Island Community Development Association (APICDA) 
in 1993 and 1994, it ended up sub-leasing the quota to American Seafoods and buying the
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fillets back after the CDQ pollock had been harvested and processed. Over time, a 
majority of the CDQ pollock has been leased and fished by factory trawlers, who were 
able to process the fish more effectively and extract higher value from the product and 
offer higher royalty payments (NPFMC 1992).
Fishing CDQ shares yielded exciting results for the factory trawler companies. 
Because the CDQ quota provided exclusive harvest rights, fishing companies did not 
need to race each other when they fished their CDQ quotas. This gave operators greater 
flexibility to choose when, where, and how to fish; decisions could be based on 
maximizing profit per pound of CDQ instead of maximizing catch-per-day as they did in 
the regular fishery. Companies could participate in the race-for-fish during the A season, 
then after the quota for that season was exhausted, fish for their CDQ pollock at a pace 
and in a manner that allowed them to capture more value from the fish. For example, in 
1994, high-value fillets represented 26.1% of the product mix for factory trawlers during 
the race-for-fish and 39.6% when they fished their CDQ quota. In addition, the overall 
product utilization rate jumped from 14.3% to 16.7% when fishing switched from the 
‘open’ season to the CDQ shares. The increased efficiency gave the factory trawlers a 
glimpse of the benefits that could be obtained from rationalization (NPFMC 1998).
With the success seen in CDQ shares and in the whiting cooperative, factory trawlers 
tried to introduce the idea of cooperatives late into the 1998 Council debate over 
Inshore/Offshore III. American Seafoods pushed the idea forcefully, with other factory 
trawler companies in support. However, in order to facilitate formation of a cooperative, 
the at-sea sector needed separate allocations to the factory trawl sector and the 
mothership sector. To gain the inshore sector’s support for the allocation, representatives 
from the factory trawlers agreed with inshore representatives to shift 4% from the 
offshore quota to the inshore sector, anticipating that gains from being able to form a 
cooperative would more than offset the reduced sector allocation (NPFMC 1998).
Council discussion at the June 1998 NPFMC meeting focused on a last minute 
proposal to establish a three way sector allocation: 40% inshore, 50.5% offshore, and 
9.5% to “true” motherships. This is the first time the idea of cooperatives was publically
104
discussed with the three-sector allocations. There was much debate over the three-sector 
allocation, and according to participants, an agreement was almost reached through the 
Council process. Nevertheless, the three-sector allocation did not go through because 
motherships did not see how it would advantage them. Their historic portion of the catch 
had represented between 8.5% and 11.5% of the TAC and they felt there was no 
advantage to agreeing to the split (NPFMC 1998).
With disagreement among participants, the Council refused to pass the three-sector 
split. One Council member indicated that he felt the Pacific Fishery Management Council 
(PFMC), which managed the whiting fishery, was unaware that the industry intended to 
form a cooperative in the whiting fishery when they passed a three-sector allocation. 
Given his knowledge of the industry’s intent to form a cooperative, he would not support 
a three-sector split. Other members also felt uncomfortable with the short time they were 
given to consider the impacts of a cooperative, and there were complaints that those 
affected had not been given time to comment on the cooperative idea. There was also 
some concern whether cooperatives were too much like an IFQ and would be disallowed 
on Secretarial review due to the MSFCMA-imposed moratorium on new IFQ programs 
(NPFMC 1998).
According to Plesha, the cooperatives were not discussed until that June 1998 
meeting (J. Plesha, personal communication). Even with the offer for an increased 
portion of the quota share to the inshore sector, the short time frame may have prompted 
some concern from some shore-based processors who were worried about competing 
with an at-sea cooperative. There were additional concerns regarding potential spillover 
effects on other fisheries. If, as expected, formation of cooperatives would lead the 
factory trawler companies to using fewer vessels in the pollock fishery, would the 
liberated capacity spill into fisheries such as salmon and flatfish, and create increased 
competition for shore-based processors in those fisheries? This concern may have also 
influenced the Council (NPFMC 1998).
The Council instead passed BSAI Amendment 51, or Inshore/Offshore III, which 
allocated 61% of the BSAI pollock TAC to the at-sea sector (after subtraction of reserves
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and a 10% CDQ allocation) and 39% to the inshore sector, with the motherships still 
contained within the at-sea sector. The factory trawler companies felt betrayed. They had 
agreed to the 4% increase in the inshore allocation in exchange for support of the three- 
sector split and the ability to form cooperative. Instead, they simply received a smaller 
share of the TAC. The amendment was then sent to the Secretary of Commerce for 
implementation in the 1999 fishing season (NPFMC 1998).
American Fisheries Act
While the Inshore/Offshore allocation debate at the NPFMC remained the primary 
focus of the pollock fishery in the 1990s, opposition to foreign ownership of vessels also 
remained an important theme. The court ruling in 1992, supporting the USCG’s 
interpretation of the Anti-Flagging Act, did nothing to curb foreign ownership in the 
pollock fishery and it had allowed the rebuilt factory trawlers a fishery endorsement. 
While fighting over sector allocations at the Council level, Tyson and Trident continued 
to argue for an interpretation of the Anti-Reflagging Act that would benefit them by 
reducing capacity in the pollock fishery through the reduction of foreign ownership and 
foreign rebuilt vessels. American Seafoods, which continued to grow, was owned by 
Rokke, a Norwegian national; by 1998, American Seafoods owned nearly all the 
Norwegian rebuilt vessels in the pollock fishery. Thus Trident and Tyson felt that if they 
could have a new congressional act introduced to implement policies that reflected their 
view of the original intent of the Anti Flagging Act, their number one competitor would 
be largely eliminated and their share of the pollock fishery would be increased (J. Plesha, 
personal communication).
After researching what rules would be required to truly end foreign ownership and the 
use of foreign rebuilt vessels in the EEZ fisheries, Trident and Tyson worked with 
Senator Stevens to introduce a new bill to Congress; on 25 September 1997, Stevens 
introduced the American Fisheries Act (U.S. Public Law 105-277). As initially written, 
the American Fisheries Act (AFA) would have stripped fisheries endorsements from
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numerous factory trawlers rebuilt in foreign shipyards under the Anti-Reflagging Act 
savings exemptions, established a 165 ft limit on U.S. fishing vessels, and would have 
limited foreign ownership in U.S. fishing vessels to 25% (NPFMC 2002). As drafted, the 
AFA would have primarily affected American Seafoods, but would have also affected 
Arctic Storm, which had Korean owners, and Alaska Ocean, which had Japanese owners. 
In addition, the AFA would have removed fisheries endorsements from most of the 
factory trawl fleet which had benefited from rebuilds in Norway and Korea (Hornnes 
2006). Surprisingly, the bill contained special exclusions for the mothership sector, which 
included vessels that had undergone substantial rebuilding in foreign shipyards and 
contained substantial foreign investment (Myhre 1998). In addition, the original draft of 
the AFA would have had no impact on foreign ownership of shore-based fish processors.
Naturally, opposition came from all affected owners. Bill Myhre, the attorney who 
had assisted the Norwegian investors in securing fishery endorsements for their converted 
vessels, wrote “History of the Anti Reflagging Act — the real story” to confront the 
threats posed by the AFA. First of all, AFA supporters claimed that the U.S. Coast Guard 
had allowed more vessels to be rebuilt overseas than Congress intended. Second, they 
claimed that vessels had been rebuilt larger than Congress had anticipated. Third, they 
argued that the U.S. Coast Guard had misinterpreted the law. Myhre defended against 
these assertions by presenting evidence that Congress knew precisely how many vessels 
had received rulings from the U.S. Coast Guard, guaranteeing that they would not lose 
the fishery endorsement after conversion, and that the amount of rebuilding would be 
significant. He argued that many Congressmen were still concerned about attracting 
foreign capital as the Anti Reflagging Act was debated, and thus had consciously allowed 
all the foreign rebuilt factory trawlers to enter the U.S. EEZ (Myhre 1998; Hornnes 
2006).
The AFA was met with additional opposition on a variety of fronts. A letter from 
Attorney General John Ashcroft to Congress stated that passage of the AFA would be an 
unconstitutional violation of the Takings Clause because it would invalidate the factory 
trawler’s fishing endorsements (Myhre 1998). Because the factory trawlers were
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primarily based out of Seattle, they appealed to Washington Senator Gorton for help in 
opposing the proposed AFA. He was able to stall the Act in committee. Senator Stevens 
then tried to add an amendment to the Commerce, Justice, State Appropriation Bill, 
which would have shifted 5% of the annual pollock TAC from the at-sea sector to the 
inshore sector and would have required that all fishing vessels be 75% U.S. owned or 
controlled. With objections from Washington Senator Gorton, the amendment was 
withdrawn (J. Plesha, personal communication).
With their recent failure at introducing cooperatives through the Council process, the 
factory trawler fleet, with American Seafoods leading the charge, took their cause to the 
Congress as well. On 20 July 1998, a little over a month after they had been denied by the 
NPFMC, American Seafoods attempted to combine the fights over the AFA and 
cooperatives by introducing a draft bill to a well-attended meeting held in the Senate 
Commerce Committee’s hearing room. Various industry representatives from the At-Sea 
Processors Association, Pacific Seafood Processors Association, United Catcher Boats, 
American Fisheries Act Coalition, and Greenpeace filled the room with congressional 
staffers in an effort to reach a compromise on the AFA. Two bills were proposed, one 
from American Seafoods, and an alternative from the Norton Sound Economic 
Development Corporation (NSEDC), a western Alaskan CDQ group. American Seafoods 
proposed a structure similar to what they proposed in Inshore/Offshore III, with the 
addition of limiting new participants in the C/P sector. NSEDC proposed a structure 
similar to that passed in the Inshore/Offshore III, but with a subdivision of the offshore 
allocation into separate sector allocations for factory trawlers and motherships. In 
addition, NSEDC proposed a further increase in the CDQ allocation from 10% to 12.5% 
of the TAC. While participants aggressively defended their respective positions, no 
agreement was reached (J. Plesha, personal communication).
Two days later, Senator Gorton sat down with a small group of AFA supporters and 
said he wanted to see a compromise bill passed by the end of the year. The Senator’s 
position was that then current participants in the inshore and at-sea sectors should be 
recognized as legal participants, including both the foreign owned and rebuilt fleet. He
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felt that the North Pacific was overcapitalized and that legislation should be passed to 
reduce the excess capacity by reducing the number of factory trawlers, thereby 
eliminating the race-for-fish. Attendees were told he would schedule a meeting for 18 
August 1998 when he would invite members of the industry to discuss their plan. Senator 
Gorton informed participants of five issues he wanted addressed in a proposed plan: 
Americanization; decapitalization; compensation; reallocation; and rationalization. He 
emphasized that if the involved parties were not able to reach a compromise soon, no Act 
would be passed (J. Plesha, personal communication).
Although the benefits of a compromise plan were more than enough to motivate 
involved parties, American Seafoods received an additional incentive that made them 
even more inclined to negotiate. Before the original introduction of the AFA, Plesha had 
been researching vessels that had been granted fisheries endorsements under the 
grandfather clause of the Anti-Reflagging Act; and more specifically, he looked into the 
clause allowing foreign rebuilding as long as the contract to rebuild had been entered into 
prior to a specified date. Under a Freedom of Information Act request, he was able to 
obtain all the background materials for the ruling letters that the U.S.C.G. had issued 
allowing the foreign rebuild. While examining the paperwork, Plesha became suspicious 
of the documentation of three vessels, including the Acona. The Acona had been a 40 
year old, 85 foot research vessel, which had been rebuilt in Norway for American 
Seafoods. The entirely rebuilt vessel, which was completed in 1990 and renamed the 
American Triumph, had the largest throughput capacity in the factory trawler fleet. Plesha 
noticed the contract for the Acona appeared backdated, so he sought out the other party 
on the contract and was able to obtain an affidavit attesting that the backdating had taken 
place in order to qualify it under the grandfather clause. The information was provided to 
the U.S.C.G., who initiated an investigation into the issue, and notified American 
Seafoods of their findings on 3 September 1998. The letter announced the U.S.C.G. was 
going “to invalidate documentation for the fishing vessel American Triumph,” effective 
in 30 days. Myhre, representing American Seafoods, suspects that the ruling would have 
been overturned in court, as there were agreements in place before the cut-off date
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established in the Anti-Flagging Act. Still, the potential loss of endorsements for one of 
its most advanced and important vessels, which was responsible for catching and 
processing nearly 3% of the total pollock TAC, was something that American Seafoods 
did not want and could be expected to defend by offering concessions on other aspects of 
the AFA.
The plan introduced by the AFA coalition at the 18 August 1998 meeting still would 
have revoked the fishery endorsements of 18 factory trawlers. Seeking some type of 
compromise, Senator Gorton and his staff continued to meet with other industry 
participants over the next few weeks to discuss issues related to the plan. The stage was 
then set for a more formal meeting in Washington, D.C. on 9-11 September 1998 in the 
Senate Appropriations Committee hearing room, which was chaired initially by Senator 
Stevens, and later by his staff member, Trevor McCabe. Senator Stevens expressed his 
positions, which focused on the same issues as Senator Gorton, namely that the bill 
require:
1. a 75% minimum level for U.S. ownership and control of vessels with 
endorsements to fish in the U.S. EEZ;
2. removal of the American Triumph and several other factory trawlers 
accompanied with a $40 million buyout of additional factory trawlers, with 
the Federal government and industry splitting the bill;
3. anti-trust exemptions for sector cooperatives, including cooperatives 
composed of processors and catcher vessels; and,
4. reallocation of the Bering Sea pollock fishery, with 10% “off the top” for 
CDQ and 50% for “onshore processors.” (Joe Plesha, personal 
communication)
With Senator Steven’s and Senator Gorton’s expectations laid out, the pollock industry 
had the outlines for framing a revised draft of the AFA (Joe Plesha, personal 
communication).
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The first three days of negotiations focused on the primary components of the AFA, 
as well as the details of the buyout. It was agreed that the shift of 10% of the directed 
pollock TAC from the offshore sector to the inshore sector would be accomplished by 
using the buyout to compensate owners of factory trawlers for the catch history of vessels 
they agreed to remove from the fishery. Although the vessel buyout option was available 
for most factory trawlers, Stevens told industry that buyouts of the Highland Light, 
Starbound and Tyson vessels would not be allowed, as they were “American” boats.
With owners of the Arctic Storm and Arctic Fjord uninterested in the buyout, the only 
vessels that could be considered were the Alaska Ocean, Endurance and American 
Seafoods’ factory trawlers. As the primary target of the legislation and with the largest 
fleet, American Seafoods negotiated the buyout of nine of their vessels. In addition, they 
agreed not to reflag the three Emerald Seafoods factory trawlers American had purchased 
in 1997, which had spent 1996 fishing in the Russian EEZ. In exchange, it was agreed 
that the American Triumph, would retain its fishery endorsement (Hornnes 2006; J. 
Plesha, personal communication).
The negotiators met again on 17-18 September 1998 to finalize some of the details, 
with a focus on the structure of the fishery cooperatives and protections for non-pollock 
fisheries in the BSAI and GOA. The concern was that a rationalized pollock fishery 
would free-up capacity which could be used to exploit other fishery resources. Crab 
processors voiced strong concern that surplus pollock processing capacity would be 
diverted to crab processing. Flatfish trawlers expressed concern that spillover of surplus 
capacity in the at-sea pollock fleet would exacerbate the already overcapitalized flatfish 
fisheries. In response to these concerns, sideboard regulations were added to the AFA. 
AFA-qualified factory trawlers were to be limited to catches of non-pollock species based 
on their past catch history; sideboard limits for the inshore sector and for motherships 
would be set at a later date by NPFMC and NMFS. For example, pollock processors were 
enjoined from processing more crab than their 1995-1997 average (J. Plesha, personal 
communication; NMFS 2002).
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On the day the bill was to be finalized, NMFS proposed modifying the bill to require 
scrapping of the nine factory trawlers American Seafoods had agreed to remove from the 
pollock fishery so that the U.S. would not be perceived to be subsidizing the expansion of 
a distant water fleet. In the end, with additional compensation offered, American 
Seafoods agreed to scrap eight vessels. The American Empress was exempted from the 
scrapping requirement and was subsequently sold to another company owned by R0kke 
and used to fish off the coast of South America (Hornnes 2006).
The State Department interjected after the deal was complete and insisted on 
grandfather clauses that would take into consideration bilateral treaties with foreign 
countries. This took into consideration investments made under prior laws. With the last 
issues resolved, the finalized draft SB1221 reached the Senate Appropriations Committee 
for inclusion with the omnibus appropriations package on 7 October 1998, and was 
subsequently passed by Congress on 21 October 1998.
Tyson, who owned several factory trawlers, was losing money on their seafood line. 
Selling their fishery assets in an overcapitalized open access fishery would have 
generated very little return on investment. Tyson saw the AFA as an opportunity to 
recapture a larger share of their initial investment when it was time to sell and Tyson’s 
close political connections to the Clinton administration meant that they wielded 
influence in shaping the AFA (Bernton 1992; Ota and Hamilton 1993). Tyson ultimately 
agreed to give up 0.5% of the catch share history of their vessels in exchange for $5 
million dollars of AFA money. This allowed the AFA drafters to increase the mothership 
sector’s allocation to 10%. With Tyson’s backing, there was confidence that, despite 
objections by NMFS, the bill would not be vetoed when submitted to the White House (J. 
Plesha, personal communication; Bernton 1992).
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Summary of the American Fisheries Act
Congress intended the AFA to accomplish two primary goals. First, it was to 
complete the process of Americanization of the pollock fishery. Second, it was to end the 
race-for-fish and overcapitalization of the fishery.
Americanization of the U.S. fleet was assured through new regulation. There was a 
prohibition on the entry of any new fishing vessels that exceeded 165 ft. registered 
length, 750 gross registered tons, or 3,000 shaft horsepower. The length limitations 
ensured that no new factory trawlers would enter the U.S. EEZ pollock fishery, thereby 
satisfying legislative objectives of Greenpeace and other environmental groups. The 
limits on horsepower were designed to limit the size net that catcher vessels could tow, 
setting an effective upper limit on the size of catcher vessels operating in the inshore and 
mothership sectors. The second, and more sweeping requirement, was that ownership of 
all U.S.-flagged fishing vessels had to comply with a 75% U.S. controlling interest 
standard (NMFS 2002).
In order to decapitalize the pollock fishery, the AFA established a buyout program 
that removed 10% of the at-sea production through a combination of $20 million in 
federal appropriations and $75 million in direct loan obligations. The direct loan 
obligations were to be paid for by a fee of six-tenths of one cent ($0.006) for each pound 
round weight of pollock harvested by catcher vessels delivering to inshore processors. In 
addition to removing capacity, the AFA listed, by name, vessels and processors and/or 
provided qualifying criteria for those vessels and processors eligible to participate in the 
non-CDQ portion of the BSAI pollock fishery. This created a prohibition on the entry of 
new vessels and processors into the BSAI pollock fishery (NMFS 2002).
With the removal of harvesting and processing capacity, the next step was to 
introduce a management structure that would end the race-for-fish among the remaining 
participants. This was accomplished by allowing for the formation of cooperatives. The 
AFA also included a new allocation scheme for BSAI pollock. After NMFS and the 
NPFMC determine the pollock TAC, the allowance for the CDQ program is set aside as
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the CDQ reserves. The AFA raised this allocation from 7.5% to 10% of the BSAI pollock 
TAC. The remaining allocation forms the initial TAC (ITAC), from which an incidental 
catch allowance (ICA) is set aside to account for bycatch of pollock in other fisheries. 
This number was originally set at about 4.5% of the TAC, but was reduced in subsequent 
years to about 3% as a consequence of improved management precision in other fisheries. 
The remaining TAC, the directed pollock allocation (DPA), was split: 50% to the inshore 
sector; 40% to vessels harvesting pollock for processing by catcher/processors ; and, 10% 
to vessels harvesting pollock for processing by motherships. These permanent allocations 
provide stability for the pollock fishery, although the actual harvest allocations can vary 
depending on variations in the abundance of pollock as reflected in variations in the 
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Figure 1.6. Pollock allocations between sectors.
Source: NMFS (2010).
2 The AFA refers to factory trawlers as catcher/processors. This can be confusing because, in general usage, 
the term catcher/processor includes pot and longline vessels that process catches. Nevertheless, through the 
balance of this document, catcher/processor will be used to denote AFA-qualified factory trawlers.
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With the three-sector allocation in place, the stage was set for cooperatives to be 
formed. The AFA set standards and limitations for the creation of fishery cooperatives in 
the catcher/processor, mothership, and inshore sectors. The AFA-qualified factory 
trawlers were allowed to form cooperatives much as they had in the Pacific whiting 
fishery. The inshore sector was allowed to form cooperatives under a quasi-IFQ program 
wherein NMFS grants allocations of the inshore BSAI pollock TAC to inshore catcher 
vessel cooperatives in proportion to the catch history contributed by vessels within the 
cooperative with the proviso that they agree to deliver at least 90% of their pollock catch 
to that processor. The contentious tying of vessels to a specific processor “is intended to 
promote win-win rationalization in both the overcapitalized harvesting and processing 
sectors” (Matulich et al. 2001). The cooperatives are also subject to annual reporting 
requirements. The AFA-qualified factory trawlers formed a cooperative in 1999; inshore 
and mothership cooperatives formed in 2000.
In order to limit concentration of ownership, an excessive share harvesting cap of 
17.5% was set for pollock in the at-sea sector. The AFA also required the NPFMC to 
develop “management measures to prevent any particular individual or entity from 
processing an excessive share of the pollock”, presumably through a share cap, which 
was later determined to be 30%.
The AFA also mandated increased observer coverage and onboard scales to weigh 
catches aboard AFA-qualified factory trawlers. All AFA-qualified factory trawlers are 
required to carry 200% observer coverage which means that vessels carry two observers 
on board whenever they are harvesting and processing fish.
Cooperatives and Fishery Sectors
The AFA establishment of a three-sector allocation was important for the pollock 
fishery. Between 1992 and 1998, the inshore/offshore allocations had been established 
through the NPFMC, and it was a constant battle over how much fish each sector was 
going to receive. Setting the new allocations through Congressional action ensured that
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the allocations to all involved parties would remain unchanged without another act of 
Congress. This gave the industry a new level of stability, as they could now turn their 
focus from lobbying the NPFMC for favorable allocations and instead focus on 
maximizing the value of their catches.
The cooperatives that developed within the three sectors were the most important 
benefit of the AFA. Cooperatives in the pollock fishery allow both leasing and selling of 
fishing privileges among cooperative members. The leasing and sale of harvesting 
privileges to outside parties is allowed only if the buyer agrees to abide by the rules set 
forth in the cooperative contract and are part of the sector to which the harvesting 
privileges were allocated. For example, a vessel in the inshore sector can lease catch 
shares to members of its own cooperative or to an outsider that operates within the 
inshore sector but cannot lease catch shares to vessels operating in the mothership or 
catcher/processor sectors. The buyer must also harvest and process the quota with one of 
the vessels already permitted, or a replacement vessel that meets specific criteria. The 
cooperatives’ membership agreements provide for contractual remedies to enforce 
sanctions should a member exceed the quota allocated to them. Cooperatives establish 
sideboard restrictions which can be traded among cooperative participants and between 
the different cooperatives (NPFMC 2002; Fell 2008). In addition, all cooperatives 
formed under the AFA were given antitrust exemptions from the Department of Justice 
(Klein 2000(a-g))
Catcher/Processor Sector
Under the AFA, the pollock catcher/processor sector consisted of 20 vessels, a 
substantial reduction from the 29 catcher/processors who had targeted pollock in 1998, 
and much lower than the 54 operating in 1991. These vessels were specifically named in 
the AFA as the only factory trawlers allowed to operate in the fishery, and no 
replacement vessels could be used except in case of loss where:
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... such loss was caused by an act of God, an act of war, a collision, an act 
or omission of a party other than the owner or agent of the vessel, or any 
other event not caused by the willful misconduct of the owner or agent.
(AFA 1998)
The sector was allocated 40% of the DPA, 8.5% of which (3.4%  of the DPA) was 
allocated to the seven (high seas) catcher vessels that had qualified catch history from 
delivering to factory trawlers, leaving 36.6% of the DPA for the AFA-qualified factory 
trawlers. After harvesting nearly 50% of the total TAC in 1998, the reduction to 34% in 
1999 represented a 32% loss of pollock to the catcher/processors, leaving the sector with 




Figure 1.7. Percentage of pollock TAC allocated to each sector in 1998 and 1999. 
Source: NMFS (2002).
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Although the catcher/processor sector suffered a large reduction in the DPA, they 
benefited from the increased CDQ allocation. Catcher/processors have harvested a 
majority of the CDQ pollock allocations since the program was introduced in 1992. As a 
result, they captured 45.6% of the DPA and CDQ pollock harvested between 1999-2009, 
which compares to the 44.4% captured by the inshore sector over the same period (Figure 
1.9). Over this time period, it has meant that catcher/processor harvests have fluctuated 
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Figure 1.9. Sector harvest percentage of BSAI DPA and CDQ pollock catches, 1999­
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Figure 1.10. Catcher/processor pollock harvests, CDQ included, 1999 to 2009 . 
Source: NMFS (2010).
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
3 2001- 2009 landings data was provided by Jim Ianelli of NOAA. Due to changes in reporting system, 
1999 and 2000 data is from NOAA catch reports. For these years, it is assumed that 90% of the CDQ 
allocation was harvested by the catcher/processor sector and 10% was harvested by the mothership sector.
4 See footnote 2
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Under the AFA, the catcher/processor sector was allowed to form either a single 
cooperative that includes both catcher/processors and catcher vessels delivering to 
catcher/processors, or catcher/processors and catcher vessels could form separate 
cooperatives and enter into an inter-cooperative agreement. The later structure was 
adopted. The Pollock Conservation Cooperative (PCC) was formed on 18 December 
1998, two months after the passage of the AFA and in time for the 1999 fishing year. 
Also in time for the 1999 season, the seven high seas catcher vessels organized the High 
Seas Catchers’ Cooperative (HSCC), with authority to lease or sell quota to AFA- 
qualified factory trawlers. Because it was more profitable to lease or sell quota than to 
harvest the fish themselves, most members of the HSCC leased or sold their quota to the 
PCC and its members. After passage of the AFA, the HSCC members were being offered 
approximately $300 per metric ton for leased quota shares, a sharp increase from the
1998 price of approximately $132 per metric ton of delivered catch. Not only did leasing 
generate higher revenues, but those revenues could be had without the cost of fishing. 
Consequently, HSCC members harvested less than 30% of their own catch allocation in
1999 and entirely ceased pollock fishing within a couple of years. It was not until 2008 
that any HSCC vessel again fished its quota and then it was not because it was more 
profitable. Instead, American Seafoods needed another vessel to harvest their quota so 
they didn’t exceed the 17.5% harvesting cap (NMFS 2002; J. Jacobs, personal 
communication).
There were two types of factory trawlers operating in the at-sea sector at the 
introduction of the AFA: surimi and fillet. Surimi factory trawlers were equipped to 
process surimi, fillet, roe, fishmeal and other products. The fillet factory trawlers could 
also produce roe and fishmeal but lacked the capacity to produce surimi. Fillet factory 
trawlers generally searched for larger fish, because small fish could only be used for the 
low value fishmeal or mince. Surimi factory trawlers had the option of using small fish 
for surimi. Although surimi was not normally as valuable as fillet, it was worth 
significantly more than fishmeal or mince and it was easier and cheaper to find large 
schools of small fish. Some factory trawlers can harvest and process over 400 mt of fish
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per day, yielding over 100 mt of frozen product. With freezer hold capacity of as much as 
1,500 mt, they can stay on the grounds for a couple of weeks at a time. The ability of the 
surimi factory trawlers to adapt to different size fish and market conditions gave them a 
significant advantage over fillet factory trawlers. As a result, under the race-for-fish 
leading up to the AFA, fillet factory trawler production peaked at 467,323 mt of 
groundfish in 1991 and declined monotonically to 90,963 mt in 1999.
Due to their operational disadvantages eight of the nine vessels scrapped by American 
Seafoods in concert with AFA implementation were fillet factory trawlers. The vessels 
scrapped were the Pacific Scout, Pacific Explorer, Pacific Navigator, Victoria Ann, 
Elizabeth Ann, Christina Ann, Rebecca Ann, and Brown’s Point. The ninth vessel, the 
American Empress, was banned from operating in the U.S. EEZ, and was sold to R0kke’s 
Resource Group International (RGI) for use in fishing outside the U.S. For removing 
these vessels, American Seafoods received $90 million dollars compensation, as well as 
the money earned from sale of the American Empress.
Even with the loss of more than half of their boats, American Seafoods was still the 
largest company in the catcher/processor sector, owning seven factory trawlers: American 
Dynasty, Katie Ann, American Triumph, Northern Eagle, Northern Hawk, Northern 
Jaeger, and Ocean Rover. Based on the catch history of these vessels, American 
Seafoods received 16.0% of the DPA, or 40.0% of the catcher/processor sector allocation. 
In addition, American Seafoods purchased the fishing rights of two of the HSCC vessels, 
the American Challenger and the Forum Star. This additional 0.56% of the DPA gave 
American Seafoods 16.5% of the DPA, or a total of 41.3% of the catcher/processor sector 
allocation. While American Seafoods ended up with significantly less catch than before 
AFA, the $90 million cash compensation eased the loss.
At the time the AFA was passed, American Seafoods was largely owned through 
R0kke’s RGI. Thus with the ownership restriction in the AFA for no more than 25% 
foreign ownership, American Seafoods faced three options. One option would be to make 
a formal ownership change under which R0kke’s two children, who are U.S. citizens, 
would be granted shares as advance of inheritance. A second option would have been to
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apply for an exemption in accordance with the AFA grandfather clause. If grandfathering 
had been administratively denied, American Seafoods could have fought the denial in 
court. The third option was to sell out.
Rokke chose to sell off his ownership in American Seafoods and focus his efforts 
elsewhere. RGI had already begun selling off its holdings in Helly Hansen and Brooks 
Sports in the late 1990’s, which it had acquired in 1993 and 1995. Selling his ownership 
in American Seafoods would allow Rokke to focus on his new Aker-RGI partnership, 
which was based closer to Norway. He sold out his shares in 2000, when the largest 
owner of American Seafood became Centre Partners, with additional investment from 
Coastal Villages Regional Fund and Central Bering Sea Fishermen's Association, both 
CDQ entities (American Seafoods Group LLC 2002).
In addition to its seven catcher/processor and two catcher vessels, American Seafoods 
completed the purchase of the catcher/processor Highland Light and catcher vessel Tracy 
Anne in September 2008. The Highland Light was part of the Yardarm Knot Group 
which was established in 1988 by Washington fishermen to harvest and process Alaska 
crab, salmon, and groundfish. Yardarm Knot took delivery of the Highland Light in 1990 
from Bender Shipbuilding and Repair Co. of Mobile, Alabama. It was an American 
company, and before American Seafoods bought it out, the Highland Light had received 
1.7% of the DPA, or 4.2% of the catcher/processor sector allocation; the Tracy Anne had 
received 0.46% of the DPA, or 1.2% of the catcher/processor sector allocation.
With the gain from further leases obtained through the retirement of the 
catcher/processor Endurance, who sold its share to the PCC in 2000, American Seafoods 
emerged with control of nearly 19.4% of the DPA, not including leased CDQ shares. This 
gave American Seafoods ownership over the 17.5% harvesting cap established in the 
AFA. However, the AFA cap limits the amount of fish a company can harvest, not the 
amount of quota a company can own. Companies that might otherwise exceed the harvest 
cap can address the issue a number of ways, which include having independent catcher 
vessels harvest the quota, leasing the quota to other companies, or swapping directed
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pollock for CDQ pollock since CDQ pollock doesn’t count against the harvesting or 
processing cap.
The second largest AFA-qualified factory trawler fleet belonged to Tyson, through 
their subsidy Arctic Alaska, and consisted of five vessels: American Enterprise, Island 
Enterprise, Kodiak Enterprise, Seattle Enterprise, and US Enterprise. They were the 
largest U.S. owned and built fleet in the catcher/processor sector, and had pushed for the 
AFA with the intent to capitalize on the windfall value of their catch history. Tyson 
received a 6.6% share of the DPA, or 16.4% of the catcher/processor sector allocation. 
The DPA that Tyson received was 0.5% less than their historical catch, since they 
transferred it to the mothership sector in exchange for $5 million as part of the AFA.
Less than a year after AFA took effect, Tyson sold Arctic Alaska. In addition to five 
AFA-qualified factory trawlers, Arctic Alaska owned shore-based processors in Kodiak, 
Alaska, Newport, Oregon, Ucluelet, British Columbia and on Pier 91 in Seattle; a floating 
plant moored near Unalaska, and surimi processors in Toronto, Ontario, and Duluth and 
Motley, Minnesota. The buyer was Trident Seafoods. The purchase of Arctic Alaska 
strengthened Trident’s position as the largest company in the U.S. pollock fishery; 
however, the purchase left Trident with more than the maximum allowed 30% processing 
capacity. To deal with this issue, Trident formed a new corporation and gave it to the 
primary owner’s sons, calling it B&N Fisheries. (B &  N stood for the last name of the 
owners, Bundrant and Ness.) Trident transferred enough quota to B&N to say below the 
30% cap. Plesha believes that Tyson sold out too early:
They had lost a lot of money in seafood. The irony is that after the AFA 
passed, their assets became quite valuable. Had they hung on for another 
year, they would have stayed in the business or sold at a far higher price.
(J. Plesha, personal communication)
The next largest owner of AFA-qualified factory trawlers was the Glacier Fish 
Company, which owned the Northern Glacier and Pacific Glacier. Based on the catch 
history of their vessels, Glacier Fish Company received 3.1% of the DPA, or 7.7% of the
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catcher/processor sector allocation. Glacier Fish Company was owned by Breivik and 
other investors and the Norton Sound Economic Development Corporation (NSEDC), a 
CDQ entity that purchased a 50% stake in Glacier Fish Company in 1998. In May 2008, 
Glacier Fish Company purchased the Alaska Ocean, the largest AFA-qualified factory 
trawler. The Alaska Ocean had been owned by a partnership involving Nippon Suisan 
and Jeff Hendricks. The Japanese owners had been grandfathered in under the foreign 
ownership provision in the AFA. The Alaska Ocean held rights to 2.9% of the DPA, or 
7.2% of the catcher/processor sector allocation. As part of the transaction, Nippon Suisan 
acquired a 25% stake in the Glacier Fish Company thereby strengthening their access to 
surimi.
The Arctic Storm Management Group managed the fifth largest AFA-qualified 
factory trawler fleet, the Arctic Storm and the Arctic Fjord. Together, these vessels 
represented 3.5% of the DPA, or 8.7% of the catcher/processor sector allocation. The 
Arctic Storm was originally financed through Pereyra’s Profish International in 
collaboration with Norwegian partners. The owners of the Arctic Storm added Korean 
partners in the 1990s, in which they became 50-50 owners of the vessel. The ownership 
structure was allowed to continue under AFA grandfather provisions. Circumstances 
changed in the early 2000s when the Korean partnership underwent some changes that 
required them to divest 50% of their ownership stake to comply with the AFA. The Arctic 
Fjord had been rebuilt in Norway and was originally named the Michelle Irene. It was 
later bought through a 50-50 venture between Arctic Storm Inc., the owners of the Arctic 
Storm, and Norwegian interests. Arctic Storm, Inc. bought out the Norwegian interests in 
1994. Bristol Bay Economic Development Corporation (BBEDC), a CDQ group, 
maintains a 30% ownership position in the Arctic Fjord. In the case of both vessels, prior 
to AFA they were managed by Arctic Storm, Inc. which was 50% Korean owned. The 
grandfather provision did not extend to Arctic Fjord management, so the management 
company—the Arctic Storm Management Group—is now 100% US owned. The 
company also owns rights to two catcher vessels in the HSCC, the Neahkanie and Sea
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Storm, which are worth 0.6679% and 0.8226% of the DPA (D. Christensen, personal 
communication).
The remaining companies were all single vessel companies. Aleutian Spray Fisheries 
owns the Starbound, representing 1.6% of the DPA, or 4.0% of the catcher/processor 
sector allocation. It had been built brand new in the U.S. and one of its primary owners 
was Ness from Trident. There was also one company that had significant foreign 
ownership when the AFA was passed. It was Alaska Trawl Fisheries, which owned the 
Endurance. They received 1.4% of the DPA, or 3.4% of the catcher/processor sector 
allocation. After fishing as part of the PCC, Alaska Trawl Fisheries sold out to PCC. The 
Endurance was removed from active fishing and its allocation was split among the 
remaining 19 AFA-qualified vessels.
The AFA also allowed for any unlisted catcher/processor that harvested more than 
2000 mt of pollock in 1997 to be allowed to fish in aggregate up to 0.5% of the directed 
catcher/processor quota. Only one vessel, the Ocean Peace, was believed to be eligible. It 
has not been a regular participant in the fishery, although it did participate in the 2008 
and 2009 seasons.
To the catcher/processor sector which had been in a constant state of flux throughout 
the 1990s, the stability provided by the AFA has been critical to their financial survival. 
Under the inshore/offshore battle, their fraction of the TAC had decreased from nearly 
80% in 1992 to 56% under the proposed Inshore/Offshore III and there was no reason to 
expect the decline to stop. The AFA stopped the decline, albeit at a low level. More 
importantly, the AFA allowed the catcher/processor sector to form a cooperative, giving 
each vessel an individual share of the pollock TAC. Vessels no longer had to race for 
fish; instead, they could pace their operation in a manner which allowed them to increase 
recovery rates, optimize product mix, and organize more efficient operations.
The AFA also ensured that there would be no new participants in the fishery and, 
more importantly, allowed for a reduction in capacity within the catcher/processor sector, 
something the sector badly needed. Members of the catcher/processor sector, although a
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little bitter about getting squeezed out of much of the pollock TAC, speak of the success 
of the AFA.
Mothership Sector
The AFA identified by name the three motherships that had been active in the pollock 
fishery and would be permitted to continue to operate in the fishery. The catcher vessels 
that could deliver to these motherships were not specifically named, but their numbers 
were limited to 20, the number of catcher vessels that had actively participated in the 
mothership sector in years immediately preceding passage of the AFA. The AFA reduced 
the mothership sector’s share of the DPA from 11% to 10% without compensation. Due 
to variations in the total TAC, the mothership sector’s share of the DPA has varied from 
over 150,000 mt in 2004 to a low of just over 81,000 mt in 2009 (Figure 1.11).
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Figure 1.11. Mothership pollock harvests, CDQ included, 1999 to 2009 . 






5 See footnote 3.
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The AFA allowed for the formation of cooperatives in the mothership sector as long 
as 80% of catcher vessels agreed: the Mothership Fleet Cooperative (MFC) formed in 
2000 with all 20 catcher vessels. Although the motherships themselves were also allowed 
to join the cooperative, none have. Under the contractual terms of the cooperative, 
catcher vessels are free to deliver their share to any of the three eligible motherships, 
although catcher vessel ownership in a particular mothership often dictates where they 
deliver their harvests. As a result, motherships have sold ownership in their vessels to 
ensure a measure of certainty in their fish supplies. For example, the Golden Alaska sold 
a significant percentage of itself to the CDQ entity Yukon Delta Fisheries Development 
Association (YDFDA) in return for assured deliveries from the two catcher vessels 
YDFDA purchased. (NPFMC 2002; YDFDA 2009).
The AFA specifically grants the three motherships operating in the pollock fishery an 
exemption from the foreign ownership requirements as long as after 1 October 2001, 
ownership changes do not exceed 50%. This allowed primary owners in the motherships 
to maintain their Japanese ownership and mortgages. Although Maruha is now involved 
in the management of all three motherships, changes in ownership have not been 
required. Nevertheless, ownership has changed such that all three motherships now meet 
the 75% U.S. ownership requirements under the AFA (B. Myhre, personal 
communication).
Motherships enjoy the advantage of being able to move with the fish, so catcher 
vessels that deliver to motherships have lower running costs and deliver fresher fish than 
catcher vessels that deliver to shore-based processors. Access to fresh fish helps 
motherships produce high quality roe and surimi that command premium prices. 
However, when the AFA was passed, the motherships were not equipped to produce 
fillets; the Golden Alaska has since invested in filleting machines and the Ocean Phoenix 
in H&G (head and gut) equipment.
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The increased value derived from finished pollock products allows motherships to 
pay higher exvessel prices to catcher vessels than do shore-based processors, with an 
average real6 price of $0.220 vs. $0.176 per kilogram, nearly 25% higher7 (Figure 1.12). 
The mothership catcher vessels are also aided by increased flexibility in making 
deliveries, for unlike the inshore cooperatives, there is no penalty for switching 
motherships. In theory, this allows vessels to deliver to the mothership paying the highest 
price, driving up the value of pollock landings. As a result, mothership owners believe 
the AFA has transferred economic rents from the motherships to the catcher vessels that 
deliver to them (NPFMC 2002). However, because owners of motherships also hold 
ownership stakes or long-term contracts with the catcher vessels, the actual magnitude of 









°  $0.15 
$0.10
Sep-97 Feb-99 Jun-00 Nov-01 Mar-03 Aug-04 Dec-05 Apr-07 Sep-08
O M o the rsh ip  •  Inshore Sector C atcher Vessels ♦ A l l  C atcher Vessels
Figure 1.12. Real ex-vessel prices for motherships catcher vessels, inshore sector catcher 
vessels, and all catcher vessels, 1998- 2008.
Source: T. Hiatt, personal communication.
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6 Adjusted to 2008 dollars
7 Due to confidentiality issues, this data is based on 20 monthly averages between 1998 and 2008.
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The MFC catcher vessels are generally smaller than catcher vessels in the inshore 
sector because they can transfer laden codends to the motherships and do not have to 
store pollock onboard in refrigerated seawater fish holds. In addition, MFC catcher 
vessels have the advantage of fishing within a few miles of their processors, which 
contrasts with catcher vessels that deliver to shore-based processors that often travel 
distances of up to 500 miles between the port and the fishing grounds. Of the 20 catcher 
vessels eligible to participate in the mothership sector, 15 are also eligible to deliver to 
shore-based processors.
At 305 feet, the Golden Alaska is the smallest of the three motherships. It joined the 
pollock fishery in 1985. Rokke held an ownership stake in the Golden Alaska until 1987. 
The Golden Alaska focuses on processing surimi, roe, and fishmeal. It works with four 
catcher vessels, with three working at a time. Ownership at the time of the AFA was 
maintained through a 50:50 partnership between U.S. interests and Nichiro. The vessel is 
now owned through a partnership of independent fishermen, the YDFDA CDQ group, 
and Maruha, which maintains less than a 25% stake in the vessel (YDFDA 2009; B. 
Myhre, personal communication).
An $8 million upgrade in 2008 transformed the Golden Alaska from a primarily 
surimi processor to a flexible operation able to process fillets, mince, surimi, fishmeal 
and fish oil, and H&G. With this upgrade the Golden Alaska can profitably operate with 
only 60% of the raw fish previously required to maintain daily operations. “We went 
through 500 mt per day of round fish, now we’re down to a maximum of 350 mt,” says 
factory manager Staale Rotnes (Fiorillo 2009). Following the upgrade, product recovery 
rates nearly doubled from about 20% to over 40%. The Golden Alaska runs four 
processing lines and is capable of producing 1,000 fillets per minute. The improved 
equipment also reduces the need for freshwater used in production of surimi from about 
600 mt per day to 200 mt per day. Because freshwater is produced through distillation, 
the reduction in water use has resulted in savings of 1,500 to 2,000 gallons of fuel per 
day. Over the typical 120 to 130 operating days in a season, this creates huge savings 
(Fiorillo 2009).
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The 680-foot Ocean Phoenix is the largest vessel in the pollock fishery. It entered the 
fishery in 1989, and was initially built for Pereyra and a group of Norwegian partners to 
process fish for their catcher vessels. The Ocean Phoenix employs a crew of 220; 
processing crew members work up to 16 hours a day. It can handle 15 to 20 deliveries a 
day from aligned catcher vessels in the pollock and Pacific whiting fisheries. At the time 
of the AFA, there were seven catcher vessels identified to be owners in the Ocean 
Phoenix and it would have met the 75% U.S. ownership requirement, except that it 
maintained various other business relationships, including a vessel mortgage, which 
would have likely been excluded under the AFA (NMFS 2002; B. Myhre, personal 
communication). All current foreign marketing agreements with Maruha have now been 
deemed legal by the Maritime Administration under the AFA provisions. Maruha’s 
ownership position remains under 25%, although primary management responsibilities 
now reside in the hands of Westward Seafoods, a subsidiary of Maruha (B. Myhre, 
personal communication). The Ocean Phoenix switched to H&G operation in 2004, 
spending $10 million on new equipment. Its operations are now similar to those of most 
vessels in Russian pollock fishery, where H&G product is frozen and shipped to China to 
be filleted and marketed as twice frozen fillets (Choy 2005).
The Excellence was a 367-foot foreign vessel that was reflagged in 1990 by an 
Alaskan company with investors that included Bill Phillips, a former aide to Senator 
Stevens and the Japanese company Taiyo (now Maruha-Nichiro Holdings). In 1991, its 
first full year of production, it processed nearly 60,000 mt of fish. It rotates 100-person 
crews, working two months on and two months off. The Excellence was 100% owned by 
U.S. citizens, but was bareboat chartered to Maruha, a non-citizen entity, when the AFA 
was signed (B. Myhre; personal communication). There were also ownership/operational 
links to five of the catcher boats (Alyeska, California Horizon, Misty Dawn, Papado II, 
and Pacific Alliance) that delivered to it at the time the mothership cooperative was 
established (NMFS 2002). Ownership is currently through U.S. investors and Maruha 
(less than 25%), with primary management responsibilities handled by a Maruha 
subsidiary (B. Myhre; personal communication).
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In late 2009, Supreme Alaska Seafoods, the operator of the Excellence and Phoenix 
Processor Limited Partnership, owner and operator of the mothership Ocean Phoenix, 
announced a merger. Supreme Alaska Seafoods' owners will own Phoenix Processor 
Limited Partnership 50/50 with the existing partners. This merger was likely a result of 
the reduced TAC in 2008 and allows the two companies to reduce management and 
operational costs. Furthermore, it allows the quota to be fished by the more efficient 
Ocean Phoenix; the Excellence has not participated in the pollock fishery since the latter 
half of the 2008 fishing season (Sackton 2010).
Inshore Sector
The AFA allows six land based and two floating processors to participate in the 
inshore sector of the BSAI pollock fishery. Three of the land based processors, Alyeska, 
UniSea, and Westward, are located in Unalaska. The communities of Akutan, Sand Point, 
and King Cove are each home to one land based processor. The two floating processors 
in the inshore sector are required to operate in a single BSAI location each year, and at 
the time of the passage of the AFA, they anchored in Beaver Inlet in Unalaska to do their 
processing. In total, the inshore processors can take BSAI pollock deliveries from a 
maximum of 97 catcher vessels, as of 23 June 2000, according the regulations 
implemented by the AFA. The shore-based processors produce surimi, fillets, roe, 
fishmeal, mince, oil, and some additional byproducts. They also process a variety of 
species, including other groundfish, halibut, and crab, but have historically processed 
very little salmon (NMFS 2002).
The AFA allocated 50% of the DPA to the inshore sector, representing an increase of 
42% over their share of the DPA under Inshore/Offshore I and Inshore/Offshore II. It also 
represented a 28% increase over the share granted in Inshore/Offshore III, which was 
never implemented due the passage of the AFA. This represented an increase in shares of 
the total TAC from 32.4% in 1998 to 42.8% in 1999 (Figure 1.7; Figure 1.8). In return for 
the increased allocation and reduction in factory trawler capacity, the inshore sector
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agreed to take on a $75 million loan. The terms of the loan commits members of the 
inshore sector to pay back the loan through a tax of 0.006 cents on every pound of 
pollock processed till the loan is paid off (AFA 1998). Even with the increased allocation 
in 1999, the actual amount of pollock harvested by the inshore sector has varied through 
the years, with their 2009 catch the lowest under the AFA (Figure 1.13).
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Figure 1.13. Amount of pollock harvested by the inshore sector, CDQ included, 1999­
2009.
Source: NMFS (2010).
Under the AFA, fishery cooperatives are authorized to form in the inshore sector of 
the BSAI pollock fishery. However, unlike the PCC, HSCC, and MFC cooperatives 
which must form at the sector level, inshore cooperatives may form around each AFA 
qualified processor. If an inshore catcher vessel cooperative forms around a specific 
processor and meets certain qualifying criteria, NMFS is required to issue that inshore 
cooperative an exclusive allocation of BSAI pollock. Catcher vessels that join inshore 
cooperatives must then deliver 90% of their allocation to the processing plant to which 
their cooperative is tied. Switching cooperatives is potentially difficult, as it requires 
switchers to fish in an open access pool for one full year before they can join a new
132
cooperative. This exposes them to the hazards of the race-for-fish both for target catches 
of pollock and for small amounts of bycatch (AFA 1998; NMFS 2002).
The six land based and two floating processors are owned by four companies and 
organized as seven cooperatives. The largest company, Trident Seafoods, is primarily 
owned by Bundrant and Ness. Trident owns land based pollock processing facilities in 
Akutan and Sand Point and the floating processor Arctic Enterprise. Trident’s largest 
plant is in Akutan, and since the passage of the AFA, the company has shifted pollock 
production from Sand Point and the Arctic Enterprise to the Akutan plant. Trident’s 
Akutan plant has capacity to process 1,400 mt of pollock per day (J. Plesha, personal 
communication). In 2009, Trident received 32.8% of the inshore quota through two 
cooperatives, the Akutan Catcher Vessel Cooperative and Arctic Enterprise Association 
(NMFS 2010; NMFS 2002).
The Arctic Enterprise Association initially included five vessels, four of which 
transferred their catch history to the cooperative. The fifth vessel, the Intrepid Explorer, 
fishes the cooperative’s entire allocation. The Akutan Catcher Vessel Cooperative is 
much larger, with 36 vessels, 32 of which fished in 2008. In 1999, 19 of these catcher 
vessels were owned directly or through parties related to Trident Seafoods, giving Trident 
the ability to vertically coordinate fishing and processing activities (NMFS 2002). This 
number has likely increased since the passage of the AFA, as catcher vessels owners 
often sell their ownership interest to the processor they deliver to when they decide to 
divest their interest (J. Dooley, personal communication).
Three inshore processors are owned by Maruha-Nichiro, a partnership formed in 
October 2007 through the merger of two of Japan’s largest seafood companies. The 
partnership controls 33.97% of the inshore quota through three cooperatives. The Peter 
Pan Fleet Cooperative delivers to the Peter Pan facility located in King Cove. In addition 
to pollock, Peter Pan processes king crab, bairdi and opilio tanner crab, Pacific cod, 
salmon, halibut and sablefish. Peter Pan receives 5.75% of the inshore pollock quota. The 
Peter Pan Fleet Cooperative includes 10 catcher vessels, only five of which fished for 
pollock in 2008. The cooperative left 23% of their quota unfished in 2008, presumably
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due to a combination of high fuel prices and soft product prices that summer (NMFS 
2010; NMFS 2002).
The second Maruha-Nichiro plant, Westward Seafoods, is located in Unalaska. 
Westward focuses on pollock but also processes Pacific cod, halibut, crab, and salmon. 
The Westward Fleet Cooperative is composed of 12 vessels that receive 18.91% of the 
inshore quota. Only nine of Westward Fleet Cooperative catcher boats fished in 2008 
(NMFS 2010; S. Wilt, personal communication). The processor held direct interest in at 
least five of the catcher vessels at the time of the passage of the AFA and, in addition, 
provided a guarantee on loans for three of the vessels. Westward has since developed 
ownership interests in additional vessels (J. Dooley, personal communication). Westward 
has set up a separate corporation, specifically for the purpose of buying catcher vessels 
from owners looking to divest their interest.
Alyeska Seafoods, the third Maruha-Nichiro plant, is also located in Unalaska. The 
Unalaska Cooperative that delivers to Alyeska receives 12.19% of the inshore quota, 
shared among 11 catcher vessels, eight of which fished in 2008. At the time of the AFA, 
Alyeska Seafoods held ownership stakes in at least six of the catcher vessels. Alyeska 
typically processes 400 mt of pollock per a day, but has peak capacity to process up to 
twice that much.
The UniSea processing plant in Unalaska and is owned by Nippon Suisan. The plant 
receives 24.26% of the inshore quota from the UniSea Fleet Cooperative, a cooperative 
of 14 vessels, one of which did not fish in 2008. UniSea has capacity for up to 1,100 mt 
of pollock per day. Although the quantity varies from year to year, pollock normally 
makes up 80% of the seafood processed at the plant, with crab and other groundfish 
making up the remaining fish.
The Northern Victor, a floating processor, is owned by Icicle Seafoods, which was 
bought by Paine &  Partners, a San Francisco-based private investment firm, in 
September, 2007. The Northern Victor Fleet Cooperative receives 8.96% of the inshore 
quota. The Northern Victor has surimi equipment but focuses on fillets. In 2008, catcher
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vessels delivering to the Northern Victor were paid full price only for fish large enough 
to process as fillets; smaller fish were processed into low-value fishmeal.
Western Alaska Community Development Quota Program (CDQ’s)
The AFA transformed the CDQ program into a permanent allocation of 10% of all 
BSAI groundfish and halibut, giving residents of remote western Alaska communities a 
permanent ownership stake in some of the richest fisheries in the world, fisheries that had 
been inaccessible to them due to a lack of shore-based infrastructure and a lack of access 
to the capital needed to compete in these large-scale, industrialized fisheries. In a 
discussion of opportunities for increased Alaskan investment in the groundfish fisheries, 
Alaska Department of Commerce, Communities and Economic Development 
(ADCCED) noted:
Involvement in Alaska's groundfish fishery operations requires 
considerable investment and expertise. Factory trawler companies are 
multimillion-dollar operations. Their employees must possess 
sophisticated business and technical skills to compete in the industry.
These companies not only employ seasoned captains, engineers, plant 
managers, maintenance crews, deckhands and processors, but headquarters 
are staffed with accountants, human resource professionals, 
administrators, lobbyists, marketing arms and sales forces. (ADCCED)
A desire to increase economic opportunity in impoverished western Alaskan communities 
and to overcome the lack of infrastructure and lack of investment capital were central to 
the purpose and design of the CDQ Program (Ginter 1995; National Research Council 
1998; National Research Council 1999; Northern Economics 2001; Northern Economics 
2002; Northern Economics 2009).
Currently, 65 coastal zone communities in western Alaska participate in the CDQ 
Program. These communities are aligned into six CDQ groups: Aleutian Pribilof Island
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Community Development Association (APICDA), Bristol Bay Economic Development 
Corporation (BBEDC), Central Bering Sea Fishermen’s Association (CBSFA), Coastal 
Villages Regional Fund (CVRF), Norton Sound Economic Development Corporation 
(NSEDC), and Yukon Delta Fisheries Development Association (YDFDA). 
(Communities and regions represented by the six CDQ entities are represented in Figure 
1.14.) As initially structured under Inshore/Offshore I, the six CDQ entities submitted 
annual proposals to ADCCED, wherein they requested shares of the CDQ allocation and 
specified the suite of fishery-related investments and activities that would be supported 
by royalties generated from leasing the shares. With the reauthorization of the MSFCMA 
in 2006, NMFS assumed responsibility for program administration and CDQ entities 
were allowed to use up to 20% of their annual royalties to support projects unrelated to 
fisheries or fisheries infrastructure. For example, the CDQ entities were authorized to use 
royalties to match grants or leverage dollars from other agencies, foundations or non­
profit projects, to support economic development within their region.
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Figure 1.14. CDQ communities and regions. 
Source: WACDA (2010).
The CDQ revenues were initially almost entirely derived from royalties obtained 
from leasing quota to catcher boats and factory trawlers. Between 1992 and 2008, 
approximately $653 million were generated from royalty payments to CDQ entities 
(ADCCED; Figure 1.15). Pollock leases have been an important component of the 
royalties, composing nearly 80% of the revenues over the same period. The real value of 
a metric ton of pollock rose through the 1990s as the value of the pollock grew, but has 
remained fairly stable between 1998 and 2008 (Figure 1.16). As a result, differences in 
pollock royalties from year to year since 1998 have been largely a function of changes in 
the BSAI pollock TAC rather than changes in the price of pollock. The exception to this
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rule is APICDA, who has a market based agreement with its CDQ partner Starbound. 
Although this has created some volatility in its pollock royalties compared to other CDQ 
groups, it has allowed the group to share in increases of pollock value. In 2008, for 
example, when the value of pollock rose sharply, the group received over $400 per mt 
versus an industry average of $341 (L. Cotter, personal communication).
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Figure 1.15. Real CDQ royalty and non-royalty revenue, 2009 dollars, 1992-2008. 
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Figure 1.16. Real CDQ pollock royalty price, 2009 dollars, 1992-20088.
Source: ADCCED (2009); APICDA (2009); CVRF (2009); NSEDC (2009).
Over time, CDQ entities began to generate more and more revenue from investments 
and other business activities. These non-royalty revenues totaled over $620 million for 
1992 through 2008. The dramatic increase in CDQ revenues in 2004 was due, in part, to 
investment payouts to several CDQ groups and high pollock and crab prices. That year 
marked an important milestone, as it was the first year in which CDQ entities earned 
more from investment and business activities than they did from royalties (Figure 1.15). 
Combined data from the six CDQ annual reports indicate that total revenues were over 
$168 million in 2007, and in spite of the global downturn, CDQ revenue rose to over 
$186 million in 2008 (DeMarban 2009; WACDA 2009).
While the overall increase in revenues is significant, it is important to recognize the 
increase of non-royalty earnings as a fraction of total revenues. Non-royalty revenues 
derive from investments, such as investment in pollock factory trawlers, motherships, and
8 The 1992-2005 data is based on all six CDQ entities. Data for 2006-2008 data excludes YDFDA data. 
APICDA, CVRF, and NSEDC are the implied prices from 2007-2009 annual reports. BBEDC and CBSFA 
prices are based on CVRF information since their quota was pooled together with CVRF for lease to 
American Seafoods in 2006-2008.
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catcher boats. The CDQ entities have also invested in local shore-based processing 
facilities and infrastructure, which are typically less profitable than their investments in 
the industrial fisheries, but generate important social capital. APICDA CEO Larry Cotter 
describes his responsibility as:
It is my job to balance the company’s portfolio between investments that 
generate revenue, and the projects that benefit our communities through 
jobs but normally lose money. (L. Cotter, personal communication)
With the increase of both royalty and non-royalty related revenue, the CDQ entities 
have seen a substantial increase in their net assets. The CDQ entities as a group have 
never seen a decrease in their net assets, although on occasion, individual CDQ entities 
have experienced annual losses. The net assets of the CDQ entities increased from about 
$456.9 million in 2007 to $480.6 million in 2008 (Figure 1.17). This results from 
investments in various pollock companies, community infrastructure, and ownership in 
various other fishing vessels. One difficulty in increasing assets year after year is that the 
options for investment in these communities are limited. Although companies are now 
allowed to invest 20% a year in non-fishery related business, they are still restricted to 
investments within their regions. This restriction is in contrast to the Alaska Native 
Regional Corporations which were granted legal authority to invest assets however and 
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Figure 1.17. CDQ assets, liabilities, and net assets, 1992-2008.
Source: WACDA (2008); WACDA (2009); ADCCED (2009).
Because CDQ entities are directed to foster economic development within their 
regions, their performance cannot be judged simply in terms of asset growth. Additional 
performance dimensions include education and vocational training, employment, and 
wages.
All of the CDQ entities fund scholarships for local residents. For instance, BBEDC 
spent $250,000 to help 213 people obtain vocational training in 2008, with some of that 
spent on financial counseling for fishermen (BBEDC 2009). ADCCED (2009) reports 
that funds provided by CDQ entities provided training to over 13,000 people9 between 
1993 and 2005 (Figure 1.18).












Figure 1.18. CDQ training, 1993-2008.
Source: WACDA (2008); ADCCED (2009); WACDA (2009).
The training, in turn, supports what may be considered to be the primary goal of 
the groups: increased economic opportunity for the communities through increased 
employment. Contracts between CDQ entities and the companies that lease their quota 
shares have often included guarantees of positions aboard vessels as well as royalty 
payments. CDQ entities have played a significant role in providing employment and 
providing funding for projects that have increased regional employment. Employment 
related to CDQ entities has grown from 317 jobs in 1993 to 4,473 jobs in 2008 
(ADCCED 2009; Figure 1.19). The CVRF has been successful at creating local jobs 
through building local processing facilities and other income generating businesses. The 
CVRF processing facility at Quinhagak processed 2.3 million pounds of salmon in 2008. 
In 2009, CVRF completed construction of a $25 million salmon processing facility in 
Platinum, the largest-ever CDQ project. In 2008, as a result of its continued focus on 
economic development, CVRFs 580 employees earned $4.4 million -  with 80 percent 

















Figure 1.19. CDQ 
Source: WACDA
The wages associated with the CDQ-associated employment have been a boon for 
their respective regions. Jobs generated by the CDQ Program include work aboard 
catcher and catcher/processor vessels, internships with fishing industry partners or 
government agencies, work in processing facilities, and management/administrative 
positions, creating an excess of over $250 million in wages between 1993 and 2008 
(Figure 1.20). These numbers may seem modest, but it is important to recognize that this 
is an economically disadvantaged and lightly populated region. Total population in the 65 
CDQ communities was only 27,773 in 2008. Residents of these communities have an 
average per capita personal income of around $26,000, compared to a statewide average 
of $40,000. Nearly 22% of the region’s residents live below the poverty level, compared 
to a statewide average of only 9.4% (WACDA 2009). The jobs and wages provided by 
the CDQ entities provide much needed employment and income.
j* ^  J  f  f  ^  /  /  /  /  /  #
Employment, 1993-200810.
(2008); ADCCED (2009); WACDA (2009).
10 1993-2008 data includes employment attributed to crew members, as well as wage and salary employees. 
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Figure 1.20. Real CDQ payroll, 2009 dollars, 1993-200811.
Source: WACDA (2008); ADCCED (2009); WACDA (2009).
In addition to the pollock CDQ allocation, the AFA also expanded the CDQ 
allocation of the TAC for all other commercial fish species in the Bering Sea from 7.5% 
to 10.0% (NMFS 2007). This, coupled with the revenues received from pollock 
investments, allowed CDQ entities to invest in fishery related projects that provided 
opportunities for local fishermen. These groups have invested in vessels, processing 
facilities, and infrastructure needed to allow residents to participate in a variety of 
fisheries that would otherwise be unavailable. For example, BBEDC has been able to 
provide an ice barge which allows local fishermen to increase the value of their salmon 
harvests. They have also created a program which provides financial assistance to enable 
residents to buy fishing permits (BBEDC 2009). The CBSFA has directly purchased crab 
harvesting and processing quota, as well the vessels to harvest their non-pollock shares 
(DeMarban 2009). The non-pollock quota has not only given the CDQ communities 
additional revenue from royalties, but the opportunity to succeed.
_  35 -
11 Data from 1993 to 2008 includes wages and salaries. 2006 -  2008 data includes the addition of payments 
to fishermen.
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American Fisheries Act’s Impact on the Pollock Fishery
The shift in management from a race-for-fish fishery to the cooperative structure had 
huge impacts on the Bering Sea pollock fishery. The pollock fleet, which had fought on 
the water over the fish and battled through Congress and NPFMC over fishing rights, was 
now able to focus on maximizing joint efficiencies in pollock harvesting and processing.
Slower Fishing Pace
An immediate benefit of the AFA cooperatives was the ability to spread harvests over 
longer seasons. Fishermen no longer had to race for fish; instead, they knew the amount 
of fish they were entitled to catch before the season started. They were able to coordinate 
a slower fishing pace, so processors could maximize their returns on the fish, thereby 
increasing what they were willing to pay for the fish. In addition, fishing effort could be 
directed in periods of the season when the fish provided a higher oil and flesh content.
For example, the B season started in June, which is a period when oil and flesh recovery 
is near its lowest because the pollock had depleted their energy reserves during spawning. 
Fishing vessels could now choose to fish later in the B season when there was an 
opportunity for greater recovery, allowing for increased returns for the harvesters and 
processors.
Since 1998, pollock catch per week has declined steadily in concert with a steady 
increase in the number of weeks fished; the overall pace of pollock removals has declined 
from a season peak of about 13,000 mt per week in 1997 to a season peak of 
approximately 6,000 mt per week in 2000 (NPFMC 2002). While this slowing of the 
overall pace of pollock fishing in the Bering Sea may also be partially due in part to 
Steller sea lion conservation measures imposed in 1999 that were designed to disperse the 
fishery over time and space, the elimination of the race-for-fish is probably the largest 
contributing factor (NMFS 2002; Wilen and Richardson 2008).
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Safety
Another benefit to harvesting under the AFA is increased safety. Commercial fishing 
has always been a dangerous occupation. From 1991 to 1998, occupational fatality rates 
in groundfish fishing off of Alaska were 46 per 100,000, an occupational fatality rate that 
is about 10 times the national average (Lincoln and Conway 1999). Part of the reason is 
that fishermen who compete for fish in a race-for-fish are often impelled to fish at times 
and places that are not very safe. Additionally, the higher costs and lower revenues in a 
race-for-fish fishery lead to lower profits margins and, indirectly, to less investment or 
attention to issues of safety. This includes postponing maintenance and delaying 
equipment upgrades (GAO 2000).
The harvesting cooperatives have allowed fishermen more flexibility in their harvest 
and permit them to be more conscious of safety issues. Even in the first two years 
following the introduction of the AFA, reports indicate that the pollock fishery was being 
conducted in a safer manner under co-ops (GAO 2000). GAO (2000) concludes that the 
safety improvements can be attributed to the fact that under the AFA, vessels can afford 
to put off fishing in dangerous weather conditions because they know their fish will still 
be there at the end of a storm. However, it should be noted that fishermen have 
commented that the AFA has made no difference in the operation of fishing vessels with 
respect to weather: fishing vessels do not make money while docked at port, and 
therefore, continue fishing until their quota is harvested.
Another safety benefit arises when older vessels are retired from the fleet. When a 
cooperative chooses to tie-up some of their vessels, the older and least sea-worthy vessels 
are eliminated first. For example, when the UniSea Fleet Cooperative retired the 165 foot 
Pacific Monarch, John Iani, Vice-President of UniSea, reported that:
It was a neat deal .... The Pacific Monarch was old and kind of run down 
and a little bit dangerous to be fishing. (Loy 2001)
An additional benefit is the increased profit vessel owners receive as a result of the 
cooperatives. Vessels that were only very close to breaking even under the race-for-fish
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are making more while enjoying reduced costs. As a result, increased money is available 
for maintenance and repairs.
Optimized Product Mix
Implementation of the AFA made it easier for fishermen and fish processors to tailor 
their output to satisfy the demands of diverse markets. Under the race-for-fish, many 
processors focused on surimi production because it is the fastest way to process large 
quantities of fish. Because the AFA cooperatives could guarantee each member a 
predictable amount of fish, participants were able to invest in machinery capable of 
producing pollock fillets and could slow down fishing to produce the more valuable 
product (Figure 1.21; GAO 1999). Processors with the ability to produce fillet and surimi 
were better able to determine the product mix that would allow them to maximize the use 
of fish and generate the greatest profit (Wilen and Richardson 2008). The increased 
flexibility also allowed companies to respond to short-term market changes. This was an 
advantage for the catcher/processor sector, when in early 1999, their flexibility allowed 
them to respond to increased demand and rising fillet prices by increasing fillet 
production while decreasing surimi production (GAO 1999). Another instance was in 
2008, when the prices of surimi soared, processors were able to focus on producing more 
surimi in order to meet the increased demand (Figure 1.22; S. Wilt, Personal 
Communication).
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Figure 1.21. Pollock production mix for BSAI pollock production, 1995-2008. 
Source: NMFS (1999d, 2001b, 2005, 2009c, 2010).
Surimi X Fillet
Figure 1.22. Surimi and fillet recovery rates12 for BSAI pollock harvests by season, 2000­
2008.
Source: NMFS (1999d, 2001b, 2005, 2009c, 2010).
12 It should be noted that these are not true recovery rates for a load of fish; rather, this is the overall rate of 
quantity produced to the total harvest, which does not account for factors such as discards.
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Increased Product Value
The AFA has also allowed harvesters and processors to focus on maximizing the 
value of the fish they harvest. This happens in a couple ways. First, there has been a 
reduction in the fish taken per tow in the catcher/processor sector. The reduced 
throughput has allowed catcher/processors to better match fish landings with their 
processing capacity. This suggests that when freed from the race-for-fish, operators have 
been harvesting fewer fish per tow, with the intent of reducing bruising in the flesh and 
contributing to improved roe quality. The slower processing pace has also permitted 
greater specialization within the processing lines, since it allows equipment to be more 
precisely tuned to the various sizes of fish harvested. Processors were able to maximize 
returns through increased recovery of higher value products, by increasing the percentage 
of the pollock to be used for fillets (Figure 1.15; GAO 2000; NPFMC 2002).
In addition, release from the race-for-fish has allowed harvesters to more closely tune 
their catches to target fish of a desired size. By slowing down fishing, vessels can spend 
more time searching for fish of the desired size (GAO 2000; NPFMC 2002; D. Abbasian, 
personal communication). Those processors that have focused on surimi production are 
able to work with fish as small as 200 g. On the other hand, processors that focus on fillet 
production may be willing to make it worthwhile for vessels to deliver partial loads of 
large fish (D. Abbasian; personal communication).
Increased Utilization of Raw Fish
The AFA has allowed pollock companies to focus on maximizing their recovery of 
marketable product from their catches. Processors report that elimination of the race-for- 
fish has allowed companies to increase the yields from pollock harvests (GAO 1999; 
GAO 2000). Processors are able to devote attention to using scraps, frames, and 
trimmings to produce salable, but low-value, products such as oil and fishmeal. Under the 
race-for-fish, vessels could not afford to waste scarce storage space on low-value 
products when the same space could instead be used to store fillets and surimi. They also
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could not afford the time to travel to a port to offload low-value products; doing so would 
have reduced their total catches.
In 1999, the first year of the PCC cooperative, catcher processors increased pollock 
utilization by about 20% (GAO 1999; GAO 2000). Further gains following the passage of 
the AFA have been evident throughout the fishery. The recovery rates of pollock harvests 
in the BSAI have increased nearly 39% from 0.25 in 1998 to over 0.35 in 2008 (Figure 
1.23). One reason for these gains is a large reduction in discards, which decreased from 
91,982 mt in 1997 to 7,661 mt in 2008 (Figure 1.24). A majority of processors report the 
ability to produce fillet, surimi, roe, fishmeal, mince, and oil with recovery rates of over 
40% 13 and are able to process everything except eyes, skin, bones, and water. Previously, 
any part of the fish not used for fillets or surimi was either turned into fishmeal and oil or 
ground up and discarded at-sea. Pollock processors have also increased their flesh (fillet 
and surimi) recovery rates at an even faster pace than overall recovery rates, with gains of 
45% from 0.17 to almost 0.25 over 1998 - 2008 (Figure 1.25). The quicker pace indicates 
that processors have been able to not only increase their overall recovery rates, but also 
increase the portion of the fish devoted to the more valued flesh products through 
improved cutting techniques and slower throughput.
13
There are several reasons why recovery rates seen in Figure 1.16 are lower than data reported by pollock 
processors. First, much of the fish oil produced and utilized by fish processors is not reported to NMFS 
because it is used in plant operations. Another factor is that fish processors likely do not include the impact 
of discarded catches within their calculations when providing their utilization rates. In addition, it was only 
possible to subtract out the weight of the finished H&G product, which was significantly smaller than the 




1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Figure 1.23. Recovery rate for BSAI harvested pollock excluding whole fish and H&G, 
1995-2008.
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Figure 1.25. Flesh recovery rate for BSAI harvested pollock excluding whole fish and 
H&G, 1995-2008.








Much of these gains are due to increased long-term planning, which is another result 
of the cooperatives. Companies that were once looking to make it through the season are 
now able to plan for the future, allowing them to purchase equipment that may take 
several years to amortize. Fishmeal machinery requires a significant investment, and 
under the race-for-fish, it was impossible for most companies to justify spending the 
money if they weren’t even sure they were going to make it through the season. Allowing 
companies secure rights to shares of the pollock TAC gave them the confidence needed 
to support investments that increased utilization rates (Felthoven 2002; Felthoven and 
Morrison Paul 2004).
Decreased Costs
The AFA cooperatives also allowed increased economic efficiency through decreased 
costs. For example, operations are able to trade quota allocations between vessels within 
a given cooperative. This makes it possible for vessels with low operating costs to harvest 
the allocations of less efficient vessels. A good example of this is Trident’s factory 
trawler fleet. Of Trident’s five AFA-qualified factory trawlers, only three are used to
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catch and process pollock; the U.S. Enterprise and the American Enterprise have not left 
port for years and will most likely be scrapped in upcoming years (J. Plesha, personal 
communication). Another opportunity for cost savings occurs near the end of a season, 
when vessels do not have enough remaining quota for a full trip, they can pool their quota 
shares onto a single vessel. In addition, vessels have been able to reduce their fuel 
consumption by slowing their cruising speed to and from fishing grounds. For example, 
the C/V Pacific Prince is able to halve fuel costs per mile when travel time is not an issue 
(J. Dooley, personal communication).
Operational efficiencies available under cooperatives are another reason companies 
may experience reduced costs. Processors may choose to shift the timing of their 
participation in the BSAI pollock fishery to avoid overlap with peak production periods 
in other fisheries. For instance, pollock processing may be accelerated or delayed to 
allow processing facilities to be dedicated to salmon or crab processing activities.
Another operational benefit under the AFA is that B season catches can be delayed to late 
summer or early fall when fillet yields are higher and oil content is higher. Fish oil can be 
used in burners to supplement diesel, allowing significant fuel savings (Alaska Energy 
Authority 2005).
Marine Stewardship Council Certification
Harvesting cooperatives have benefited the pollock fishery by fostering a new spirit 
of cooperation. Under the race-for-fish, companies were in constant competition with 
each other, but since implementation of the AFA, pollock operations have been more 
willing to work together for the benefit of the fishery as a whole. A prime example of this 
was seeking sustainable seafood certification from the Marine Stewardship Council 
(MSC). The MSC fishery certification program uses a third party to review the current 
condition and management of a fishery, after which it rewards the fishery with a seafood 
eco-label that recognizes sustainable management practices. The certification process is
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arduous and costly, requiring the fishery’s time and resources. In 2001, the pollock 
industry began the certification process, and after four years, obtained MSC certification.
The MSC certification provides buyers with what many regard as an independent 
assessment of how well a fishery is being managed. Some buyers value credence 
attributes such as ‘organic’, ‘free-trade’, ‘shade-grown’, and ‘certified sustainable’ and 
are willing to pay price premiums for otherwise undifferentiated products (Wessells et al. 
1999; Johnston et al. 2001; Wessells 2002). It is perceived that MSC certification 
provides Alaska pollock preferential access to European and North American markets. In 
contrast to the pollock resource in Russia, which faces challenges due to concerns about 
enforcement and monitoring of harvests and the basis for determining harvest levels,
MSC certification of the Alaska pollock fishery signals wholesale buyers that they can 
rely on consistent long-term availability of Alaska pollock (Gudmundsson and Wessells 
2000; Van Zile 2005). The MSC certification is particularly important in western 
European markets, where households are concerned with the sustainability of their 
seafood and do not trust national or European Union reports on the condition of fish 
stocks or the sustainability of fisheries management. As the premier eco-label, MSC has 
given Alaska pollock advantages in the European market, and advantage that is expressed 
in a price premium relative to comparable grades of Russian pollock. The number of 
international fisheries that have met MSC standards and certification has grown 
enormously over the past two years, with many European retailers and brand owners now 
committed to this ecolabel (EU Fish Processors’ Association 2008). Bird’s Eye has 
launched the Sustainable Fish Finger, an Alaska pollock product that is set to compete 
and replace some cod products in the British market. In the U.S. market, MSC 
certification also gives Alaska pollock an extra boost. Wal-Mart has set a 100% 
sustainable fish target for North America, and has begun to carry Alaska pollock in its 
frozen section. McDonald’s has declared a commitment to sustainable fish products, 
using Alaskan pollock in all their fish sandwiches. The cutbacks in the pollock TAC in 
2009, however, have forced McDonald’s to look elsewhere, as they announced their
154
European restaurants have converted to haddock in order to preserve their Alaska pollock 
for the U.S. market (MSC 2006; MSC 2007; Eurofish 2009).
CDQ Partnerships
The CDQ groups have impacted western Alaskans in numerous ways, including 
employment, infrastructure, and access to opportunities. But western Alaskans are not 
alone in benefiting from the CDQ program. Pollock operations, particularly factory 
trawlers, have enjoyed benefits from business ties to CDQ entities. Each CDQ entity has 
chosen different ways to involve themselves with the pollock fishery. Perhaps the most 
successful of these is CVRF. The CVRF received 24% of the CDQ quota in 2009. The 
company has been successful with its investments, with $44 million in revenue reported 
for 2008, making it top among the six CDQ groups for that year (Figure 1.26). CVRF has 
done particularly well from its investments in the pollock fishery. The company has made 
substantial investments in the catcher/processor sector, beginning with purchase of a 23% 
stake in American Seafood in 2000 when Rokke sold out of the company (American 
Seafoods Group LLC 2002). The CVRF extended its ownership stake in American 
Seafoods in 2006, when they participated in the $81.75 million buyout of Centre 
Partner’s 23% equity interest in American Seafoods (American Seafoods Group LLC 
2006). This brought CVRF’s ownership stake to over 46%.
The CVRF, in partnership with BBEDC, CBSFA, and YDFDA (for their B season 
share), pooled their allocations of pollock quota together and leased their shares to 
American Seafoods. By aggregating their shares, they were able to leverage their 
bargaining position and pool the associated bycatch allowances and negotiate lease prices 
with American Seafoods to around $330 per metric ton for their CDQ pollock. In 2009, 
however, CVRF did not renew their longstanding lease agreement with American 
Seafoods and instead entered into a lease agreement with the Arctic Storm Management 
Group. While this seemed like a peculiar move, considering their vested interest in the 
success of American Seafoods, CVRF has thus far profited under the leadership of
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Morgen Crow and is likely to benefit from this action as well (CVRF 2007; CVRF 2008; 
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Figure 1.26. Annual Revenues for CDQ entities in 2007 -  2008. 
Source: DeMarban (2009).
The NSEDC received 22% of the CDQ pollock allocation in 2009 but only reported 
total revenues $7.7 million in 2008. The low revenues were mainly due to the NSEDC’s 
large holding of short term securities, which have decreased in value during the global 
economic downturn (Figure 1.26). The NSEDC has invested back in the community in a 
variety of ways, including $1.2 million in energy subsidy for qualified Norton Sound 
households and $6.4 million in wages to 515 people in 2008. The NSEDC held a 50% 
ownership stake in the Glacier Fish Company until Glacier Fish acquired the Alaska 
Ocean. Under terms of the acquisition, Nippon Suisan gained a 25% ownership stake in 
Glacier Fish; NSDEC’s ownership stake declined to 37.5%, albeit of a now larger 
company. The NSDEC received around $330 per metric ton for their CDQ share of 
pollock from Glacier Fish in 2008, up from around $323 in 2007 and $318 in 2006 
(NSEDC 2007; NSEDC 2008; DeMarban 2009; NSEDC 2009).
The BBEDC received 21% of the pollock CDQ allocation in 2009. They earned $20.9 
million in revenues in 2008, a decrease from the $29.7 million earned in 2007. The
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BBEDC awarded $159,000 to each of the 17 regional communities in 2008 to help 
finance economic-growth projects and is one of the only CDQ groups with their primary 
headquarters located in western Alaska. The BBEDC owns 30% of the Arctic Fjord, 
which is managed by the Arctic Storm Management Group. They have also invested in 
several catcher vessels. The BBEDC owns: 50% of the Morning Star, which delivered to 
Alyeska Seafoods in 2008; 50% of the Dona Martita and Arctic Wind, which both deliver 
within the Westward Fleet Cooperative; 50% of the Morning Star, which delivers within 
the Peter Pan cooperative; and 50% of the Defender, which delivers to the UniSea 
cooperative. The BBEDC leased their pollock CDQ shares to American Seafoods in 2008 
(BBEDC 2009; DeMarban 2009).
The APICDA received 14% of the pollock CDQ allocation in 2009. In 2008,
APICDA invested $5 million to complete the Bering Pacific Seafoods plant in 
False Pass. The APICDA was poised to move forward with construction of two 
additional shore-based processing facilities in 2009 and 2010 in St. George and 
Nelson Lagoon. This is in addition to the Atka Pride Seafood processing plant 
that APICDA built, and has owned and operated with the Atka Fishermen’s 
Association since 1994. The APICDA provided higher education scholarships to 
61 individuals in 2008, totaling $228,555. The group owns 19 seafood harvesting 
and catcher/processing vessels directly or through joint ventures with other 
companies, including 20% of the Starbound which fished 75% of APICDA’s 
pollock CDQ in 2008. The APICDA also has a 50:50 partnership with Trident 
Seafoods in ownership of the pollock catcher vessel Golden Dawn (L. Cotter, 
personal communication).
The YDFDA received 14% of the pollock CDQ share in 2009. The YDFDA bucked 
financial trends in 2008 with revenues of $35.5 million, up from $33.1 million earned in 
2007. Primarily through Kwikpak Fisheries, a wholly owned seafood processor, YDFDA 
pumped $3.8 million into the region and employed more than 800 resident fishermen, 
processing plant workers, and other staff in 2008. The YDFDA has provided financial 
support to the Alaska Department of Fish and Game for various projects, including the
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operation of the Pilot Station sonar project that is used as an index of the number of 
salmon returning to the Yukon River. The YDFDA’s regional fisheries manager, Eric 
Olson, chairs the NPFMC, giving YDFDA and the other CDQ groups an important voice 
in Council decisions. In 2000, YDFDA bought into the mothership Golden Alaska, of 
which it currently owns 30.3%, and the catcher vessels American Beauty and Ocean 
Leader, of which it owns 75%. Both of these catcher vessels deliver to the Golden 
Alaska. In 2008, YDFDA leased its A season CDQ pollock share to the Golden Alaska, 
and its B season CDQ pollock share to American Seafoods. This has varied throughout 
the 2000s, as YDFDA has typically leased between 70% and 100% to the Golden Alaska 
(DeMarban 2009; YDFDA 2009).
The CBSFA is the smallest CDQ, representing one community, St. Paul. The CBSFA 
received 5% of the pollock CDQ allocation in 2009. Like YDFDA, CBSFA increased 
revenues in 2008 ($18.1 million) relative to 2007 ($16.1 million). The CBSFA doubled 
education and outreach activities in 2008, paying out $373,100. The CBSFA has an 
ownership stake in American Seafoods of slightly more than 4 percent. The CBSFA has 
partnered 75:25 with UniSea in ownership of the catcher vessels Starward and Starlite. 
The CBSFA also holds a 30% share of the catcher vessel Fierce Allegiance; all three of 
these vessels deliver pollock to UniSea (American Seafoods Group LLC 2002; American 
Seafoods Group LLC 2006).
The many partnerships formed between CDQ groups and pollock fishing companies 
make sense for several reasons. For CDQ groups, investment in pollock operations was 
one of the few options available under the initial program constraints. Many of the other 
local fisheries and associated facilities have lacked the catch share structure of the 
pollock fishery and have been considerably less profitable. Especially since passage of 
the AFA, pollock royalties and profits from ownership of AFA-qualified vessels have 
been strong. Control of CDQ shares has provided leverage in negotiations with pollock 
companies; ownership stakes in those companies has benefited from the security of 
control of CDQ shares. Another benefit is that members of CDQ communities are 
typically given hiring preference aboard partner vessels.
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For the pollock operations themselves, partnering with CDQ groups has provided 
access to financial and political capital. The CDQ entities have typically held large cash 
positions and must invest 80% into fishery projects; as a result, CDQ entities were 
willing to pay a premium for ownership in the profitable pollock fishery. When Rokke 
needed to reduce his stake in American Seafoods to comply with AFA requirements, the 
natural place to turn was to CDQ entities that had leased quota shares to American 
throughout the 1990s. Not only did the CDQs provide financial resources, but there was 
an expectation that their ownership interest would lead the CDQ entities to provide their 
partners with priority access to pollock CDQ share leases. Another benefit of ownership 
is that it provides the pollock fishery clout when faced with political issues. For instance, 
when the fishery was under an immense amount of political pressure over salmon 
bycatch, CVRF brought in large numbers of community members to testify to the 
NPFMC in support of the pollock fleet, under the mantra “Pollock Provides!”
Fisheries Management under the American Fisheries Act
The formation of cooperatives has given members of the pollock fishery an increased 
sense of ownership not felt under the race-for-fish. In the pre-AFA fishery, pollock 
operations supported responsible management, but their attention remained focused on 
catching as much fish as possible before the TAC for the season was exhausted. They did 
not know how many fish they were going to catch or how they were to be caught; instead, 
they knew that if they did not catch them, someone else would. Under the AFA, 
companies were given a permanent stake in the pollock resource. Their access to 
dedicated shares of the pollock TAC was guaranteed and they knew that with proper 
management, there would be fish for them to harvest in subsequent years. With their 
rights to fish in place, pollock operations had a vested interest in the health of the fishery. 
Pollock operations now have an increased ability to respond to issues related to the 
Bering Sea ecosystem, such as issues with Steller sea lions and salmon bycatch. Proper 
conservation and management of the entire ecosystem becomes imperative to protecting
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their catch share. As a result, fishing operations have taken a more active role in the 
management process, seeking out areas of concern and actively looking for methods to 
address them. Pollock fishermen discuss their role as “co-managers of the fishery.”
Steller Sea Lion Closures
One of the first crises for the industry after AFA implementation was occasioned by 
the need to adapt to fishery management measures mandated under the Steller sea lion 
revised final reasonable and prudent alternatives (NMFS 1999a). Populations of Steller 
sea lions had been in decline for over 20 years despite numerous actions taken to stem the 
decline. In 1990, NMFS had published an emergency rule, listing Steller sea lions as a 
threatened (not endangered) species under provisions of the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA). This provided greater protection to Steller sea lions and gave them higher priority 
when determining policies involving their surrounding environment.
Since pollock is a part of the Steller sea lion diet, concern arose that localized 
depletion near the sea lion rookeries and haulouts might be contributing to the decline. In 
1991, the effort to divide the pollock fishery into an A and B season to spread the harvest 
out over time was partially motivated by concern for sea lions. By leaving time between 
the A and B season, and setting an ending date for the B season of 1 November, the idea 
was to prevent compression of pollock fisheries and to decrease the chance of localized 
depletion of prey for Steller sea lions. Another measure, the ban on roe stripping, was 
passed, in part, due to concerns that the discarded carcasses attracted sea lions to the 
fishing grounds where they were vulnerable to entanglement in the fishing gear or to 
being shot by fishermen. Trawl closures were also implemented in 1991 to reduce 
disturbance of sea lions within 10 nm of 27 rookeries, with some of the trawl closures 
extended to 20 nm during the pollock A season. In addition, the domestic Bogoslof Island 
pollock fishery was closed due to resource conservation concerns, although they were 
again not solely related to sea lions (National Research Council 2003).
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It is unclear whether these management actions have had any impact on the trajectory 
of the Steller sea lion population. By 1996, the sea lion population had declined to 20% 
of their levels in the 1970s. The NRC (2003) report recommended that to reverse 
declines, fishing effort should be more evenly distributed in time and place. The 
continued decline also led to the Steller sea lion populations west of 144° W being listed 
as endangered in 1997. By moving the status of this population from threatened to 
endangered, the priority given to these populations was increased substantially and 
further action to protect them was required (National Research Council 2003).
In April 1998, Greenpeace filed a complaint in U.S. District Court that NMFS had 
failed to revise the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) relating to federal groundfish 
fisheries in Alaska and had violated the ESA because the biological opinion regarding the 
impact of these fisheries on sea lions was inadequate. NMFS released a new biological 
opinion in December 1998 (known as BiOp I), which concluded that the groundfish 
fisheries, excepting pollock, were unlikely to cause harm to listed species. For the pollock 
fishery, there was concern based on possible competition between the fishery and sea 
lions for pollock (NMFS 1998). In response to this finding, a set of Reasonable and 
Prudent Alternatives (RPAs) was developed in consultation with the NPFMC that spread 
fishing effort out (NMFS 1999a). Several restrictions were implemented that affected the 
pollock fishery. In 1999, trip limits were imposed for the pollock fishery in the Gulf of 
Alaska. In addition, pollock fishing in the Aleutian Islands was prohibited, with pollock 
catches in other critical areas being further restricted. Four fishing seasons were created 
for pollock to further spread the harvest out over time (National Research Council 2003).
These restrictions were implemented in the 1999-2000 fishery management plans. 
After the RPAs went into effect in January 1999, NMFS issued another biological 
opinion (BiOp II), which examined the effects of the entire groundfish fishery 
management plan on sea lions and found no danger from the pollock fishery based on a 
review of the TAC levels proposed for the GOA and BSAI management areas (NMFS 
1999b). In response, Greenpeace filed suit and on 9 July 1999, US District Court Judge 
Thomas Zilly found the RPAs to be arbitrary and capricious because there was no
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explanation of how the proposed restrictions mitigated jeopardy for the Steller sea lion. 
He also felt that the environmental impact statements were insufficient and directed 
NMFS to prepare a more comprehensive analysis of the Bering Sea, Aleutian Islands, and 
Gulf of Alaska groundfish fisheries (National Research Council 2003).
In addition, in January 2000, Judge Zilly ruled that the “no jeopardy” finding in BiOp 
II was inadequate under ESA because it only considered the TAC levels for individual 
groundfish fisheries and failed to consider the cumulative impacts of all groundfish 
fisheries on sea lion populations. Based on that January ruling, Greenpeace filed for an 
injunction to prohibit groundfish trawling in Steller sea lion critical habitat until a new 
comprehensive biological opinion was prepared by NMFS. The injunction was granted in 
July and implemented in August 2000 (National Research Council 2003).
The growing number of Steller sea lion measures impacted when, where, and how the 
pollock fishery could occur. Many of the areas that were closed to trawling had been 
prime fishing grounds for the catcher vessels based in Unalaska and Akutan. That left 
two options: going further out for fish or increasing effort on areas close to town that 
were still open. With a lack of hard science either proving or disproving the link between 
pollock fishing and the decline of the Steller sea lion populations, industry members were 
concerned that continued pressure from environmental groups would further threaten 
operations if issues were not scientifically addressed. To address these and other 
environmental concerns through scientific research, the PCC formed the Pollock 
Conservation Cooperative Research Center (PCCRC) to fund an endowment to the 
University of Alaska Fairbanks to be administered by the Dean of the School of Fisheries 
and Ocean Science and to support research on science matters related to the groundfish 
fisheries off Alaska.
As the pollock industry became more involved in the science of the interactions 
between fishing activities and sea lion populations, a new biological opinion (BiOp III) 
was released (NMFS 2000). It concluded that the possibility that Steller sea lion 
populations were jeopardized by the Alaska groundfish fisheries, including fisheries for 
Atka mackerel (Pleurogrammus monopterygius), Pacific cod, and pollock, due to
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competition for prey and modification of prey distribution in critical habitat could not be 
dismissed. This revised biological opinion found jeopardy with regard to pollock even 
under the restrictions imposed by the 1999 RPAs. The opinion included a comprehensive 
set of new RPAs that incorporated adaptive management to assess the efficacy of the 
groundfish restrictions. The western population was divided into 13 management areas 
designated as either open- with fishing allowed under the 1999 restrictions-or closed- 
with no fishing allowed in critical habitat (National Research Council 1999).
The effects of the proposed regulations would have been substantial. A simulation 
posted in the Federal Register estimated the impact of implementing the measures would 
have cost the industry between $225 and $401 million annually, which is an estimated 
40% of the annual value of the fishery (Department of Commerce 2001). With the 
measures neither seeming reasonable nor prudent, the pollock industry once again turned 
to their ally, Senator Stevens. His response was swift and effective. He attached an 
amendment to the December 2000 omnibus appropriations bill that delayed full 
implementation of the RPAs and provided the NPFMC with an opportunity to develop an 
alternative set of RPAs. In addition, the amendment provided $30 million for economic 
relief to offset losses incurred by sea lion protection measures, $28 million for research 
on the causes of the decline of sea lions, and $2 million for scientific review of BiOp III, 
including a review by the National Academy of Sciences (National Research Council 
2003).
As a result of these actions, in February 2001, the NPFMC appointed an RPA 
committee to develop alternatives to the RPAs in BiOp III that addressed potential issues 
of the pollock, Atka mackerel, and Pacific cod fisheries but in a manner that could result 
in a less severe impact on the fishing industry and fishery dependent communities. In 
June, the RPA committee proposed an alternative set of measures that discarded the 
earlier adaptive management approach and used new telemetry data to justify restricting 
fishing primarily in the first 10 nm of the 20 nm radius, thereby delineating the highly 
restrictive critical habitat areas. This decision was based on telemetry data suggesting that 
sea lions spend most of their time at sea within 10 nm of the rookeries. The revised RPAs
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assumed that the telemetry data reflected the foraging behavior of sea lions, and 
therefore, a 10 nm zone would create the desired effect while allowing the fisheries to 
continue to operate. By moving most fishing activities beyond 10 nm, with some further 
restrictions between 10 and 20 nm, the RPA committee was able to reach the same 
theoretical reduction of jeopardy postulated under measures recommended in BiOp III. In 
August 2001, NMFS released BiOp IV, which evaluated the new RPAs and included a 
supplemental environmental impact statement that compared the various RPAs. NMFS 
concluded in BiOp IV that the June 2001 RPAs provide adequate protection for Steller 
sea lions with regard to the groundfish fisheries (NMFS 2001a; National Research 
Council 2003).
Although a near disaster for the pollock fleet was averted, the cause of the decline of 
the western stock of Steller sea lions has continued to be the subject of much speculation 
and debate despite numerous analyses and many detailed reports. The $30 million spent 
through Senator Steven’s earmark and countless other studies sponsored by the North 
Pacific Research Board, the PCCRC, and various state and federal agencies have left 
scientists with more questions than answers. The story of Steller sea lion decline, which 
might otherwise have remained an obscure biological mystery, became an issue of 
national interest because of the regulatory implications for management of the 
commercial fisheries in the North Pacific.
Salmon Bycatch
Managing salmon bycatch in the BSAI pollock fishery has been a perennial 
challenge. Concern about surreptitious targeting of salmon was, in part, behind the 
requirement for onboard federal fisheries observers in the foreign and JV fisheries. An 
overall bycatch cap of 55,250 Chinook salmon (Oncorhynchus tshawytscha) was set for 
BSAI area foreign trawl fisheries in 1982 (NPFMC 1982b). Salmon bycatch and concern 
about salmon bycatch continued during the “Americanization” era, throughout the 
Inshore/Offshore debates, and continues in the post-AFA epoch (Witherell et al. 2002).
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The trouble with Chinook salmon and chum salmon (O. keta) bycatch is that it has 
varied substantially from very low numbers in some years to very high numbers in other 
years (Figure 1.27, Figure 1.28), and has even varied substantially from month to month 
in the same year. In addition, bycatch has varied substantially and unpredictably from one 
region to the next within and between years. Consequently it has been difficult to predict 
how much bycatch will occur, or when and where it will occur, let alone design 
management measures that are likely to be successful without requiring draconian 
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Figure 1.27. Chinook salmon bycatch by pollock vessels in the BSAI.
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Figure 1.28. Non-Chinook (mostly chum) salmon bycatch by pollock vessels in the 
BSAI.
Source: Data for 1977-1990 from Queirolo et al. (1995); data from 1991- 25 August 2009 
from NMFS (2009b).
During the 1980s, the annual overall Chinook salmon bycatch cap was apportioned to 
foreign nations engaged in the TALFF and JV fisheries; nations that exceeded their cap 
were prohibited from fishing in large sections of the Bering Sea during the remainder of 
the year (NPFMC 1983b, NPFMC 1984, Witherell and Pautzke 1997). As early as the 
January 1989 NPFMC meeting, Henry Mitchell proposed setting a schedule of ever more 
restrictive prohibited species bycatch limits on incidental catches of salmon by domestic 
catcher boats engaged in the fall Shelikof Straits pollock fishery. Beginning in 1992, the 
Council experimented with an individual vessel incentive program (VIP) to reduce 
prohibited species bycatch (NMFS 1993). However, concerns about due process and the 
accuracy of bycatch estimates left the VIP program so inefficacious that is was rescinded 
in 2008 (NMFS 2008).
The Council switched to a spatial management approach in 1995 and established the 
Chinook Salmon Savings Areas (NPFMC 1995b) and the Chum Salmon Savings Area 
(NPFMC 1995c). These seasonal closure areas encompassed fishing grounds that had 
consistently experienced high Chinook salmon and non-Chinook salmon bycatch rates.
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Additional management measures modified the closure areas to depend on total bycatch 
and bycatch rates (NMFS 1999c).
In 2001, the PCC and the catcher vessel cooperatives formed an inter-cooperative 
group to devise a voluntary strategy to reduce bycatch of non-Chinook salmon. The plan 
excluded vessels with high bycatch rates from fishing for pollock in areas that reported 
elevated chum salmon bycatch. This program exemplifies the type of voluntary 
coordination that can occur among the AFA cooperatives and could not have occurred in 
the pre-AFA fishery (NMFS 2002). With this example in mind, and with the observation 
that bycatch rates outside the salmon savings areas often exceeded bycatch rates inside 
the salmon savings areas, NPFMC approved a system of dynamic spatial closures that 
allowed managers to shut off high-bycatch areas in near real time, measures made 
possible by the heightened observer coverage requirements imposed by the AFA 
(NPFMC 2005, NPFMC 2007). An exemption to area closures for vessels participating in 
the voluntary rolling hotspot system (VHRS) was implemented in 2006 and 2007 through 
an exempted fishing permit and, beginning in 2008, through Amendment 84 to the BSAI 
FMP (NPFMC 2008). Nevertheless, despite all of these measures, the bycatch Chinook 
reached 121,638 in 2007 (Figure 1.27) and the bycatch of non-Chinook salmon exceeded 
700,000 in 2005 (Figure 1.28).
The record bycatches of non-Chinook salmon in 2005 and of Chinook salmon in 2007 
raised concerns in western Alaska where Chinook salmon runs have declined since 1996. 
To address these concerns, in 2008, the NPFMC initiated review of an amendment to the 
BSAI groundfish Fisheries Management Plan to reintroduce binding annual caps on 
Chinook salmon bycatch and to create an incentive to minimize Chinook salmon bycatch 
at levels below the bycatch cap (NPFMC 2008). Under the Council’s preferred 
alternative, beginning in 2011, the AFA cooperatives can choose to operate subject to 
proportionate shares of a simple bycatch cap of 47,591 Chinook salmon or proportionate 
shares of a less restrictive bycatch cap of 60,000 Chinook salmon if they adopt an 
incentive plan agreement (IPA) structured to create vessel-level incentives to avoid 
bycatch even when the cap is non-binding and as long as actual bycatch is below 47,591
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in at least four out of seven years. The bycatch caps will be apportioned to the AFA 
cooperatives or sectors based on a formula that weights past catches of pollock and past 
bycatches of Chinook salmon and apportioned 70:30 between the A and B seasons for 
pollock (NPFMC 2008). The AFA cooperatives have explored several options for 
structuring one or more IPAs but have not yet established an IPA for salmon bycatch 
avoidance.
United Catcher Boats and the PCC have also experimented with technical methods 
for reducing salmon bycatch. For example, the PCC has helped support field trials of 
second-generation flapper-panels. These were tested in the 2008 B-Season aboard the 
Northern Jaeger and the Arctic Fjord. The initial results indicate that there has been an 
improvement on Chinook bycatch in relation to fishing performance of the nets, though 
more testing was needed (Pollock Conservation Cooperative 2008). Nevertheless, John 
Dooley, who has fished BSAI pollock for over 25 years, claims there “are lightning 
strikes,” or times of high abundance. He recalls tows of 1000 salmon, which cannot be 
avoided if your vessel is the first one on the fishing grounds (J. Dooley, personal 
communication).
Although bycatch can be thought of as a biological or technological issue, it has 
important social and economic ramifications. Setting a bycatch cap for salmon involves 
implicit and uncertain tradeoffs between fisheries for salmon and fisheries for pollock. 
Liberal bycatch allowances increase the magnitude of likely losses to the directed salmon 
fishery; small bycatch allowances may prevent full exploitation of the pollock fishery. In 
addition, bycatch caps can have different impacts on different segments of a fishery. For 
example, to the extent that bycatch rates are inversely related to distance from Unalaska 
and Akutan, they have a larger impact on the inshore fleet than they do on the offshore 
fleet. Similarly, within the inshore fleet, salmon bycatch caps can have a larger effect on 
smaller vessels with limited operating ranges or on vessels that focus on harvests of large 
pollock for fillet production.
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Decline in Russian Stocks
While AFA cooperatives have had an important impact on the fishery, their success 
was aided in part by a sharp reduction in pollock biomass in Russian waters. The Russian 
fleets had depleted the resources off their coast through overfishing, much of it 
unreported. As a result, the harvests of pollock in Russia had been decreasing steadily 
since 1988, when catches were over 3.3 mmt. By 2002, Russian catches had dropped to 
less than 25% of their 1989 level, with reported catches of less than 850,000 mt (Figure 
1.29). Russia had historically produced a majority of the global supply of pollock fillets, 
but the drop in catch created a shortage that drove prices up. Between 1998 and 1999, the 
first year of the AFA, average pollock fillet prices increased 41% to 74%, depending on 
the type of fillet (GAO 1999). The increase in prices corresponded nicely with the 
passage of the AFA, which further increased the value of the pollock fishery to its 
participants.
Figure 1.29. Annual Russian catches of pollock, 1988-2007. 
Source: UN FAO (2009).
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The Future of the Pollock Fishery
The passage of the AFA has proven to be a boon for the U.S. pollock industry, 
providing both improved management stability and increased economic benefits for 
fishery stakeholders. Pollock companies, once engaged in a Hobbesian struggle for 
catches, are now able to focus on harvesting and processing. Pollock operations have 
been able to maximize their revenues by focusing on the most profitable product forms 
demanded at the time. Global markets have expanded, allowing firms to look beyond 
Japan for roe and surimi sales, and the U.S. for fillet sales. Increased demand from 
Europe and other markets has allowed pollock processors to maintain a diversified 
portfolio of buyers, allowing operations to maintain profitably when prices remain low 
for one product or in one region. Additionally, pollock operations have been able to 
afford much needed capital investments, and when needed, have been able to turn to 
capital markets to provide needed financing.
The U.S. pollock fishery has also been able to respond to environmental and 
management concerns related to their fishery since the AFA was passed. From issues that 
include Steller sea lion population declines and salmon bycatch, they have responded to 
concerns from affected parties. The increased profitability within the pollock industry has 
allowed members to sponsor studies from impartial third parties that provide scientific 
answers to issues facing the Eastern Bering Sea. Furthermore, the industry has been able 
to comply with management actions that have resulted in increased expenses.
The future of the pollock fishery, however, holds many questions. Although the 
fishery is in an unparalleled period of stability, where fishing operations have been given 
increased flexibility and have responded with increased responsibility, the future under 
the AFA as it is currently structured is less clear. One of those looming issues may be the 
geographic distribution of the Alaska pollock biomass. Pollock populations appear to 
have shifted farther north towards Russian waters, enough so that Andrei Kraini, the chief 
of the Federal Agency for Fishery in Russia has speculated that:
170
The warming of the climate will be to our advantage.. .Because of this, 35 
percent of Alaska pollock will migrate from the U.S. part of the Bering 
Sea to colder waters, towards our coasts. So the U.S. plans to lower the 
catches, while we have sizably increased the fishing quota. (Sackton 2009)
The spatial shifts in pollock biomass may have contributed to stock assessment findings 
that led to the historically low TAC of 815,000 mt in 2009.
The principal effects of shifts in pollock biomass are changes in the distance U.S. 
pollock vessels must travel to catch fish. The further the center of biomass shifts towards 
the boundary between U.S. and Russian EEZs, the farther pollock fishermen have to 
journey to catch their fish, thereby increasing the costs associated with harvesting the 
fish. Furthermore, these travel distances can also be increased by management actions, 
and with recent and future fishery management actions related to salmon bycatch and 
Steller sea lions, there is little hope that fishing vessels will be spending more time 
fishing near shore.
These current and future management actions may pose additional issues than just 
traveling farther. It remains to see how the Chinook salmon bycatch incentive plan will 
affect the fishery when it is implemented in 2011, with future management actions aimed 
at reducing chum salmon bycatch also in development. There is still continued debate on 
how pollock affect Steller sea lion populations, since the sea lions have failed to rebound 
as biologist had hoped. With increased public debate on both these topics, the pollock 
fishery continues to provide a popular scapegoat for concerned parties. It remains to be 
seen how the pollock fishery will be affected by potential management actions going 
forward.
These issues, combined with rising fuel costs, will continue to pressure the pollock 
fishery. The real price of diesel in Dutch Harbor tripled from 1999 ($1.31) to 2008 
($4.34) (Figure 1.30). This negatively affects all the three sectors through increased costs, 
but disproportionately affects inshore catcher vessels. Inshore catcher vessels are already 
traveling farther from the shore to the fishing grounds during the B season, with the
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average distance increasing from 2003 to 2008 from 70 nm to 196 nm (Figure 1.31). 
With higher fuel costs and no corresponding increase in pollock value, the inshore sector 
left 10% of their 2007 B season quota in the ocean, even as the at-sea sector continued to 
pay over $300 per mt to harvest CDQ fish, an outcome that is inconsistent with 
MSFCMA National Standard 1 or National Standard 5. Salmon bycatch measures 
combined with anticipated increases in fuel costs will continue to squeeze the 
profitability of the inshore sector during the B season, potentially forcing the sector to 
leave fish in the water in future seasons (The A season is at much less risk due to roe 
production).
Figure 1.30. Real monthly #2 marine diesel price ($/gal) in Unalaska region, February 
1999 -  December 2008.
Source: Fisheries Economics Data Program (2009).
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Figure 1.31. Average distance travelled per inshore catcher vessel trip, 2003-2008. 
Source: S. Lewis, personal communication.
Discrepancies in profitability across sectors expose the limitations of the AFA. The 
Act has provided an immense amount of flexibility -  but only to the point it does not 
conflict with the framework established under the AFA. While it may be advantageous 
for pollock operations to transfer or lease fish between sectors, rather than leaving it in 
the water, the AFA has handcuffed the NPFMC from adopting any policies that conflict 
with the Act without further changes from Congress. And although large amounts of fish 
have not been left in the water since 2007, increasing Russian catches, rising fuel prices,
and management actions intended to facilitate Steller sea lion recovery or reduce salmon
bycatch increase the likelihood that portions of the B season inshore sector allocation 
may be left unharvested.
If history is a guide, one might assume that if the inshore and at-sea sectors desired to 
add flexibility to the AFA, they could importune Congress. But the titans who crafted the 
AFA are no more and none have risen to fill the resulting void. Moreover, the sectors 
have become comfortable with the predictability and profitability of the status quo and 
are reluctant to risk reopening old wars. For example, John Dooley notes that there are 
several components of the AFA which he would change, but he adamantly opposes 
opening the door for any changes to the current legislation (J. Dooley personal
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communication). It seems that even after more than a decade, the battle that preceded the 
passage of the AFA remains fresh. The at-sea sector would be expected to oppose 
changes to the AFA, unless the changes allowed for an increased share of the TAC or the 
at-sea sector felt it more beneficial to lease quota from the inshore sector than to leave 
portions of the inshore quota unfished. That is, the at-sea sector might benefit more from 
increased product value and larger market share if a portion of the inshore sector’s B 
season quota was left unfished than it would gain from leasing the unfished quota shares. 
Moreover, the inshore sector would likely strongly oppose any changes that fail to protect 
their current allocation of fish, making any industry sponsored changes unlikely.
There are also numerous other factors outside the control of the AFA fisheries that 
could play into any possible AFA changes. For instance, although one sector may not 
care if some fish from another sector are left in the water, it could be expected that if 
pollock allocation were consistently left unfished and no changes were implemented, it 
would be construed as a violation of the MSFCMA standard that requires fisheries be 
managed in a manner “which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the nation with 
particular reference to food production”. Another issue that would have to be considered 
is the impact of any action on outside fisheries, since a shift in the overall profitability of 
the inshore sector would affect more than just the pollock operations. Economies of scale 
and prosperity founded on the pollock fishery has allowed shore-based processors to 
continue processing other species that often barely cover their costs, and are sometimes 
even subsidized by pollock profits (L. Cotter personal communication). This is especially 
true for some of Alaska’s salmon fisheries, such as Trident’s salmon operations (D. 
Abbasian personal communication).
With the NPFMC and pollock operations lacking both the motivation and legal 
authority to institute changes to the AFA, the pollock fishery may see change instigated 
from a new source. In the same way that the MSFCMA paved the way for 
‘Americanization’ of the BSAI groundfish fisheries, creation of the CDQ program has 
paved the way for ‘Alaskanization’ of these fisheries. The Inshore/Offshore amendments 
were proxy battles between Seattle-based Japanese and Norwegian interests that were
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largely won by the Japanese aligned inshore sector. The AFA armistice secured the 
inshore sector’s gains but gave both sectors opportunity to thrive. In contrast, the CDQ 
program was designed to transfer benefits to actual Alaskans. In the early 1990s, Alaskan 
ownership in the BSAI pollock fishery was negligible; owners were either foreign, with a 
majority from Japan, Norway, or Korea, or residents of the contiguous U.S., especially 
Washington, Oregon, and California (NPFMC 2002; Hornnes, 2006; J. Dooley, personal 
communication). Both inshore and offshore sectors hired their fishing and processing 
crews from the Pacific Northwest or from outside the U.S. Most companies in both 
sectors purchased supplies in the Pacific Northwest and shipped them to storage facilities 
in Unalaska and other ports near the fishing grounds. Nearly all revenues generated in the 
fisheries flowed out of the state (Miller et al. 1992; NPFMC 1992; Herrick et al. 1994).
It seems that with their increasing ownership positions, CDQ groups may have the 
incentives in the future to advocate for changes to the AFA. CDQ entities, through the 
CDQ allocation and their ownership stakes in AFA-qualified factory trawlers, 
motherships, and catcher vessels, controlled nearly 257,167 mt—nearly 26%—of the one 
million mt pollock TAC in 2008 (Figure 1.32). Their impact has been especially evident 
in the catcher/processor sector, where 32.7% of the catcher/processor DPA is controlled 
by CDQ entities (Figure 1.33). If CDQ pollock harvested by the catcher/processor sector 
is included for 2008, the percentage of CDQ control in the sector increases to 47.1%, 
giving CDQ entities control of nearly half of the catcher/processor sector pollock 
harvested. The royalties and profits earned by CDQ entities flow back into western 
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Figure 1.32. CDQ ownership in the pollock fishery in 2008 (mt).

















Figure 1.33. Percentage of harvest owned by CDQ groups, 2008.
Source: APICDA (2009); BBEDC (2009); CBSFA (2009); CVRF (2009); NSEDC 
(2009); YDFDA (2009).
It is interesting to note, however, that CDQ entities have established a stronger equity 
position in the at-sea sector than they have in the inshore sector. The CDQ entities hold 
major and often majority equity shares in every PCC company except Trident and they 
have a similarly large equity position in one of the three mothership fleets. In contrast,
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CDQ investment in the inshore sector has been limited to ownership of a few catcher 
vessels; shore-based pollock processors have not solicited investment from the CDQ 
entities and because Trident and the Japanese seafood companies are large, diversified 
companies with ready access to financial capital, they have had little need for access to 
CDQ capital and they have been largely immune to unsolicited ownership bids.
Moreover, because the inshore sector has been unable to match the high prices that the at- 
sea sector has offered for CDQ pollock leases, the CDQ groups have had little incentive 
to offer their pollock quota shares as assets to be tied to an ownership stake with 
companies in the inshore sector.
As CDQ groups continue to look for new investments, the opportunities available within 
the fishery sector continue to shrink. With few opportunities in the inshore sector, it may 
be advantageous for the CDQ groups to push for the expansion of the offshore allocation, 
thereby opening access to a larger portion of the TAC. This would not only benefit their 
operations from increased royalties and investment returns in the at-sea sector, but it may 
also increase investment opportunities in both sectors. In turn, it would likely continue to 
increase the Alaskanization of the pollock fishery through increased ownership, 
employment opportunities, and expanded revenues. The NPFMC remains dominated by 
an Alaskan majority, which means potential decisions affecting the fishery are likely to 
swing in favor of a CDQ-owned at-sea sector that was disadvantaged during the 
inshore/offshore wars. The largest difficulty CDQ groups would face is changing the 
AFA, which has to come from an act of Congress. Although Congress has often acted 
favorably on issues pertaining to Alaska Natives, CDQ groups lost their number one ally 
in Senator Stevens. It will be interesting to see what, if any, actions take place regarding 
this issue in the future.
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ABC: Allowable Biological Catch
AFA: American Fisheries Act
AI: Aleutian Islands EEZ
AP: Advisory Panel
BiOp: Biological Opinion
BSAI: Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands EEZ
CDQ: Western Alaska Community Development Quotas
CP: Catcher/processor
CPC: Comprehensive Planning Committee
CRP: Comprehensive Rationalization Plan
CV: Catcher Vessel
CVOA: Catcher Vessel Operational Area
DAP: Domestic Annual Processing
DPA Directed Pollock Allocation
EBS: Eastern Bering Sea EEZ
EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone
EIS: Environmental Impact Statement
FCMA: Fishery Conservation and Management Act




gpd: gallons per day
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gph: gallons per hour
GOA: Gulf of Alaska EEZ
ICA: Individual Catch Allowance
IPA: Incentive Plan Agreement
ITQ: Individual Transferable Quota
IPQ: Individual Processor Quotas
JVP: Joint Venture Processing
k: knots
kg: kilogram
kph: knots per hour
MFCMA: Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act
MSFCMA: Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act
MS: Mothership




NMFS: National Marine Fisheries Service
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NPFMC: North Pacific Fishery Management Council
OY: Optimum Yield
PCCRC: Pollock Conservation Cooperative Research Center
SSC: Science and Statistical Committee
TAC: Total Allowable Catch
TALFF: Total Allowance Level of Foreign Fishing
VHRS: Voluntary Rolling Hotspot System
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Appendix 1B—Interviews and Correspondence
Dave Abbasian is the plant manager of the Akutan processing plant for Trident Seafoods. 
He has worked his way up the company ladder and has been employed with Trident for 
over 25 years. Mr. Abbasian provided a tour of the Akutan processing plant, interviews, 
and e-mail and phone correspondence.
Alec Brindle is the former owner of Wards Cove, a major seafood processing company 
that operated in Alaska for 75 years. Wards Cove formed a partnership with two Japanese 
companies to form Alyeska Seafoods Corporation, a large pollock processing plant, and 
has maintained ownership in several of the vessels that delivered to it. He was involved in 
the Council process and testified for the inshore sector on numerous occasions. Mr. 
Brindle was interviewed at a United Catcher Boat luncheon in Seattle.
John Bundy, a Seattle attorney, has been involved with the Glacier Seafoods since its 
inception in 1982. He original represented the company as an attorney during the 
construction of the Northern Glacier, joined full-time in 1993, and continued as 
President. He worked to establish the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative in 1997 
and the Pollock Conservation Cooperative in 1998, and was a voting member of the 
NPFMC from 1999-2008. Mr. Bundy provided an interview in March 2009.
Doug Christensen is President of Arctic Storm Management Group. He started with 
Arctic Storm, Inc. at its inception in 1986, became President in 1995, and remained 
President when the company became Arctic Storm Management Group after the passage 
of the American Fisheries Act. He has been the President of the U.S. Surimi Commission 
since 1995. Mr. Christensen provided a personal interview and numerous e-mails.
Larry Cotter is the Chief Executive Officer for the CDQ group Aleutian Pribilof Island 
Community Development Association. He served on the Advisory Panel to the NPFMC
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for six years during the transition years from foreign fishing. After that, he served as a 
voting member of the Council for an additional six years in the 1990s during the 
inshore/offshore debates. During that time he was Chair of several committees including 
the Bycatch Committee and Crab Management Committee. Mr. Cotter provided an 
interview and a review of an early draft of chapter 1.
John Dooley is an owner and captain of two pollock catcher vessels, the Pacific Prince 
and the Caitlin Ann. He was involved in the original joint venture operations with the 
Russians off the coast of Oregon, before moving to the pollock fishery where he has 
fished since the early 1980s. Mr. Dooley allowed the author to ride along on a pollock 
fishing trip in summer 2009 and provided numerous interviews throughout that trip.
John Gruver is the Inter-Coop Manager for United Catcher Boats. He started fishing in 
pollock joint ventures in the early 1980s and has been involved in the fishery ever since. 
Mr. Gruver was interviewed at a United Catcher Boat luncheon in Seattle.
Jan Jacobs is Director of Government Affairs for American Seafoods Company. He has 
been working in the fishing industry since 1984, has been a member of the NPFMC’s 
Advisory Panel since 2004, is President of the Pacific Whiting Conservation Cooperative, 
and is a Board member and officer for a variety of different industry associations. Mr. 
Jacobs provided two interviews for this project, numerous correspondences through e­
mail, and a review of a preliminary draft of Chapter 1.
Bob King is a staff member for U.S. Senator Mark Begich, whom he advises on fishery 
issues. Mr. King spent 20 years as news director in Dillingham and then moved to Juneau 
where he was press secretary for Governor Tony Knowles. He wrote a history of Alaska's 
fisheries for the Alaska Department of Fish and Game for the state's 50th anniversary.
Mr. King provided a review of a draft of Chapter 1.
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Stephanie Madsen is the Executive Director of the At-Sea Processors Association, where 
she tracks fisheries management and policy issues statewide, regionally and nationally. 
Stephanie has been involved in fisheries off the coast of Alaska for over twenty years.
She served with the NPFMC in variety of roles: on the Advisory Panel from 1993- 2001; 
as a voting member from 2001-2007; and Chairwoman from 2003-2007. Ms. Madsen 
provided an interview and e-mail correspondence for this project.
Paul MacGregor is a partner in the Seattle law firm of Mundt MacGregor. He has 
represented a number of pollock catcher processor companies and related trade 
organizations for more than 25 years; and has regularly attended and spoken at NPFMC 
meetings since 1978. Mr. MacGregor provided an interview on March 2009.
William Myhre is a Washington, D.C. attorney who has worked with closely with the 
pollock fishery since the 1980s in a variety of capacities. He has represented the pollock 
mothership and catcher processor sector with issues such as vessel registration, 
ownership requirements, and foreign rebuilt vessels. He has testified before Congress on 
a variety of issues related including the Anti-Reflagging Act and American Fisheries Act. 
Mr. Myhre provided a phone interview and various e-mail correspondences.
Brent Paine is the Executive Director of United Catcher Boats, a trade organization for 
pollock catcher vessels from Alaska, California, Oregon, and Washington. He formerly 
worked for the NPFMC and played an integral role in defending the rights of the catcher 
vessels during the American Fisheries Act debate. Mr. Paine provided an interview at a 
United Catcher Boat luncheon in Seattle.
Dr. Wally Pereyra is a Chairman of Arctic Storm Management Group. He was a 
groundfish scientist with the National Marine Fisheries Service before becoming a 
General Manager of the Marine Resources Company, a joint venture between the US and 
Soviet Union in 1977. Dr. Pereyra served for nine years as Vice Chairman to the North
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Pacific Fishery Management Council during the Inshore/Offshore debates and the 
passage of the American Fisheries Act. He provided a review of Chapter 1.
Joe Plesha worked as Counsel to the Senate Commerce Committee for ocean issues 
during the mid-1980s and has been General Counsel and Chief Legal Officer at Trident 
Seafoods Corporation since 1987. He was involved with passage of the Anti-Reflagging 
Act, the North Pacific Fishery Management Council's adoption of the Inshore/Offshore 
pollock allocations, and passage of the American Fisheries Act. Mr. Plesha provided 
access to company documents and personal notes regarding these events, along with 
sharing his recollections through e-mail and interviews.
Wilt Sinclair is the plant manager for Alyeska Seafoods, a pollock processing plant in 
Unalaska. He provided an interview in Unalaska in August 2009.
Joe Sullivan is a partner in the Seattle law firm of Mundt MacGregor. He has been 
involved in Alaska fisheries as a fishermen, Mayor, and, currently, in a legal capacity. He 
provided an interview in March 2009.
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CHAPTER 2: Institutional Structure and Revenue Maximization in the 
Eastern Bering Sea Pollock Fishery1
A b stra c t A simultaneous-equation equilibrium model of domestic and 
international markets for pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) fillets, surimi, 
and roe is used to examine the combined effect of variability in landings 
and changes in product mix on pollock first wholesale prices and 
revenues. The market for U.S. pollock products in the 1990s was focused 
mainly on selling surimi and roe to Japan. Since the passage of the 
American Fisheries Act, processors have increased product quality and 
product recovery rates, diversified their mix of product forms, and 
developed fillet and surimi markets in the U.S. and Europe. The model 
indicates that first wholesale revenues are maximized when pollock 
harvests are maximized. Strictures on transfer of allocations between 
sectors can lead to under-harvest when product prices are low, fuel costs 
are high, or when the most productive fishing areas are at great distances 
from shore-based processing facilities, especially when these conditions 
arise during the B season.
Introduction
The eastern Bering Sea (EBS) fishery for Alaska pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) 
yields gross exvessel revenues of over $300 million and a first wholesale value of over 
$1.2 billion. Over the last 30 years, annual Total Allowable Catch (TAC) has ranged 
from 813,000 mt to 1,494,900 mt, making the Alaska pollock fishery the largest tonnage 
U.S. fishery. During the 1960s and 1970s, Alaska pollock was largely harvested by a
1 Strong, J. and K.R. Criddle. 2011. Institutional structure and revenue maximization in the eastern Bering 
Sea pollock fishery. Submitted to Marine Resource Economics.
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Japanese mothership fleet that extracted roe and processed the meat into surimi, a fish- 
based protein paste. A Russian mothership fleet produced a frozen headed and gutted 
(H&G) product destined for consumption in the Eastern Bloc. Passage of the Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) in 1976 stimulated an “Americanization” of 
the fishery. The 1980s and 1990s were characterized by rapid increases in the number of 
U.S.-flagged harvesters and catcher-processors and by development of extensive shore- 
based processing capacity. In the mid-1980s, the Total Allowance Level of Foreign 
Fishing was zeroed-out in favor of allocations to joint-ventures. By 1991, the joint- 
venture allocations were also eliminated to make room for harvesting by U.S.-flagged 
catcher vessels (CVs) that delivered to U.S.-flagged motherships or processing facilities 
in the U.S. and for harvesting by U.S.-flagged catcher-processors (CPs) and U.S.-flagged 
catcher vessels (CVs) that delivered to them. Continued increases in harvesting and 
processing capacity during the 1990s precipitated a race-for-fish and engendered heated 
political battles over allocations between the offshore (motherships, CPs, and associated 
CVs) and inshore sectors (Criddle and Macinko 2000). While a few processors invested 
in fillet technology, roe and surimi remained the primary products. Under the race-for- 
fish, it was not advantageous for processors to produce time intensive product such as 
fillets. Instead, they focused on high throughput production methods to accommodate the 
large volumes of catch taken in compressed seasons.
These conditions changed following passage of the American Fisheries Act (AFA) in 
1998. The AFA established permanent sector allocation shares for each of the four 
sectors of the fleet and authorized members of the sectors to form harvesting cooperatives 
in which fishing operations privately negotiated contracts that guaranteed each vessel a 
portion of the TAC. The CP sector and CVs that delivered to them formed cooperatives 
in 1999. The CVs that delivered to inshore processors formed cooperatives in 2000, as 
did the CVs that delivered to motherships. The AFA also expanded the Western Alaska 
Community Development Quota (CDQ) program from an allocation of 7.5% of the EBS 
pollock TAC to 10% of the TAC for each EBS groundfish species. The six CDQ entities 
represent 65 western Alaska communities and were created to provide opportunities for
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community residents to benefit from wealth being derived from exploitation of EBS 
fishery resources. These groups have, until recently, leased their quota to AFA-qualified 
fishing vessels operating in the at-sea and inshore sectors. Under the AFA, pollock 
operations have enjoyed increased operational stability and increased revenues 
(Felthoven 2002, Fell 2008, Wilen and Richardson 2008, Morrison Paul, Torres, and 
Felthoven 2009). The AFA enabled processors to look beyond simply processing the 
largest amount of fish before the end of the fishing season and instead focused on 
maximizing revenues through increased capital expenditures into technology, expanded 
global markets, and optimized product mix.
While Hiatt et al. (2010) provides an excellent descriptive overview of pollock 
products and their markets, markets for pollock products have received very little 
attention in formal models. Sproul and Queirolo (1994) modeled Japanese household 
consumption of surimi in 1980, 1985, and 1990 and found statistically significant 
declines in consumption of surimi that they attributed to increases in household income 
and increases in the consumption of beef, pork, and chicken. Using data from 1986 to 
1993, Herrmann et al. (1996) developed a simultaneous equation model of the Japanese 
demand for U.S. surimi, the U.S. supply of surimi to Japan, inventory holdings of surimi 
in Japan and the United States, and U.S. exvessel price for Alaska pollock. The study 
found that although surimi exports to Japan were unresponsive to changes in export price, 
exvessel demand was inelastic over the biologically plausible range of catches, implying 
that exvessel revenues could be maximized by harvesting the maximum permissible level 
of catch. Fell (2008) used cointegration methods to examine the responsiveness of 
pollock processors to changes in surimi and fillet prices before and after implementation 
of the AFA and found that price responsiveness increased in both the inshore and 
offshore sectors post-AFA. Morrison Paul, Torres, and Felthoven (2009) used a revenue 
function model to examine CP-sector choices of product form pre- and post-AFA and 
found that the mix of regular and deep-skin fillets, surimi, and roe was responsive to 
variations in product prices and to increased operational flexibility that followed
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implementation of the AFA. These choices of product form, in turn, affected operation 
choices related to tow duration, crewing, and vessel power.
This study uses monthly time series data from 2000-2008 to extend the single 
product-single market model of Herrmann et al. (1996) to a represent post-AFA demand 
and allocation of fillets, roe, and surimi to markets in Japan, Europe, and the U.S. This 
contrasts with the cointegration approach applied in Fell (2008) to identify structural 
breaks pre- and post-AFA and the revenue function approach used by Morrison Paul, 
Torres, and Felthoven (2009) to explicate the joint effects of product mix and 
productivity that arose from implementation of the AFA. Instead, this study uses a 
structural model of post-AFA markets to account for the effects of variability in landings 
and changes product demand on the mix of products produced, patterns of trade, and first 
wholesale prices and revenues. Comparative static simulations based on the estimated 
model are used to explore how changes in prices and product volumes may affect 
revenue.
Model Specification, Estimation, and Validation
U.S. production of pollock roe, fillets, and surimi and their demand in and allocation to 
markets in the U.S., Europe, and Japan were modeled using monthly data for 2000-2008. 
The model included nine behavioral equations. The five demand equations were specified 
as inverse (price-dependent) demands because, in a typical year, fishermen harvest the 
entire pollock TAC, which is exogenously determined, and global prices adjust to the 
quantity produced. Each demand equation includes per capita imports, substitute prices, 
and per capita income. The producer price index for intermediate foods and feeds was 
used to normalize prices to 2008 levels.
The supply of U.S. pollock was treated as a stochastic process moderated by 
variations in survival and growth, various environmental factors, and changes in harvests. 
The upper bound on U.S. pollock harvests (the TAC) is set by the U.S. Secretary of 
Commerce based on recommendations of the North Pacific Fishery Management Council
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(NPFMC) which is, in turn, advised by a Scientific and Statistical Committee (SSC) 
invested with authority under the FCMA to set binding upper limits for the Acceptable 
Biological Catch and the Overfishing Level. The SSC acts as a peer review panel for 
stock assessments prepared by National Marine Fisheries Service staff who develop 
models that incorporate information from the fishery and fishery-independent surveys to 
estimate and project recruitment. While the pollock fishery occasionally harvests less 
than the TAC, landings are generally within a few percentages of the TAC, thus the 
supply of pollock is not well represented by a traditional supply function. Instead, the 
disposition of surimi to the U.S. and Japan, and fillets to U.S. and Europe were 
represented using four allocation equations that each considered own price, prices in 
competing markets, levels of production in the at-sea processing and shore-based 
processing sectors, and monthly seasonal variables. Additional variables, such as lagged 
quantities and competing product prices, were included in some of the allocation 
equations to account for variability due to other factors. The allocation of pollock roe to 
Japan was not estimated because, on average, the Japanese market buys over 95% of U.S. 
pollock roe production. Linear and nonlinear model forms were explored for each of the 
behavioral equations. The ultimate choice of functional form was based on goodness of 
fit for the individual equations and on performance of the overall equation system. Data 
sources used in the model are listed in Table 2.1. U.S. import and export statistics were 
obtained from the United States International Trade Commission, which maintains 
records of exports and import quantities and prices. Japanese imports and exports of roe 
and surimi, as well as Japanese consumption statistics and welfare measures, were 
obtained from Trade Statistics of Japan. European import and export statistics were 
obtained from the Eurostat database. Production data for the at-sea and inshore sectors of 
the U.S. pollock fishery were derived from the NMFS catch accounting system (Patty 
Britza NMFS/AKRO). Variable definitions and sources are listed in Table 2.2.
Market Clearing Identities
Market clearing identities are equations that transform input data series into appropriate 
forms for inclusion in the behavioral equations. These adjustments account for changes in
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price due to inflation and fluctuating exchange rates. Quantities supplied were not 
adjusted to account for changes in population due to the relatively short time span 
modeled and relatively stable population levels for Japan, Europe, and the U.S. The first 
12 market clearing identities included in the model are used to obtain time series for the 
endogenous variables (Table 2.3). The 13th identity transforms prices into 2008 price.
Allocation Equations
Allocation of pollock fillets to US
The primary market for fillets produced from Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) 
and Gulf of Alaska (GOA) pollock is the U.S., which received an average of nearly 44% 
of all fillets produced over 2000-2008. Equation 2.1 represents the quantity of Alaska
pollock fillets allocated to the U.S. ( filletQ US) as a linear function of monthly dummy 
variables (mi ) ,  the real U.S. price for single frozen pollock fillet blocks ( filletP US) ,  the 
real price of European pollock fillet imports from the U.S. ( fiUetpUS ̂ EU) ,  the quantity of 
pollock fillets produced by the inshore processing sector ( fdletQ SS) ,  the quantity of 
pollock fillets produced by the at-sea processing sector ( fdletQ AS) ,  the lagged real US 
import pollock fillet price ( fllletPtIM^ US) ,  and the lagged quantity of pollock fillets 
allocated to the U.S. ( ) :
filletQUS = A0 + £  Pum + P112 ( fllletPFS ) + A13 {filletPUŜ EU ) + A14 ( Q  )
i=1 (2 1 )
. P ( fillet s1AS\ . P ( fillet( IM^US\ . P ( fillet sUS \
+p 15^ Qt ) + p 16\ Pt-1 ) + p n \  Qt-1 )■
Although there is no public data on the monthly quantities of U.S. pollock fillets sold 
within the U.S., a proxy time series was constructed based on input from industry 
representatives who indicated that most PBO and PBI pollock fillets are sold within 90 
days and that deep-skin fillets are sold within 180 days. For each year, the annual volume
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of pollock fillets allocated to the U.S. was constructed as the difference between total 
annual fillet production and total annual fillet exports. Monthly production of U.S. 
pollock fillets was multiplied by a ratio of the annual allocation to the U.S. and total 
annual production. Sales out of production inventories were based on a smoothing 
function that assigned 35% of production in time period t to sales in time period t, 40% to 
sales in t+1, 10% to sales in t+2, and 5% to sales in t+3, t+4, and t+5.
Pollock fillets imported into the U.S. are mostly twice-frozen fillets of Russian origin. 
Therefore lagged real U.S. import pollock fillet price was included in equation 1 to 
represent the impact of Russian pollock fillet imports on sales of U.S. pollock fillets in 
the U.S. The lagged quantity of U.S. pollock fillets allocated to the U.S. represents the 
effect that past fillet sales to the U.S. have on current sales through, for example, 
establishment of long term contracts with major purchasers.
Allocation of pollock fillets to Europe
The sales volume of U.S. pollock fillets exported to Europe exceeded the volume of 
pollock fillets retained in the U.S. for the first time in 2002 and has frequently done so 
since 2004. From 2000-2008, over 49% of U.S. pollock fillets were sold into European 
markets. Equation 2.2 represents the quantity of U.S. pollock fillet exports to Europe 
( filhtQ m  ̂  Eu ) as a linear function of monthly dummy variables (mt ) ,  the real price of
European pollock fillet imports from the U.S. (fllletP^ S ̂ EU),  the real U.S. price (from
Urner Barry reports) for single frozen pollock fillet blocks ( filletP US) ,  the lagged quantity
of fillets produced by the inshore sector ( filletQ S_i1) ,  and the lagged quantity of fillets
produced by the at-sea sector ( filletQti_S1):
fillet q us ̂ EU  = ^ 0  + £  P2imi +^212 [filletPUŜ EU ) + )  ( (  ) +
i=1 V ) \ ) (2.2)
P214 ( lletQS_1 ) 2 1 5  [fllletQA1 ).
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Lagged quantities of fillets produced by the inshore and at-sea sectors were used to 
represent the difference in time between fillet production and their distribution to Europe.
Allocation of pollock surimi to Japan
The primary market for pollock surimi is Japan, which purchased over 63% of total U.S. 
pollock surimi from 2000-2008. Equation 2.3 models the quantity of pollock surimi
imported from the U.S. by Japan ( surimiQUS ̂ J N ) as a linear function of monthly dummy 
variables, the real price of Japan pollock surimi imports from the U.S. ( surimiP 1̂ iS ̂ JN),
the two-period lagged quantity of pollock surimi produced in the inshore sector 
(surimiQS_>2), the two-period lagged quantity of pollock surimi produced in the at-sea
sector (suriiniQ jA_S2), and the real U.S. price (from Urner Barry reports) for single frozen
pollock fillet blocks (f i lletp US):
‘"rimiQU!Ŝ JN =P30 + 2  h m i  +^3,2 h ~ p u ^ jN) + )  ( g S S , )
i=1 (2.3)
+ *14  ( Q A S , ) + * 1 5  ( f 'llet?U'S ).
Japanese imports of pollock surimi from the U.S. are used in place of U.S. pollock 
surimi exports to Japan because the latter fails to account for the portion of Japan-bound 
surimi that is first exported to Korea and held in bonded warehouses for reshipment to 
Japan. Unlike U.S. export statistics, which treat pollock surimi transshipped through 
Busan as exports to Korea, Japanese import statistics properly account for U.S. 
origination of the pollock surimi. In addition, to account for the lag time between 
production and arrival in Japan, the models uses a two-month lag on surimi production. 
The real U.S. price (from Urner Barry reports) for single frozen pollock fillet blocks was 
included to account for the opportunity cost of producing high grade surimi for Japan in 
terms of forgone production of pollock fillets.
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Allocation of pollock surimi to the U.S.
The U.S. was the second most important market for pollock surimi over 2000-2008- 
when the U.S. share was 21% of U.S. pollock surimi output. Equation 2.4 expresses the 
quantity of U.S. pollock surimi allocated to the U.S. ( surimiQ US) as a linear function of
monthly dummy variables, the real price of all surimi imported into the U.S. ( surimiP US) ,
the quantity of pollock surimi produced in the inshore sector ( surimiQ SS) ,  the quantity of
pollock surimi produced in the at-sea sector ( surimiQ AS) ,  the lagged quantity of pollock
surimi allocated to the U.S. ( surtmtQJU-i1) ,  and two indicator variables ( I 1) and (I 2) used
to remove the influence of two months when there were no recorded surimi imports to the 
U.S.:
11
surimiQUS — P40 + ^ P 4imi + P412 ( sunmiPtUS ) + P413 ( sunmiQfS ) + P414 ( sunmiQAS )
i=1 (2.4)
+P415 ( ( ' Q ^ ) + P416 (I1) + P417 ( i  2 )■
Although there are no public data on monthly quantities of U.S. pollock surimi sold 
within the U.S., a proxy time series was constructed based on industry input that opined 
that most surimi is sold within 90 days of its production. For each year, the annual 
percentage of pollock surimi allocated to the U.S. was estimated as the difference 
between total U.S. pollock surimi production and the sum of U.S. pollock surimi exports. 
Based on industry input, the monthly production of pollock surimi was multiplied by the 
annual percentage and allocated from inventories to sales such that 40% of production in 
time period t was allocated to sales or exports in time period t and 40% was allocated to 
sales in period t+7. The residual 20% was allocated to sales and exports in period t+2.
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Inverse Demand Equations
Inverse demand for pollock fillets in the United States
Equation 2.5 represents the real U.S. price for pollock fillet blocks (filletp US) as a linear
function of monthly dummy variables, the quantity of pollock fillets allocated to the U.S. 
market ( filletQ US) ,  the real import price of pollock fillets imported into the U.S.
(fiiktp iM ̂ US),  the lagged real first wholesale price of pollock fillet block in the U.S.
PUS),  and real U.S. per capita disposable personal income ( In c ^ S):
filMpJJS =^50 + 2  +^512 (filletQUS ) 1 3  )
i=1 V ' V ' (2.5)
+#14 ( lletPUS ) 1 5  ( c US ).
The real import price of pollock fillets imported into the U.S. was used as a substitute 
for U.S. pollock fillets and is comprised, largely, of twice-frozen pollock fillets harvested 
in Russia and processed in China.
Inverse demand for pollock fillets in Europe
Equation 2.6 characterizes the real price of U.S. pollock fillet exports to Europe. Where 
(filletp uS ̂ EU) is represented as a linear function of monthly dummy variables, the per
capita quantity of U.S. pollock fillet exports to the U.S. ( fiUetQUS^ EU) ,  the real price of
European pollock fillet imports from China and Russia ( fllletPtCR̂ EU) ,  an index of
disposable income in Germany (inc(EU€) E) ,  and the exchange rate of euros to U.S.
dollar (E x f  ̂ $):
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fillet PUS ̂  EU =p 60 + £  p6imi +P612 ( q Us^ eu ) + P613 ( PCR̂ EU )
i—1 V 7 V 7 (2.6)
+P614 {Inc?E ) + P615 {Ext ) •
The real price of European pollock fillet imports from China and Russia was chosen 
as a substitute because Russian pollock fillets provide the most direct competition with 
Alaska pollock fillets in Europe. Large quantities of those fillets are derived from 
minimally processed fish shipped to China for reprocessing and shipped into the 
European market as twice-frozen fillets. An index of disposable income in Germany was 
chosen because Germany was the largest European importer of U.S. pollock fillets over 
the modeled time period. The euro to U.S. dollar exchange rate is included to represent 
the variability in European pollock fillet prices associated with fluctuating exchange 
rates.
Inverse demand for pollock roe in Japan
No allocation equation was modeled for the Japanese pollock roe market since a 
comparison of the Japanese imports of pollock roe with total U.S. production of pollock 
roe indicates that almost 96% of all U.S. pollock roe is exported to Japan. Equation 2.7
models the real price of Japanese pollock roe imports from the U.S. ( roeP US ̂ JN) as a
linear function of monthly dummy variables, the quantity of U.S. pollock roe produced 
(roeQtotai ), the real price of Japanese pollock roe imports from China and Russia
( roeP CR ̂ JN) ,  the Japanese index of real consumption expenditures (In c JN), the
Japanese cold storage holdings of pollock roe ( roes JN), and an indicator variable (13)
used to eliminate the influence of one missing observation:
11
roe f>US^JN 
Pt P 70 +Y ,P nmi +P712 ( roeQT tal) + P713 [ roePCR̂ N) + P714 ( C )i—1 y / y  > \ > (2.7)
+P715 ( roesJN j + P716 (I 3 )•
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Roe prices are influenced by anticipated Russian and U.S. production and Japanese 
inventories, because pollock roe is consumed almost exclusively in Japan (American 
Seafoods Group LLC 2006). As a result, Russian pollock roe prices in Japan and 
Japanese cold storage holdings of pollock roe have been included in the model to 
represent their respective impacts on Japanese pollock roe price.
Inverse demand for pollock surimi in Japan
Equation 2.8 describes the real price of Japanese pollock surimi imports from the U.S.
(siinmp rn ̂ JN) as a linear function of monthly dummy variables, the quantity of
Japanese imports of pollock surimi from the U.S. (surimiQ UŜ JN) ,  the real price of all
other surimi imported into Japan (surimi p(other ̂ JN),  the real two-period lagged price of
Japanese pollock surimi imports from the U.S. (surimiPlUŜ JN),  the Japanese index of
real consumption expenditures (ln c JN),  and the three-period lagged Japanese cold
storage holdings of surimi (suriiniS JN3):
surimi pUS ̂ JN  Pt :fi80 + 2  P»m<i +/%12 ( (  ̂ JN) + )  ( c ( N)
i=1 (2.8)
. n (surimi (US ̂ JN \ . n ( t,„„JN\ . n ( surimi c<JN\
+P814 ( ( -2 ) + )  (Inct ) + )  ( St-3).
The real two-period lagged Japanese pollock surimi import price is used to capture 
unknown market forces that affect the Japanese surimi price. The three-period Japanese 
cold storage holdings of surimi is included to reflect its impact on price in subsequent 
periods because negotiations over the price of surimi between the United States Surimi 
Commission and Japanese surimi processors often take place before the season begins; 
therefore, current prices reflect to some degree the cold storage holdings of prior periods.
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Inverse demand for pollock surimi in the United States
Equation 2.9 represents the real wholesale price of U.S. pollock surimi in the U.S.
( surtmtpus) as a linear function of monthly dummy variables, the quantity of U.S. pollock
surimi allocated to the U.S. ( surtmtQUS) ,  the real price of halibut in the U.S. ( haltbutp u s),
the lagged real wholesale price of U.S. pollock surimi in the U.S. ( surtmtp us ) ,  the real
U.S. per capita disposable personal income (Inc ÎS) ,  the real price of U.S. pollock surimi
exports to Europe ( surtmtp US ̂ EU) ,  the four period lagged real wholesale price of U.S.
pollock surimi in the U.S ( sunmip U_S4) and two indicator variables (I4 and I5):
surimi (US _ p \  ' p ^  p I surimirUS\ , o I halibut (US \ pt -P90 + ̂ P 9 imi + A>12  ̂ Qt j + A>13  ̂ pt j
i=1
+^,,4 ( mipUS) + P915 (IncUS ) + ̂ ,,6 ( s™ pU ,S^ EU ) (2.9)
+^915 ( nm'pUS J + P918 (I4 + + ̂ 919 (15 )■
The allocation of pollock surimi to the U.S. has varied widely, ranging from 34% of 
production in 2002 to 6% in 2005. Because there is no public time series of U.S. surimi 
prices, the model instead assumes that the U.S. wholesale pollock surimi price is 
proportional to the U.S. import price of all surimi. The model uses the import price of all 
surimi rather than just pollock surimi because most of the surimi purchased by the U.S. 
market is intermediate and recovery grade, and U.S. surimi purchasers do not generally 
place a premium on pollock products. The real one-period and four-period lagged U.S. 
surimi pollock import price is used to reflect autocorrelation that represents the role of 
long term contracts and establishment of relationships with major buyers. The indicator 
variables are used to account for two periods, February, 2001 and May, 2006, for which 
there were no observations of first wholesale prices in the U.S. import price of all surimi 
data set.
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Roughly 10% of pollock surimi produced in the U.S. was exported to Europe during 
2000 to 2008 period. A majority of that quantity was exported in later years when U.S. 
exports of pollock surimi to Europe have approached and, in 2009, exceeded exports to 
Japan. Because this is a recent development, there were not observations to model the 
emergence of this market. Instead, the model includes the real price of European pollock 
surimi imports from the U.S. to represent the increasing importance of Europe as a 
market for U.S. pollock surimi.
Total pollock revenue
The model was designed to highlight trade flows and product demands that are the most 
influential markets for U.S. pollock. Quantities and prices from the five most important 
markets were estimated as part of a simultaneous equation system. While not explicitly 
represented in the estimated equation system, the first wholesale value of pollock 
products can be derived from estimates of prices and allocations from the primary 
markets and used to produce estimates of real first wholesale pollock revenues. Equation
2.10 represents real first wholesale pollock revenues (TRPollock) as the sumproduct of the
U.S. pollock fillet allocation and the U.S. pollock fillet price, European pollock fillet 
imports from the U.S. and the European import price of U.S. pollock fillets, Japanese 
pollock surimi imports from the U.S. and the Japanese import price of U.S. pollock 
fillets, the U.S. allocation of pollock surimi and the U.S. surimi price, and, the Japanese 
imports of U.S. pollock roe and the Japanese import price of U.S. pollock roe:
Tr P  ollock _ ( filletQUS ) *  ( fillet pU S  j  + ( filletQUS ̂ E U  ) * ( fillet pU S  ̂ E U  )
+ ( surim Q U S ̂ J N  ) * ( s u r im i(U S ^ J N  ) + ( surimiQUS ) * ( surim i(U S  ) (2 10)
+ ( ro eQ ^S  ̂  JN  ) * ( roe( US ̂  JN  )
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Coefficient estimates and model performance
Coefficient estimates for the system of nine equations were obtained using the open 
source program Systemfit in the R programing language (Henningsen and Hamann 
2007). Systemfit uses an iterative three-stage least squares (3SLS) approach (Zellner and 
Theil 1962). All nine equations in the specified system are over-identified. Consequently 
an indirect least squares estimator could not be used. While two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) and 3SLS are possible options, 2SLS assumes that there is no covariance among 
equations. Because the disturbances were expected to be contemporaneously correlated, 
an iterated 3SLS approach is preferred (Zellner and Theil 1962; Henningsen and Hamann 
2007). Coefficient estimates and corresponding asymptotic p-values are included in Table
2.4.
The preferred method of evaluating a system of equations for its predictive accuracy 
is to look at goodness-of-fit (GOF) statistics over the estimation time period.
Examination of individual equations does not provide information for the overall system 
performance, nor does it provide information on how the equations interact. The use of 
model simulation provides greater insight into the intertemporal and intratemporal 
linkages present within the model. Historic dynamic simulations were conducted for 2000 
-2008 time period. The GOF statistics reported include the coefficient of variation (cv), 
the correlation between the actual and predicted values of the endogenous variables (r), 
and the Theil inequality coefficient (U 1) (Theil 1966).
Conversion o f Pollock TAC to Allocation Equations
It is necessary to relate ranges of TAC levels to their respective production of roe, fillet, 
and surimi, which are then used with the supply and demand model estimated coefficients 
to conduct a comparative static simulation. Relating surimi and fillet production to catch 
requires several considerations. First, flesh recovery from pollock for fillets and surimi is 
largely dependent on fish size. Age-3 and age-4 pollock, which average 345 g to 548 g, 
are considered ideal for producing surimi. Larger fish are ideal for producing fillets. 
Catches of small fish can decrease recovery from an average of 29% to 31% to an 
average of as little as 24% to 25%. Recovery rates can be further skewed when the catch
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includes large numbers of very small fish (age-2), which end up being ground into 
fishmeal. . Pollock larger than 750 g tend to yield lower grade surimi because their flesh 
strength declines (S. Wilt, pers. comm.). As a result, changes in the size distribution of 
the catch can significantly affect the mix of processed products independent of market 
considerations.
Another consideration is that there are limits to the flexibility that processors have in 
shifting between fillet and surimi production. Trimmings and stickwater, along with 
small fish, can be used to produce surimi but cannot be shifted into fillets (Park 2005, D. 
Christensen, pers. comm.; J. Jacobs, pers. comm.; D. Abbasian, pers. comm.). 
Consequently, a portion of the total recovery will invariably go into surimi. Product 
flexibility is also limited by long-term contracts, which can constrain processors from 
responding to short-term changes in demand. Additional technical constraints arise in 
limits to the interchangeability of processing lines. Processors typically maintain 
dedicated lines devoted to either surimi or fillets, with additional lines that are able to 
process either. Some minimum amount of pollock must be processed through the surimi 
lines to avoid shutdown or reductions in surimi quality. Time spent in fish holds before 
processing also affects flesh recovery and product quality, thus increased travel from 
fishing grounds in the B-season negatively impacts flesh recovery in shore-based 
processors and leads to an increase in surimi production relative to fillet production.
Flesh recovery rates were calculated for inshore and at-sea (CP and mothership) 
sectors and by season (A and B) for the 2007 fishing season based on production found in 
source 4 of Table 2.1 and harvests recorded in NMFS (2010) . Catches by the Ocean 
Phoenix were not included in the at-sea harvest because the Ocean Phoenix produces 
H&G pollock instead of fillets. Incidental catches of pollock in non-target fisheries were 
also omitted because they are a small component of total catch that enters the market in 
low-valued product forms. Based on these assumptions, the A-season flesh recovery rate 
was 25.8% for the inshore sector and 24.5% for the at-sea sector. B-season recovery rates 
were 25.2% for the inshore sector and 26.8% for the at-sea sector. To account for the 
production of recovery grade surimi that cannot be alternatively used as fillets, we have
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assigned a production rate of 4.25%, equivalent to the ratio of surimi produced that did 
not go into the Japan market and the sum of BSAI catches in 2007. Based on discussions 
with industry representatives, one third of the remaining flesh recovery was allocated to 
surimi and one third was allocated to fillets. The balance was allocated according to 
highest price—surimi exports to Japan, fillet exports to Europe, or U.S. fillet sales. Roe 
recovery rates were based on the 2007 season. During the A-season, roe recovery rates 
were modeled as 4.12% for the inshore sector and 4.93% for the at-sea sector. Roe 
recovery in the B-season was modeled as 0.60% for the inshore sector and 0.38% for the 
at-sea sector.
Price differences between sectors
To examine sector specific revenues within the comparative static simulations, it was 
necessary to differentiate product values between the at-sea and inshore sectors. 
Differences between surimi prices in the inshore and at-sea sectors can be substantial. 
Market reports suggest that average prices differ by 20%  to 33% in favor of at-sea 
product. Based on Hiatt et al. (2010), surimi produced at sea was assumed to enjoy a 23% 
price premium. Fillet prices were treated as equal between the sectors; while the inshore 
sector has greater flexibility in product forms, the at-sea sector produces a higher 
proportion of high-value deep-skin fillets.
Roe prices reported in Hiatt et al. (2010) do not represent actual transaction prices.
So, data from 1,752 actual transactions (from 2000 to 2006 and 2008) were used to model 
transaction price as a log-linear function of the year of the transaction, harvest sector (1 if 
at-sea, 0 for inshore), season (1 if B-season, 0 if A-season), and grade (1 for standard 
quality, 0 for lower grades):
ln (.oepBANR ) = + + Sat_sea + £ Season + Qstandard (2 11)
The transactions used to estimate the parameters of equation 11 represented 45% 
(82,914 mt) of the 181,242 mt of roe produced from 2000 to 2006 and in 2008. The data 
were compiled from BANR market reports over 2000-2006, and Seafood News reports in
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2008, and included a variety of factors that contributed to the determination of the 
different values of different characteristics of the roe. A weighted least squares approach 
was used to account for differences in the volumes of reported transactions. The log- 
linear functional form was used to represent percent changes in price associated with 
processing roe in the at-sea and inshore sectors. The model was tested with the at-sea 
transactions subdivided into mothership and CP sectors, with roe harvests in the 
mothership sector demonstrating a stronger effect (0.28 versus 0.22). The final model 
results indicate that the model performed reasonably well (R2 = 0.71), and that the 
expected additional value derived from harvesting pollock at-sea is 23.5%; this estimated 
price differential was applied to the roe prices used for the at-sea sector.
Comparative Static Simulation
Conditions reflective of 2007 were used as a basis for simulations and sensitivity 
analyses of revenue because it preceded the 2008-2010 recession and because the B- 
season inshore TAC was under-harvested due to a large TAC, low-surimi prices, high 
fuel prices, and catch-per-unit-effort declined near the end of the season. The simulations 
are structured around first wholesale revenues, rather than ex-vessel prices because ex­
vessel prices are not defined for CPs and because exvessel transaction data on the 
mothership sector is confidential due to the small number of firms. In addition, the 
available exvessel data fail to account for roe bonuses, end-of-year profit sharing 
bonuses, vertical integration between processors and the owned or leased catcher-vessels 
that deliver to them, and lease and profit sharing arrangements that have emerged under 
the AFA cooperative and CDQ structures.
Results
Allocation Equations
Coefficient estimates with corresponding p-values and summary statistics for individual 
equations (equations 1-9) in the market model are contained in Table 2.4. The estimated
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allocation of U.S. pollock fillets to the U.S. (equation 1) accounts for nearly all 
(R2 = 0.96) of the observed variation and the estimated coefficients on all explanatory 
variables included in the equation were statistically significant at a 1% level (p- 
value<0.01). The allocation of pollock fillets to the U.S. is inelastic to variations in prices 
in the U.S. and Europe: a 1% increase in U.S. price of U.S. pollock fillets leads to a 
0.48% increase in the allocation of U.S. pollock fillets to the U.S. while a 1% increase in 
the European price of U.S. pollock fillets leads to a 0.31% decrease in the allocation of 
U.S. pollock fillets to the U.S. Although the allocation of U.S. pollock fillets to the U.S. 
is affected by fluctuations in U.S. and European market prices, some U.S. buyers have 
long-term contracts and depend on pollock regardless of short-term fluctuations in price. 
Moreover, in interviews, U.S. pollock processors indicated that a majority of their fillet 
output is pre-sold and thus unresponsive to short term price fluctuations. Changes in the 
production of pollock fillets by the at-sea and inshore sectors have different effects on the 
allocation of pollock fillets to the U.S. A 1% increase in the production of pollock fillets 
in the at-sea sector leads to a 0.28% increase in the quantity of pollock fillets allocated to 
U.S. markets whereas a similar increase in inshore production only leads to a 0.16% 
increase in the amount of fillets allocated to the U.S., results that are likely due to higher 
fillet recovery rates in the at-sea sector that stem from fresher product. Additionally, the 
production responses for both sectors would be higher if lagged allocations had not also 
been included in the model.
The allocation of U.S. pollock fillets to Europe (equation 2.2) is explained by 
European and U.S. prices, U.S. production, and seasonal dummy variables. The included 
variables accounted for most (R2 = 0.81) of the observed variation in exports of U.S. 
pollock fillets to Europe. The allocation of pollock fillets to Europe is more sensitive to 
variations in prices in Europe and the U.S than is the allocation of U.S. pollock fillets to 
the U.S. (equation 2.1). A 1% increase in the European price of U.S. pollock fillets leads 
to a 1.32% increase in the allocation of U.S. pollock fillets to Europe, while a 1% 
increase in the U.S. price of U.S. pollock leads to 1.94% decrease in the allocation of 
U.S. pollock fillets to Europe. European demand for U.S. pollock fillets increased over
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the time fueled, in part, by appreciation of the euro against the U.S. dollar. In addition, 
because the European market for U.S. pollock fillets is more recent than the U.S. market, 
European buyers are less dependent on U.S. pollock. As was found in equation 1, the 
production response of at-sea and inshore sectors differed. A 1% increase in the 
production of pollock fillets in the inshore sector leads to a 0.34% increase in the quantity 
of pollock fillets allocated to European markets while a similar increase in at-sea sector 
production leads to a 0.64% increase in the quantity of pollock fillets allocated to 
European markets.
The allocation of U.S. pollock surimi to Japan (equation 2.3) depended on Japanese 
pollock surimi import prices, U.S. pollock surimi output, European pollock surimi 
imports, U.S. pollock fillet prices, and seasonal dummy variables. This equation 
accounted for a large portion (R2 = 0.82) of the observed variation in U.S. pollock 
allocations to Japan. The amount of pollock surimi exported to Japan was responsive to 
changes in U.S. pollock fillet prices; a 1% increase in the U.S. pollock fillet price led to a
1.92% decrease in the allocation of U.S. pollock surimi to Japan. This is unsurprising 
because the high quality U.S. pollock surimi desired in the Japanese market requires high 
quality pollock meat that would otherwise be used in fillet production. Changes in 
inshore and at-sea production of pollock surimi had similar effects on the allocation of 
U.S. pollock surimi to Japan. A 1% increase in production by the inshore sector resulted 
in a 0.29% increase in the allocation of U.S. pollock surimi to Japan while a similar 
increase in production by the at-sea sector resulted in a 0.26% increase in the allocation 
of U.S. pollock surimi to Japan. While this may be surprising, given that most of the 
highest grade surimi is produced in the at-sea sector, it should be recognized that three of 
four major shore-based processors, Alyeska, Unisea, and Westward, are subsidiaries of 
Japanese seafood conglomerates. Consequently the inshore sector can be expected to be 
particularly influential in determining Japanese imports. The price of U.S. surimi in the 
U.S. was omitted from this equation because the U.S. market does not appear to be 
influential in determining the allocation of U.S. surimi to Japan. The U.S. market 
generally receives intermediate grade surimi, while the Japanese market sources
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intermediate grade surimi from a variety of fisheries and mostly purchases only the 
highest grades of pollock surimi from the U.S. Furthermore, the U.S. market appears to 
act as a secondary market that is able to absorb surimi that would otherwise depress 
Japanese surimi prices. Consistent with this observation about the role of the U.S. market 
for surimi, tests of the model with and without the U.S. surimi as an explanatory variable 
concluded that U.S. surimi prices were not influential in determination of the allocation 
of surimi to Japan. The lagged Japanese real import price of other (not U.S. pollock) 
surimi increased by 1% at the mean, the allocation of Japanese imports of U.S. pollock 
surimi decreased by 0.64%, indicating a strong movement between the market buildup of 
surimi from other countries and the decreased willingness to pay for lower grade U.S. 
pollock surimi.
Equation 2.4, the allocation of U.S. pollock surimi to the U.S., also performed well 
(R2 = 0.88), particularly considering the data were constructed from time series of 
production and exports adjusted to reflect expert opinion about temporal relationships 
between production and distribution from cold-storage holdings. Of most importance was 
the lagged U.S. allocation of U.S. pollock surimi to the U.S., which led to a change of 
0.79% in the U.S. allocation of U.S. pollock surimi for every 1% change in the lagged 
quantity. Although the coefficient on at-sea production was not statistically significant in 
the equation, the coefficient on inshore production was statistically significant at a 1% 
level. The inshore sector, with most catches being processed 24 to 72 hours after harvest, 
produces a lower overall grade of surimi, and consequently, supplies more surimi to the 
U.S. market than the at-sea sector.
Demand Equations
The U.S. and European inverse demand equations for pollock fillets (equations 2.5 and 
2.6) performed well (R2 = 0.89 for equation 2.5 and R2 = 0.77 for equation 2.6). The 
influence of twice-frozen pollock fillets, lagged U.S. pollock fillet prices, U.S. pollock 
fillet allocations, and U.S. per capita income were all statistically significant at a 1% 
level. Changes in the lagged U.S. pollock fillet price had the greatest effect on current
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U.S. fillet prices; a 1% change in the lagged price leads to a 0.83% change in the current 
price. The European pollock fillet import price from Russia and China, the European 
fillet allocation, and the euro/U.S. dollar exchange rate were statistically significant at a 
10% level. Despite their low p-values, these variables were retained in the model because 
they contributed to performance of the overall equation system. German real disposable 
income was not statistically significant. The European pollock fillet import price from 
Russia and China is particularly influential on European pollock prices—a 1% change in 
the import price engenders a 1.44% change in European imports of U.S. pollock. With 
the European market initially turning to U.S. pollock fillets in the early 2000s in response 
to reduced Russian output, the market has become increasingly dependent on the U.S. 
supply. The high elasticity of U.S. prices to the price of Russian and Chinese imports 
suggests, however, that a large rise in Russian pollock catches and their subsequent price 
decrease would have a significant impact on U.S. pollock producers.
The Japanese import price of U.S. pollock roe (equation 2.7) also performed well 
(R2 = 0.76), with Japanese cold-storage holdings and Japanese imports of pollock roe 
from other countries both being statistically significant at a 1% level (p-value <0.01). 
Although interviews with industry members discounted the reliability of Japanese cold- 
storage holdings data, it appears that the monthly reported values reflect factors that 
influence purchasers’ perceptions. The model found that a 1% change in cold-storage 
holdings led to a 1.2% change in roe prices, which accords with industry reports (e.g., 
BANR) that have suggested that cold storage holdings are an important factor in the 
determination of roe auction prices. On the other hand, Japanese roe consumption 
statistics, which were considered important by industry members in determining the 
direction of the market, where not found to be statistically significant and did not provide 
theoretically consistent results. Changes in Japanese cold-storage holdings appear to 
reflect other underlying market influences not specifically modeled in the equation. For 
example, demand for pollock roe appears to be declining—more is being sold at grocery 
stores rather than specialty shops. Although similar quantities of pollock roe continue to 
be consumed, the premium ascribed to the product has declined along with prices.
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Equation 2.8, describing the Japanese import price of U.S. pollock surimi performed 
well (R2 = 0.80). Statistically significant variables included the Japanese allocation of 
U.S. surimi, the Japanese price of non-U.S. surimi, lag-three Japanese cold-storage 
holdings, and lag-two Japanese import price of U.S. surimi. The Japanese price for U.S. 
pollock surimi involves negotiations between the United States Surimi Commission and 
Japanese buyers that often extend over several months. Prices are often agreed to before 
fishing begins, thus the importance of including a two-month lag for Japanese import 
price and a three-month lag on Japanese cold-storage holdings. As was the case for the 
Japanese roe demand equation, Japanese consumption of surimi was dropped from this 
equation because it was not statistically significant and exhibited theoretically 
implausible behavior. Because Japanese cold storage holdings of pollock surimi are 
moderately collinear with Japanese surimi consumption, omission of the consumption 
statistics could confound estimates of the influence of cold-storage holdings but should 
not adversely affect estimates of Japanese demand for U.S. pollock surimi. An increase of 
1% in the Japanese price of non-U.S. surimi imports is estimated to lead to a 0.69% 
increase in the price of Japanese imports of U.S. pollock surimi, underscoring Japanese 
consumers’ decreased willingness to pay for high-quality/high-priced U.S. pollock 
surimi. The Japanese index of real disposable income, while not statistically significant 
(p-value = 0.50), consistently provided a negative impact on Japanese surimi prices 
during sensitivity analyses, consistent with the behavior of an inferior good. Surimi 
appears to be a substitute for higher priced seafoods and according to industry members, 
surimi demand increases during weak economic periods. This was the case in the latter 
half of 2008 at the onset of the global market crisis, when Japanese surimi prices 
increased.
The U.S. price of U.S. pollock surimi (equation 2.9) did not perform as well as the 
other eight equations (R2 = 0.56). This was likely due, in part, to the lack of specific data 
on domestic sales and inventories. Moreover, the U.S. surimi market is the least 
important of the five markets modeled, and as such, poor fit in this equation does not 
greatly influence overall fit of the equation system or adversely affect performance of
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other modeled relationships. Similar to the role of income in the Japanese pollock surimi 
demand equation, there is a negative coefficient associated with U.S. per capita 
disposable income, consistent with the expected behavior of an inferior good, except that 
in this case, the estimated coefficient is statistically significant. As described in equation
2.4, the U.S. market for surimi fluctuates widely, with surimi generally sold as a 
substitute for higher priced seafood products such as crab, lobster, and scallops. 
Consequently a 1% decrease in the U.S. per capita disposable income is associated with a 
2.49% increase in the price of U.S. pollock surimi. Halibut (Hippoglossus stenolepsis) 
was chosen as a substitute for other seafoods; a 1% increase in the price of halibut was 
found to lead to a 0.39% increase in the price of surimi.
Goodness o f Fit Statistics
The GOF statistics show that the model fits the data fairly well (Table 2.5). The lowest 
correlation between actual and estimated values of the dependent variables was 0.75 
(U.S. pollock surimi prices), while six of the correlation coefficients were 0.90 or greater. 
In addition, the correlation between actual and estimated total pollock revenue was 0.97. 
The coefficient of variation suggested a little more variability between equations, 
particularly in the allocation equations, varying from 3.7% in the U.S. pollock fillet price 
equation to 47.0% in the European fillet import equation. The Theil U1-statistics indicate 
that the model provides a reliable fit to the historical data, with statistics for individual 
equations ranging from a low of 0.03 in the U.S. pollock fillet price equation to a high of 
0.31 in the Europe fillet import equation. Although the GOF statistics show reduced 
reliability in equations 2, 3, and 4, the overall results were favorable. Overall U.S. 
pollock revenue from the five product markets was particularly successful, with a cv of 
14.2% and Theil’s U1 equal to 0.12, indicating that errors in the individual equations did 
not harm the overall predictive capability of the system of equations.
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Discussion
In 2007, 1.332 million metric tons (mmt) of pollock was harvested from the EBS. This 
catch had a first wholesale value of $1.170 billion and an average value per kg of $0.91. 
Model estimates of $1.189 billion in first wholesale value and an average value per kg of 
$0.93/kg do not differ significantly or appreciably from the observed values.3 Based on 
the estimated relationship, revenue from roe, fillets, and surimi would be maximized at a 
harvest level of 4.987 mmt (Figure 2.1). The BSAI pollock stock has never been and 
seems unlikely to ever be large enough to support a TAC larger than 1.5 mmt, thus it 
seems likely that the fishery will operate in an inelastic portion of the combined demand 
for surimi, fillets, and roe. In contrast, Herrmann et al. (1996) found that surimi revenue 
in the pre-AFA pollock fishery was maximized when harvests were 1.7 mmt. The 
difference could be from the shift in the pollock fishery’s focus since the passage of the 
AFA or a reflection of the importance of fillet and roe as components of the demand for 
pollock. Instead of maximizing revenue by maximizing catch, industry looks to produce 
the highest return per kilogram harvested. Consistent with Fell (2008), processors are 
now able to shift production into different products to respond to market demand. In 
addition, the ability to diversify over different products and new markets could explain 
why the fishery appears to be less vulnerable to year-to-year changes in the pollock TAC 
and resultant shifts in the supply of pollock available for allocation to various markets 
and product forms.
Pollock revenue also varies widely by sector. For example, at a TAC of 1.394 mmt 
(the 2007 TAC), under conditions such that all the TAC is harvested, inshore wholesale 
revenue is estimated to be $553.1 million dollars and at-sea sector wholesale revenue is 
estimated to be $740.5 million (Figure 2.2). Under those same conditions and with CDQ
3 The price ($/kg) excludes catches and production in 2007 associated with the mothership Ocean Phoenix, 
which produces headed &  gutted fish rather than surimi or fillets.
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ownership reflecting their 2008 shares in the inshore and at-sea sectors, CDQ entities 
would have received over $311.8 million—over 24% of the total first wholesale revenue 
generated in this fishery. Estimates of revenue per kilogram caught of $0.91 for the 
inshore sector and $1.04 for the at-sea sector indicate that the at-sea sector maintains a 
15% advantage in value per kg relative to the inshore sector4. While this indicates a 
differential value of $84.0 million over the 610,739 mt allocated to the inshore sector in 
2007, the differential is smaller than the $0.34/kg that at-sea vessels paid to lease CDQ 
shares in 2007. Since 2000, virtually the entire CDQ quota has been leased to the at-sea 
sector because that sector is willing to offer higher lease prices and other benefits to their 
CDQ partners, which is a consequence of the increased value that can be derived from 
harvesting and processing at-sea. Because the cost structures of the inshore and at-sea 
sectors are unknown the magnitude of differences in net revenues could be larger or 
smaller than the estimated differences in gross revenues. In addition, there may be 
important heterogeneities in costs and revenues among the vessels or firms that operate in 
the inshore and at-sea sectors. Despite this lack of direct information about the cost 
structure of the inshore and at-sea sectors, the 2007 season provides indirect information 
about absolute costs in the inshore sector and relative costs in the at-sea sector. In 2007, 
in face of unanticipated high fuel costs, the inshore sector left 10% of its B-season quota 
unharvested. The at-sea sector harvested its entire B-season quota as well as the entire 
CDQ quota. Since the model indicated the at-sea sector maintained a $0.10/kg advantage 
over the inshore sector but the CDQ quota cost of $0.34/kg, there are a few options, or a 
combination thereof, that explain why the at-sea sector continued to harvest their 
allocation. Moreover, industry experts suggest that the at-sea sector maintains a lower 
per-unit operating cost structure across the combination of harvesting and processing that 
allows them to continue harvesting pollock even though their increased $/kg does not 
cover the CDQ costs. It is also possible that the at-sea sector receives a larger price
4 This and all subsequent $/kg curves calculated for this paper assume all pollock is harvested, exclude 
Ocean Phoenix harvest and production, and include the value of all fillet, surimi, and roe produced.
225
differential than is estimated within this model or that the at-sea sector may benefit from 
efficiencies of scale by harvesting the CDQ pollock in addition to the at-sea sector 
allocation.
Under the AFA, the U.S. pollock fishery has grown in financial value and 
experienced unparalleled stability. Operating under the current cooperative structure, 
pollock processors have been able to rapidly expand into new markets, optimize first 
wholesale revenues across a mix of roe, fillets, and surimi, and maximize recovery rates 
among a suite of product forms. The elevated revenues and overall stability have allowed 
companies to weather poor economic conditions, including the conditions in the 2007 B- 
season that led to a 10% under-harvest of the inshore sector quota.
Despite the pollock fishery’s relative strong financial condition under the AFA, key 
challenges lie ahead. Russian pollock harvests have been trending upward since 2002 and 
can be expected to exert increased downward pressure on pollock prices. If the Russian 
pollock fishery wins Marine Stewardship Council certification as a sustainable fishery, 
the price premium and enhanced access to western European markets offered to U.S. 
pollock products may be reduced. A mere 10% decline in pollock prices would have 
caused a $130 million decline in gross revenue in 2007, decreases of $74 million to the at 
sea sector, $55 million to the inshore sector, and $31 million to the CDQs. Continuation 
of recent trends in Japanese consumer preferences appears likely to exert downward 
pressure on prices for high-grade surimi and roe. A combined downturn of 20% in surimi 
and roe prices would have wiped out nearly 10% of the total first wholesale revenue the 
pollock fishery derived from roe, fillets, and surimi in 2007.
Increases in the EBS TAC are estimated to have a relatively small impact on the 
projected revenue. Under 2007 conditions, over the range of past BSAI pollock TACs of 
0.813 mmt to 1.502 mmt, the estimated price changes from $0.988/kg to $0.913/kg, a 
difference that is likely to be offset, in part, by decreased variable costs as vessels take 
fewer trip or as companies stack their quota on fewer vessels. With the fishery operating 
in the inelastic portion of the demand curve, it makes economic sense to maximize catch. 
This inelasticity will also help to minimize the impact of increased Russian harvests.
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However, the inshore sector appears to be vulnerable to reductions in first wholesale 
prices and increases in fuel costs, especially during the B-season, where under conditions 
such as were present in 2007, first wholesale value declines from $0.814/kg to $0.785/kg. 
Such a drop in value could again lead the inshore sector to under-harvest a portion of 
their B-season catch share or to incur short-term loss in order to satisfy contracted 
deliveries.
With all the turmoil the U.S. pollock fishery has endured over its short 35-year 
history, the expected conditions seen in the future appear relatively benign. The fishery 
has endured far greater challenges than short-term potential losses to a single sector. The 
current management, governance, and market structures have played vital roles in the 
success of the BSAI pollock fishery. It remains to be seen, however, with rising fuel 
prices, ongoing restrictive Steller sea lion protection measures, and changes in the timing 
and location of fishing that will result from new regulatory requirements in 2011 to 
restrict Chinook salmon bycatch and impending measures to restrict non-Chinook salmon 
bycatch, if the inshore sector’s B-season quota will remain profitable. The AFA, despite 
all its positive impacts, does not provide the flexibility to adapt to these potential 
changes. With that the possibility of increased shares of the TAC left unharvested, 
amending the AFA to allow leasing pollock catch shares between sectors could be to the 
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Figure 2.1. Simulated 2007 BSAI pollock wholesale revenue curve.
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Figure 2.2. Simulated 2007 BSAI pollock wholesale sector revenue curve.
231
Table 2.1. Data sources, frequencies, and ranges




Total Value and Quantity 
Purchased per Household
Trade Statistics of Japan Monthly, 1999-2008
2 Roe Auction Prices Seattle Roe Auction Prices BANR Reports
Intermittent Spring and 
Fall 1999-2009
3
Japanese Surimi and Roe 
Cold Storage Holdings
Amount in Inventory Trade Statistics of Japan Monthly, 1992 - 2009
4
Roe, Fillet, and Surimi 
Production
Quantity Produced by 





Japanese Roe Import 
Quantity and Price
Average Price and Quantity 
of Imports from Russia, 
U.S., and Korea
Trade Statistics of Japan Monthly, 1999- 2008
6
Japanese Surimi Import 
Quantity and Price
Average Price and Quantity 
of Imports from all Countries
Trade Statistics of Japan Monthly, 2000-2008
7
U.S. Surimi Import and 
Export Quantity and Price
Average Price and Quantity 
for Individual and Total 
Countries
United States Internationa 
Trade Commission
l
Monthly, 1992 -  2009
8 U.S. Fillet Price 66lb block, $/kg Urner Barry Monthly, 1998-2008
9
U.S. Fillet Export and 
Import Quantity and Price
Average Price and Quantity 
for Individual and Total 
Countries





European Fillet and Surimi 
Import Quantity and Price
Average Price and Quantity 
of Imports from U.S., Russia, 
China, and Japan
Eurostat Monthly, 1999-2009
11 U.S. per capita Income Real Terms




Japanese index of real 
consumption Real Terms





German per capita 
Income
Real Terms Eurostat Monthly, 1999-2008




Intermediate Foods and 
Feeds
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics
Monthly, 1998-2008
16 Exchange Rates Dollar, Yen, and Euro




Table 2.2. Variable definitions and sources
Variable Definition Source
filletQ US Quantity of pollock fillets allocated to the U.S. 4, 9
fillet p US U.S. Urner Barry price of single frozen pollock fillet block 8
f i l le tp  ( u g)UŜ EU European import price of pollock fillets 10
filletQ SS Quantity of pollock fillets produced by the inshore sector 4
filletQ AS Quantity of pollock fillets produced by the at-sea sector 4
fillet p IM  ̂ U S Price of U.S. pollock fillet imports 9
filletQ US^  EU U.S. pollock fillets exports to Europe 9
surimiQ US ̂ J N Quantity of Japanese pollock surimi imports from the U.S 6
surimi p  ( J p  ¥) US ̂ JN Price of Japanese pollock surimi imported from the U.S. 6
surimiQ SS Quantity of pollock surimi produced in the inshore sector 4
surimiQ AS Quantity of pollock surimi produced in the at-sea sector 4
surimiQ US Quantity of U.S. pollock surimi allocated to the U.S. 4, 9
surimi pU S  
p t Price of U.S. surimi imports 7
IncUS Real U.S. per capita disposable personal income 11
filletp ( fU g)CR̂ EU Price of European pollock fillet imports from China and Russia 10
In c  ( E U €) ) Index of disposable income of Germany in Euros 13
E x f^ Europe-U.S. exchange rate-One Euro to U.S. dollars 16
E *U$ Japan-U.S. exchange rate-One U.S. dollar to Japanese Yen 16
roe p  ( jp ̂  ) US ̂ JN Japanese import price of U.S. pollock roe 5
roeQSS Quantity of pollock roe produced in the inshore sector 4
roeQAS Quantity of pollock roe produced in the at-sea sector 4
roe p  ( j p  ¥ )CR̂ JN Price of Japanese pollock roe imports from China and Russia 5
Inc tJN Japanese index of real consumption expenditures 12
roe s JN Japanese cold storage holdings of pollock roe 3
surimi s  JN Japanese cold storage holdings of pollock surimi 3
surimi p  ( j p  ¥ ) olher ̂ jN Japanese price of surimi imports other than U.S. pollock surimi 6
surim ip ( E U € ) S ^ EU Price of European pollock surimi imports from the U.S. 10
halibut pU S  
p t Price of halibut in the U.S. 14
roeQ US ̂ JN Quantity of Japan imports of pollock roe 5
p p i U U.S. producer price index for intermediate foods & feeds (base=1982) 15
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1. U.S. pollock fillet price in the U.S.
2. Europe import price of U.S. pollock fillets
3. U.S. import price of pollock fillets
4. Japan import price of U.S. pollock surimi
5. U.S. import price of surimi
6. Europe pollock fillet import price from China and Russia
7. Japan pollock roe import price from U.S.
8. Total quantity of roe produced
9. Japan pollock roe import price from China and Russia
10. Japanese surimi import price excluding U.S.
11. U.S. Urner Barry halibut price
12. Europe import prices of U.S. pollock surimi
13. 2008 producer price index for intermediate food & feeds
Table 2.3. Market clearing identities
f ille t P U S  _  f i l l e tP U S  *  200S p p j U S
J t t k t p ^ ^ E U  _  ( JiUe tP  (E U € )UŜ EU * E x ) * 2008p p j uS
f ille t p i M ^ U S  _  J i l l e t p I M ^ U S  *  2 0 0 8 p p i U S
surimi p U S ^ J N  _  (  surimi p  ( J p ¥ )U S ^ J N  /  E x )  *  2 0 0 8 p p i U S
s u r im ip U S    s u r im ip U S  *  2008P P I ^
f i i k t ^ P c r ^ e u  _  (  j u m  p  ( e u €  ) CR^ E U  *  E x € ^ $ )  *  2008p p i u s
■Pt U S J  _  ( roeP  (  J P ¥  ) s  J  /  E x Mf i %)  *  200aP P i U s
; _  total roe _  SS roe _  ASQ, _ Q, + Q,
'P t C R ^ J N  _  ( roeP  ( J P ¥ ) (CR^ J N  /  E x f ^ $ )  *  2 m P P i U s
s u r im iP o th e r ^ J N  _  (  surimip  ( J P ¥ ) ° t h e r ^ J N  /  e ^ ¥ ^ $  )  *  2 0 0 8 p p i U S
halibut P U S  _  halibut p US  *  2008P P I  US
surimi P U S  ̂ E U  _  (  surimi p  ( e u  €  ) S  ̂ E U  *  e ^  )  *  2 0 0 8 p p i U S
2008p p i U S  _  p p i U S  /  2008M e a n p p i U S
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Table 2.4. Coefficient estimates with corresponding p-values (in parentheses) and
summary statistics
Equation P n  0 P n \ P n 2 P n 3 P n 4
1 -3,334,730 (0.00) -91,632 (0.79) -359,214 (0.44) 633,345 (0.11) -67,905 (0.84)
2 4,579,960 (0.09) -552,692 (0.66) 2,747,550 (0.04) -2,150,530 (0.23) -6,363,480 (0.00)
3 18,244,300 (0.00) 231,429 (0.90) 981,453 (0.61) 9,281,380 (0.00) 2,529,950 (0.20)
4 -1,937,260 (0.00) -352,360 (0.54) -481,554 (0.62) 1,914,120 (0.02) 3,420,430 (0.00)
5 -1.285 (0.01) -0.018 (0.78) 0.104 (0.14) 0.084 (0.28) 0.014 (0.83)
6 -3.123 (0.00) 0.047 (0.70) 0.091 (0.51) 0.210 (0.18) -0.141 (0.26)
7 6.968 (0.77) 1.373 (0.55) 4.923 (0.31) 9.153 (0.02) 7.760 (0.00)
8 2.437 (0.18) -0.462 (0.02) -0.378 (0.04) 0.425 (0.05) 0.361 (0.16)
9 4.960 (0.03) 0.075 (0.81) -0.0024 (0.99) 0.183 (0.58) 0.680 (0.05)
Equation P n 5 P n  6 Pn7 P n 8 P  n 9
1 -909,894 (0.00) -44,909 (0.90) -57,792 (0.91) 367,504 (0.47) -259,613 (0.57)
2 -738,716 (0.55) -159,983 (0.90) 4,595,410 (0.00) -1,482,110 (0.46) -2,630,240 (0.19)
3 -4,356,780 (0.01) 1,284,130 (0.45) 1,642,130 (0.35) 5,109,160 (0.00) 4,865,250 (0.01)
4 -122,711 (0.83) -715,066 (0.19) 375,974 (0.64) 1,016,020 (0.27) 1,653,210 (0.05)
5 -0.035 (0.59) -0.012 (0.85) 0.099 (0.18) 0.275 (0.00) 0.197 (0.03)
6 -0.173 (0.16) -0.171 (0.17) 0.122 (0.43) 0.199 (0.25) 0.306 (0.07)
7 8.185 (0.00) 8.562 (0.00) 8.771 (0.00) 8.022 (0.00) 9.112 (0.00)
8 -0.209 (0.20) -0.229 (0.19) -0.259 (0.14) -0.032 (0.85) 0.226 (0.32)
9 -0.295 (0.36) 0.233 (0.45) 0.233 (0.45) 0.183 (0.57) 0.294 (0.41)
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Table 2.4 (cont.). Coefficient estimates with corresponding p-values (in parentheses) and
summary statistics
Equation P n10 P n 1 1 P  n12 P n13 P  n14 P n15
1 -63,099 (0.87) -323,840 (0.33) 677,624 (0.01) -494,360 (0.01) 0.158 (0.00) 0.233 (0.00)
2 -3,279,900(0.06) -2,040,040(0.13) 2,272,130 (0.00) -2,971,050(0.00) 0.372 (0.01) 0.563 (0.00)
3 5,397,310 (0.01) 406,270 (0.83) 479,587 (0.70) 0.375 (0.00) 0.319 (0.02) -4,914,180(0.06)
4 1,359,520 (0.03) 755,711 (0.17) 87,489 (0.63) 0.199 (0.00) 0.034 (0.53) 0.783 (0.00)
5 0.144 (0.06) 0.033 (0.62) -2.5 x 10'8(0.00) 0.203 (0.00) 0.827 (0.00) 4.6 x 10'5 (0.00)
6 0.195 (0.17) 0.114 (0.36) -2.0 x10-8 (0.07) 1.608 (0.00) 7.7x10"5(0.65) 1.065 (0.00)
7 5.996 (0.00) 5.617 (0.00) -6.0 x 10"7(0.17) 0.686 (0.00) 0.154 (0.52) 9.1 x 10'7 (0.00)
8 0.459 (0.10) 0.172 (0.38) -4.8 x10-8 (0.02) 0.663 (0.00) 0.444 (0.00) -0.012 (0.50)
9 -0.105 (0.77) 0.179 (0.57) -2.6 x10-8 (0.52) 0.183 (0.12) 0.270 (0.00) 0.382 (0.00)
Equation P n 1 6 P n H P  n18 P n 19 df R2
1 856,770 (0.00) 0.617 (0.00) 90 0.96
2 92 0.81
3 92 0.82
4 -883,162 (0.46) 783,296 (0.50) 90 0.88
5 92 0.89
6 92 0.77
7 -12.90 (0.00) 91 0.76
8 -2.3 x10-8 (0.00) 91 0.80
9 -2.0 x10-4 (0.01) 0.330 (0.00) 0.501 (0.44) -0.059 (0.93) 88 0.56
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Table 2.5. Goodness of fit statistics. CV is the coefficient of variation, r is the correlation 
between the estimated and predicted values of the dependent variables, and U1 is the 
Theil inequality coefficient.
Equation Variable CV r U1
2.1 U.S. fillet allocation 13.0% 0.98 0.10
2.2 European fillet allocation 47.0% 0.90 0.31
2.3 Japanese surimi allocation 32.3% 0.90 0.24
2.4 U.S. surimi allocation 34.6% 0.94 0.24
2.5 U.S. fillet demand 3.7% 0.94 0.03
2.6 EU fillet demand 8.0% 0.88 0.07
2.7 Japanese roe demand 23.2% 0.87 0.20
2.8 Japanese surimi demand 11.2% 0.90 0.10
2.9 U.S. surimi demand 26.2% 0.75 0.22
2.10 Total revenue 14.2% 0.97 0.12
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General Conclusion
Although the walleye pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) fishery has prospered under 
the AFA, there are a variety of factors that may affect its viability in coming years. 
Pressure on revenues, stemming from declining Japanese demand for roe and high- 
quality surimi, could reduce overall revenue and increase fillet production and increase 
the supply of fillets and surimi to markets in the U.S. and Europe. Rising Russian pollock 
harvests, coupled with possible MSC certification, will continue to put pressure on 
pollock values. Management measures, such as those intended to reduce salmon bycatch 
and to minimize impacts on Steller sea lions (Eumetopias jubatus), which cause fishing 
vessels and catcher processors to travel greater distances from port, increasing operating 
costs per ton harvested. When coupled with rising fuel prices, it is increasingly likely that 
portions of the inshore B-season allocation will be left unfished. The inshore sector, 
which already experiences lower per-pound revenues than the at-sea sector, is also more 
adversely affected by regulatory actions or changes in the spatial distribution of pollock 
biomass that force vessels to travel greater distances from port.
Rather than permitting structural impediments to result in under-harvests prohibitions 
on leasing or transfers between sectors could be amended. However, because the NPFMC 
lacks authority to amend the AFA, any change would require Congressional action. 
Allowing leasing between sectors could provide increased revenues for inshore and at-sea 
sectors as well as consumers who would benefit from increased supplies of surimi and 
fillets.
In addition, because CDQ entities are invested in the inshore and at-sea sectors, 
amendment of the AFA to allow intersectoral transfers and thereby increase the 
likelihood that the full TAC will be harvested thereby increasing the likelihood that the 
CDQ entities will fully benefit from their ownership shares in the inshore and at-sea 
sectors. CDQ entities rely heavily on royalty payments from leasing their pollock 
allocation and revenue obtained from their investments on the pollock fishery to offset
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the cost of subsidizing community-based salmon (Oncorhynchus spp.) and halibut 
(Hippoglossus stenolepis), fisheries and their investments and contributions to 
infrastructure and community development. Allowing intersectoral transfers is unlikely to 
affect the size of CDQ royalties, but the expected value of their capital investments could 
be significantly increased.
